Seeking Safety in Numbers

By William E. Smith

Arafat seems to say no to Hussein--and to Reagan

"This is a unique moment, which I must be seized before it is lost." Those were the words of State Department Spokesman John Hughes last week, as he called again upon Israel and the Arab states to join in peace negotiations proposed by President Reagan last September to settle the destiny of 1.3 million Palestinians who live in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. King Hussein of Jordan had indicated his willingness to consider joining the peace process, but only if he had the backing of the Palestine Liberation Organization. After four meetings in the Jordanian capital of Amman, Hussein and P.L.O. Chairman Yasser Arafat seemed for a time to be on the verge of an agreement. By the end of the week, however, it was clear that they were not. Arafat headed for South Yemen, leaving to two aides the task of telling Hussein that the P.L.O. was not yet ready to adopt a joint negotiating position with the Jordanians. That was bad news for the Reagan initiative and for the cause of peace in the Middle East.

Arafat had appeared to understand the urgency of the situation as well as Hussein did. Israel is engaged in a crash program of building Jewish settlements in the West Bank, whose population at the moment is 96% Arab. By 1987, if not sooner, however, the government of Prime Minister Menachem Begin expects to increase the Jewish population of the territory from 35,000 to 100,000, making the Israeli colonization essentially irreversible.

At the beginning of his latest talks with Hussein, Arafat described the political difficulties he faces, not only from P.L.O. hard-liners but from a number of Arab states as well. Hussein then asked Arafat if he would endorse Jordanian participation in U.S.-sponsored peace negotiations, whose aim would be to establish a future relationship between Jordan, the West Bank and Gaza. Arafat replied that he could not give the King a mandate to speak for the Palestinians. Arafat reportedly also put aside the idea of authorizing certain Palestinians who are not members of the P.L.O. to participate in future negotiations. When Hussein proposed that a joint PL.O.-Jordanian team should join negotiations over the Reagan plan, Arafat complained that the U.S. initiative was weak because it did not give sufficient support to the rights of the Palestinians. Quoting an old Arabic saying, an Arafat aide grumbled, "Hussein is trying to sell us the fish in the sea."

As he had done on previous occasions, Hussein tried to persuade Arafat to grant some kind of recognition to Israel, on the gamble that the U.S. would then meet two key Palestinian demands: recognition of the P.L.O. and acceptance of Palestinian self-determination as a basis for negotiation. Arafat, in reply, proposed that the P.L.O. and Jordan agree to a set of negotiating principles, which would then be presented to an Arab summit meeting for ratification. Explained an aide: "Arafat does not want to make a move without a lot of people moving with him." Referring to Egypt's isolation from the rest of the Arab world after Anwar Sadat signed the peace treaty with Israel, he added: "The lesson of Sadat is that there is safety in numbers." That was fine with Hussein, but first he wanted to work out the details of the agreement with Arafat. One of the P.L.O. leader's colleagues remarked that, as always, "Hussein wants specificity, and Arafat wants ambiguity."

So far, so good. But after four sessions Arafat abruptly asked for an adjournment and left for Kuwait. Unperturbed, Jordanian officials announced that the talks would be "completed" when Arafat returned later in the week. But the P.L.O. leader did not come back. For the moment at least, he seemed unable to make a move that might alienate hard-liners within his organization and possibly provoke a split. That appeared to leave Hussein with the toughest decision of all: whether to take the bold and dangerous step of joining the peace process on his own.

For the Reagan Administration, the apparent failure of the Hussein-Arafat talks was a big disappointment. U.S. officials were also upset about reports that the Israeli government had embarked on a policy of encouraging American Jews to buy land in the West Bank. Reacting with anger, the State Department repeated Reagan's call of last September for a freeze in settlement building in the West Bank. Then, for the first time, Spokesman Hughes hinted publicly that the U.S. might apply sanctions against Israel to halt the spread of settlements if Hussein joined the peace talks. Said Hughes: "We are determined to do our best to assure that the results of those negotiations are not prejudiced from the outset by activities of any party that reduce the prospects of a negotiated peace."

King Hussein had told the U.S. several months ago that he would not enter the peace process until Israeli forces withdrew from Lebanon. Negotiations between the Israelis and the Lebanese have been going slowly, although there were signs of progress last week. A number of security matters remain unresolved, including the future role of Major Saad Haddad, a renegade Lebanese army officer who is Israel's best friend in Lebanon. But negotiations are moving so quickly that the two sides have scheduled four meetings for this week instead of the usual two. Israeli officials declared after the 27th round of talks that they were hopeful of an agreement in the "near future," perhaps by the end of the month. By then, however, it may be too late to persuade Arafat to support Hussein in giving negotiations with Israel and the U.S. a chance.

-- By William E. Smith. Reported by Harry Kelly/Jerusalem and Roberto Suro/Amman

With reporting by Harry Kelly, Roberto Suro This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.