Archive: Reagan for the Defense

By WALTER ISAACSON

The crusade he has embarked upon requires that he balance two competing messages: the U.S. must resolutely rearm to counter the Soviet threat, but it must project its peaceful intent along with its military might. Congress must be convinced that his $274 billion defense budget for fiscal 1984 ought not to be gutted. The nuclear freeze movement at home and abroad has to be countered so that the U.S. can upgrade its strategic forces and proceed with deployment of NATO missiles. And the Soviet Union needs to be persuaded that the West will not shrink from nuclear competition if its proposals for arms reductions are spurned. In a television address last week, Ronald Reagan confronted this complicated balancing act by graphically depicting what he claims is Moscow's "margin of superiority" while broaching a surprising and controversial idea for preventing nuclear war.

Reagan refused to retreat an inch in defending what is now proposed to be a $2 trillion, five-year military spending plan. Speaking just 33 minutes after the House voted to cut by more than half his proposed 10% increase in next year's Pentagon budget, the President sharply assailed the arguments of his critics as "nothing more than noise based on ignorance." Said he: "They're the same kind of talk that led the democracies to neglect their defenses in the 1930s and invited the tragedy of World War II." In order to emphasize the offensive threat posed by the Soviet Union, Reagan declassified spy-plane photographs showing Soviet activity in the Caribbean area. His charts showed the five new classes of Soviet ICBMS that have been produced since the U.S. Minuteman was deployed. He compared Moscow's missiles aimed at Europe with the lack of any NATO missiles aimed at the Soviets. And he pointed to a daunting Soviet lead in conventional weapons.

Then, in concluding his down-to-earth defense of his budget, Reagan launched the debate over U.S. military spending into an entirely different orbit. "Let me share with you a vision of the future which offers hope," he began. The President went on to suggest that America forsake the three-decade-old doctrine of deterring nuclear war through the threat of retaliation and instead pursue a defensive strategy based on space-age weaponry designed to "intercept and destroy" incoming enemy missiles. "I call upon the scientific community in our country, those who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their great talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace: to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete."

Reagan's video-game vision of satellites and other weapons that might some day zap enemy missiles with lasers or particle beams and the drama surrounding his unexpected announcement were partly a political ploy to change the context of the debate over defense spending. But if his space-age plan proceeds, or even if the suggestion of a shift in strategy is taken seriously, the implications are staggering. Indeed, as Reagan said, "we are launching an effort which holds the promise of changing the course of human history." Not since 1972, when the antiballistic missile (ABM) treaty was signed as part of the SALT I accords, has the U.S. or U.S.S.R. actively taken steps to set up a defense against nuclear attack.

Embarking on an effort to build shields rather than swords was a characteristic Reagan gesture--a clear and simple assertion from his gut challenging the accepted wisdom that defensive systems are "destabilizing." His notion that missiles could be knocked out in space had a wistful though dangerous appeal; it suggested that the nation could be defended without earthly sacrifice and bloodshed.

As with many of the President's uncomplicated-sounding proposals, the idea of space-age missile defenses masks a swarm of complexities. It raises the specter of an arms race in space, which ultimately could be more expensive and dangerous than the one taking place on earth. In a prompt and strong reaction, Soviet Leader Yuri Andropov personally warned: "Should this conception be converted into reality, this would actually open the flood gates of a runaway race of all types of strategic arms, both offensive and defensive." Even more ominous, the development of a missile defense system could undermine the very foundation of strategic stability, namely, the concept of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), which has often been modified, but never abandoned. Under this concept each side is deterred from using its weapons by the fear of cataclysmic retaliation (see following story).

The recognition that defensive systems could upset the nuclear balance was the propelling force behind the 1972 ABM treaty, the only arms-control pact that binds the two superpowers. It declares: "Each party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are seabased, air-based, space-based, or mobile-land-based." The Administration says that merely undertaking research into such a project does not violate the treaty. Indeed, the Soviets have been spending perhaps as much as five times the U.S. amount on laser technologies and weapons, although they apparently have not developed such devices for knocking out missiles. Over the past decade, the U.S. has tested lasers against relatively slow-flying drones and antitank missiles. The results were mixed, but good enough to show the concept's potential.

Two retired military intelligence officers, Air Force Major General George Keegan and Army Lieut. General Daniel Graham, have been leading advocates of space weaponry. Graham headed a project, called the High Frontier, which was funded by the Heritage Foundation, a Washington think tank. It reported that technology currently exists to orbit more than 400 "killer satellites" that could knock out Soviet missiles. There were other supporters of the idea, most notably Edward Teller, the hawkish physicist known as "the father of the hydrogen bomb."

Reagan first discussed the question of missile-killing technology with his science adviser, Physicist George Keyworth II, in a conversation two years ago. Keyworth, an admirer of Teller's who helped develop an earlier ABM system, appointed a task force that included Teller, Consultant Edward Frieman and former Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard. Early this year they informed Reagan that the idea seemed technically feasible, and it was brought up at a Feb. 11 White House meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Reagan said nothing for the next three weeks, then popped the idea at a morning briefing. He told National Security Adviser William Clark to have the Pentagon and State Department formally consider the project. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was left out of the consultation due to the turmoil there resulting from the still unsettled controversy over the nomination of Kenneth Adelman to head the agency.

Reagan felt the need to include a positive element in his speech last week to show that his Administration had a broader vision than simply confronting security problems with greenbacks. So he decided to announce his space-age plan with some public fanfare, rather than simply order that it be studied quietly.* Clark warned Reagan on the day of the speech that he could expect criticism, even from within his Administration, for precipitately suggesting such a radical change in strategy. "It won't be the first time," the President replied. "It doesn't bother me."

In order to preserve an element of surprise in its announcement, the White House restricted discussions of the ABM plan to top officials on what is called a "close held" basis. Most congressional leaders were kept in the dark until the afternoon of the speech. So were most of those on the the political and policy staffs in the West Wing. The paragraphs in Reagan's speech on new defensive technologies were drafted separately and then blended into the speech by the President. The overriding factor in the timing and handling of the issue--one that discomfited a few senior aides--seemed to be the desire for intensive political impact rather than a careful consideration of the subject. The most important ramifications that the Administration has yet to address fully may be geopolitical rather than technological. What course will the Soviets take in response? Moscow, which has a lead in many applications of laser technology, seems unlikely to refrain from exploiting it. If both nations follow parallel roads into space, a new balance of forces could emerge. The President hopes that an emphasis on defensive weapons could be linked to a negotiated reduction in offensive missiles. But the Administration has not even begun to work out the possible contingencies involved in a Soviet-American military space race. If either side nears the point of deploying an ABM system first, the strategic situation could become dangerously destabilized, especially if offensive weapons have not yet been reduced.

What has been dubbed at the White House the "star wars add-on" actually tended to obscure the real substance of Reagan's speech, which was part of a series designed to rally support for his defense budget. In what staffers jokingly call the "Darth Vader" speech, Reagan told evangelical Christians meeting in Orlando, Fla., in early March that the Soviet empire was "the focus of evil in the modern world." This Thursday, the President will outline the U.S. position on European-based missiles in an address in Los Angeles and next week will make another speech on the need for the MX missile. In addition to presidential speeches, the Administration has been conducting classified briefings for Congressmen in the White House theater on the Soviet military threat.

Even with this concerted public relations offensive, the Administration will have serious trouble salvaging what it considers to be an acceptable defense budget in Congress. House Democrats last week passed their own version of a budget for fiscal 1984, which begins in October. Depending on how inflation is calculated, the Democratic plan raises defense spending by about 2% to 4%, compared with the more than 10% after-inflation boost that Reagan wants.

The Democratic leadership used various parliamentary maneuvers to ensure that the budget plan it had worked out would be considered as a whole; the only amendment they would permit was a substitute of Reagan's proposed tax and spending package. But no Republican was willing to introduce the Reagan version of the budget on the floor for fear of being politically tainted by its large deficit ($188.8 billion) and whopping increases in defense. The G.O.P. members preferred instead to let the Democratic proposal, which calls for tax hikes of $30 billion and deficits of $174.5 billion, be the focus of debate. Reagan personally lobbied against the budget alternative, mostly with Democratic freshmen. He told Ronald Coleman of Texas that the Democratic plan was "way out of line." Army Secretary John Marsh also called Coleman, subtly reminding the Congressman that Fort Bliss was in his district. Coleman stuck with his party. "Even though I'm a freshman, I think there's enough of us not to let anything happen to Fort Bliss," he said. The 26 seats won by the Democrats last fall tipped the balance: on what was close to a party-line vote, the Democrats budget passed, 229 to 196.

The Democratic budget plan will not pass the Republican-controlled Senate, of course. But the President will have trouble prevailing there too. On defense spending, Republican leaders in the upper chamber are closer to the Democrats in the House than their leader in the White House. They have publicly urged that the growth in the Pentagon budget be cut to about 5%. The more pragmatic members of the President's staff, led by James Baker, are hoping for a compromise at about 7%. For them to persuade the President to come down to that level may be as difficult as getting Republican Senators to come up to it.

Underlying Reagan's speech last week was his unwavering contention that questions about the proper level of military spending should be divorced from the nation's overall budgetary and fiscal situation. The determining factor, Reagan insisted, should be the level of threat posed by the Soviets. "Our defense establishment must be evaluated to see what is necessary to protect against any or all of the potential threats," he said. "The cost of achieving these ends is totaled up and the result is the budget for national defense."

Reagan somberly detailed the overwhelming nature of these threats as he sees them. Using red and blue charts marked with the Soviet sickle and the American flag (which inexplicably contained 56 stars), he compared the production of armaments since 1974: 3,050 tactical warplanes for the U.S. vs. 6,100 for the Soviets, 27 U.S. attack submarines vs. 61 Soviet ones, 11,200 U.S. tanks and armored fighting vehicles vs. 54,000 for the U.S.S.R. He also displayed a graph of the unilateral increase in Soviet intermediate-range missiles aimed at Europe, noting the pledges made by Kremlin leaders at each point in their buildup. Critics claimed he did not make clear how the comparisons compelled precisely the spending increase that Reagan proposed, rather than one twice as big or one half the size, since the President was essentially contending the military budget should have nothing to do with the nation's ability to afford the spending.

The question of using spy-plane photographs to bolster Reagan's charges of Soviet involvement in Latin America was debated within the intelligence community. Reagan felt that if the public could see what he sees, it would be more willing to rally around his policies. So, less than two weeks after he signed an Executive Order clamping down on leaks of classified material, he ordered three reconnaissance-plane photographs declassified. He did, however, accede to intelligence agency arguments that the release of additional satellite photographs would reveal too much about U.S. techniques.

Reagan's display of the photographs was not done in a sensational manner, and the evidence revealed in two cases was hardly more than what tourists could have gathered on the ground. Comandante Tomas Borge, a leader in Nicaragua's Sandinista directorate, scoffed at the idea that the Mi-8 Soviet helicopters Reagan pointed out on an airfield at Managua were threats to American security. They are familiar sights at Managua's airport. One was used to transport Pope John Paul II during his visit there in March. Borge told TIME: "You can see them without climbing into a satellite."

The photographs did, however, illustrate an important point that Reagan made: the Soviets are "spreading their military influence" to America's backyard, and doing so in a way that indicates that their aims are far from merely defensive. Pointing to a new 10,000-foot runway on the tiny Soviet-aligned Caribbean island of Grenada (pop. 110,000), Reagan noted: "Grenada doesn't even have an air force. Who is it intended for? The Caribbean is a very important passageway for our international commerce and military lines of communications. The rapid buildup of Grenada's military potential is unrelated to any conceivable threat to this island country." Two photographs of Cuba reveal a communications facility staffed by 1,500 Soviet technicians, which the President said is the largest of its kind in the world, and an airfield from which two modern Soviet antisubmarine planes are operating. "During the past two years, the level of Soviet arms exports to Cuba can only be compared to the levels reached during the Cuban missile crisis 20 years ago," Reagan said.*

Reagan's figures are technically accurate, and the Soviet buildup has indeed been formidable, but there is still ample room for dispute over what the numbers mean. Daniel Inouye, in the official Democratic response, argued that it is wrong to think that the Soviets enjoy a strategic superiority, as Reagan asserted. Said the Hawaii Senator: "Reagan left the impression that the U.S. is at the mercy of the Soviet Union. Most respectfully, Mr. President, you know that is not true. You have failed to present an honest picture." Inouye said that Reagan failed to point out that the Soviet Union's advantage in land-based missiles is "more than offset" by American warheads on submarines and bombers; the total nuclear warhead arsenal of the U.S. is 9,268, compared with 7,339 for the Soviets. (These numbers, from a Democratic Party study, differ somewhat from the most recent Pentagon reports, which say the U.S. has about 9,000 warheads and the U.S.S.R. has about 8,500.)

Some skeptics charged that the speech was part of an increasing Pentagon propensity toward "threat inflation." Explained Congressman Les Aspin of Wisconsin: "We are seeing a more exaggerated and disingenuous presentation of the Soviet threat than we have seen in the past." As an example of how this works, critics point to Defense Department hype two years ago for the new Soviet T-80 tank. It was depicted in briefings and a Pentagon publication as fast, heavily armored and bristling with grenade and missile launchers. That was when the Administration was anxious to secure funding for America's new M1 tank. A recent photograph released by the Pentagon in its latest assessment of Soviet strength shows that the T-80 is actually only a slight modification of its predecessor, the T72, with similar shape, armor and capability.

Reactions to Reagan's defense of his military spending plans were dwarfed by the debate over his vision of satellite missile killers. "To inject and hurl out this new idea while the whole world is waiting for the U.S. to come up with a reasonable arms control proposal I find bizarre," said Democratic Senator Christopher Dodd of Connecticut. "Can you imagine the reaction here and abroad if Yuri Andropov had made this speech?" Others were appalled at the enormous potential costs of a space race. Said Republican Senator Mark Hatfield of Oregon: "It is a call to siphon off the meager and inadequate commitment which now exists to rebuild America." A few Senators, including Republicans Pete Domenici of New Mexico and Malcolm Wallop of Wyoming, have long been urging such a project. The reaction from most others was guarded curiosity. "It's worth putting out and debating," said Senator William Cohen, a Republican from Maine.

The White House reported an outpouring of supportive calls and telegrams after the speech (80% out of 2,800 in favor). Said Senior Adviser Michael Deaver: "He has had the most favorable response to any speech since he was elected President." But editorial reaction from around the country was more skeptical. The Atlanta Constitution, which labeled Reagan's characterization of the Soviet threat as "huckstering misimpressions," said that by "raising the remote possibility of a sci-fi defense against Soviet missiles, he risked destabilizing the U.S.-Soviet military balance--already dangerously tenuous." The Chicago Sun Times called the speech "an appalling disservice." Said the Detroit Free Press: "Reagan's vision of a 21st century in which the U.S. will be hermetically sealed against all nuclear attack provides no answer to the problem of how our national security is to best be addressed now and in the next couple of decades."

There was some feeling, however, that Reagan's challenge to a system of deterrence that is based on the threat of mutual destruction could be a welcome element in the debate over nuclear policy. "Reagan now suggests that we slowly start investigating whether in the next century technology may offer a solution to our security that does not rest on the prospect of mass and mutual death," noted the Washington Post. "It is the product of Ronald Reagan's peculiar knack for asking an obvious question, one that has moral as well as political dimensions and one that the experts had assumed had been answered, or found unanswerable, or found not worth asking, long ago."

Moscow's response was far less generous. For the second time since coming to power, Andropov chose to respond personally to a U.S. initiative through an interview with Pravda. He began by conceding that part of what Reagan said was correct: "True, the Soviet Union did strengthen its defense capability. Faced with feverish U.S. efforts to establish military bases near Soviet territory, to develop ever new types of nuclear and other weapons, the U.S.S.R. was compelled to do so." But then he struck back, saying of his American counterpart: "He tells a deliberate lie asserting that the Soviet Union does not observe its own moratorium on the deployment of medium-range missiles [in Europe]." When he addressed Reagan's idea of space-age defensive ABMs, Andropov became heated. "It is a bid to disarm the Soviet Union in the face of the U.S. nuclear threat," he said. The relation between offensive and defensive weapons cannot be severed, he argued. "It is time Washington stopped devising one option after another in search of the best ways of unleashing nuclear war in the hope of winning it. Engaging in this is not just irresponsible, it is insane."

Reagan invited a group of 52 scientists and national security experts to the White House Wednesday night to view his speech and be briefed by top officials. Some of those who attended, such as Teller and David Packard, a co-founder of the Hewlett-Packard Co., were longtime advocates of ABM research. Said Packard: "Technology has moved ahead to the point where we could design a ballistic missile defense system which could be fully effective. If both sides had a defensive system, it would be stabilizing."

But other scientists who were at the White House briefing, including Victor Weisskopf of M.I.T., Hans Bethe of Cornell and Simon Ramo of TRW Inc., are troubled by the plan. "I don't think it can be done," says Bethe, a Nobel laureate in physics. "What is worse, it will produce a star war if successful." Ramo, one of the developers of the ballistic missile, likes the idea in theory but says, "We don't know how to do it." He also worries about the awesome offensive power that would be inherent in what are conceived of as defensive weapons. Asks Ramo: "Who says that this technique will be used only to knock out missiles in the sky? If it's such a good technique, why not use it to knock out things on the ground?"

Scientists also believe that any satellite antimissile system could lead to more emphasis on low-flying missiles, like the cruise, that would not be vulnerable to space defenses. The satellites could also be vulnerable. "Many potential counters, such as decoys or space mines, have the power to neutralize space-based systems," says Stanford University Physicist and Arms Control Expert Sidney Drell. His colleague Arthur Schawlow, who won the Nobel Prize for his work on developing the laser, agrees: "A laser battle station out in space would be a sitting duck."

The fact that new weapons could probably evade or destroy satellite defense systems makes the technology Reagan envisions incalculably expensive. "The offense can add dimensions to thwart or neutralize the defense for far less money than the cost of defensive systems," says Ramo. "Hence it's economically unsound." Jeremy Stone, director of the Federation of American Scientists, agrees. "The cost is unlimited," he says, "because what we try to do in defending the country, the Russians will attempt to negate by penetrating the system."

Even if such a system could survive, points out another Stanford physicist, Wolfgang Panofsky, it is "infeasible" to design a defense that will intercept all missiles. "It is possible to develop a system that can shoot down one missile, but that is a long cry from developing a system that does not leak," he says. Such shortcomings in a nuclear defense system clearly would be disastrous. Even if a system were 90% effective, the leakage of just a fraction of Moscow's 8,500 or so warheads could be devastating. Says Kosta Tsipis, co-director of a program in science and technology at M.I.T.: "The critical failure of all these defensive systems is that they must be perfect. Less than that and they are ruinous. What the President is offering is a cruel hoax."

Carl Sagan, the Cornell University astronomer and author, and Richard Garwin, a military expert at IBM's Watson Research Center, have prepared a petition of leading scientists opposing space weaponry. Sagan, who listened to Reagan's speech from a Syracuse hospital where he was recovering from an appendectomy, was so agitated that he pressed to have the manifesto completed for release this week. It concludes: "If space weapons are ever to be banned, this may be close to the last moment in which it can be done."

West European political leaders and defense experts were taken aback by Reagan's out-of-the-blue suggestion that the entire deterrent doctrine be reassessed. One main worry: such a strategic shift might "decouple" America's defense of itself from that of its NATO allies. "I fear this will be an issue that could become extremely divisive between the Europeans and the U.S. because it is tending toward Fortress America," said British Colonel Jonathan Alford of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. "The proposal intends to put a bubble over the U.S., and that would be followed by a bubble over the Soviet Union. If we can't threaten to strike the Soviet Union, we Europeans are going to be out in the cold." While the London Standard headlined its worry over REAGAN'S RAY-GUNS, the Times engaged in soberer hyperbole, calling the initiative "one of the most fundamental switches in American policy since the second World War."

In Bonn, the disarmament spokesman in the opposition Social Democratic Party, Egon Bahr, said Reagan "has broken a taboo, and the new perspective could be fruitful." But Manfred Worner, Defense Minister in the conservative government, called the plan "a program for the next century, not one to tackle the defense problems of tomorrow."

For Western Europe, visions of 21st century satellite weapons could scarcely divert attention from an immediate defense concern, the 572 American Pershing II and cruise missiles that NATO plans to begin deploying this year if no agreement is reached with the Soviets on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF). For this reason, allied officials are less interested in the speech Reagan gave last week than in the one he is scheduled to deliver Thursday in Los Angeles spelling out the U.S. INF negotiating stance.

So far the U.S. has stood pat on Reagan's zero option, which proposes that NATO forgo its planned deployment if the Soviets dismantle the 613 intermediate-range missiles they now have in place. NATO defense ministers meeting in Portugal were successfully persuaded by Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger last week to reaffirm support for deployment of NATO'S missiles if there is no agreement at the INF negotiations in Geneva. But despite this declaration, West European leaders remain hopeful that the U.S. will adopt a more flexible approach. In this week's speech, Reagan is expected to indicate that the U.S. will consider accepting an interim U.S.-Soviet balance of, perhaps, 300 warheads for each side as a step toward the eventual elimination of Euromissiles. Offering such a compromise would help blunt the intense opposition among many citizens in Western Europe to new missiles. In addition, a good-faith bargaining gesture could neutralize one of Reagan's severest political problems both at home and abroad, the perception that he is not really sincere in seeking arms control.

Reagan's final speech in his current defense crusade is expected to offer a recommendation concerning the much disputed MX missile. A presidential panel has been studying ways to deploy the new ICBMS, which remain homeless after three years of basing proposals ranging from race tracks to dense packs. The panel is expected to suggest that a limited number of the mammoth missiles be built and placed in existing silos used by Minuteman ICBMs. The panel is also considering calling for a new, smaller missile, dubbed Midgetman, that could be made mobile and thus less vulnerable to an enemy strike.

With so many crucial defense decisions looming in the coming months, it was distressing that Reagan chose this particular moment to introduce his star wars vision of missile defense forces. The issue of altering fundamental nuclear strategies is far too important to be tossed about either for temporary political impact, or in the name of getting the levels of defense spending that he feels -- rightly or wrongly -- the nation so urgently needs. Shifting to a system of satellite defenses would require years of careful planning and sincere negotiations with the Soviets, for the idea can never work as a unilateral pursuit or as merely a hostile escalation of the arms race. -- By Walter Isaacson. Reported by Laurence L. Barrett and Douglas Brew/ Washington

* Reagan actually proposed such a plan before. It was outlined in a White House position paper on defense in October 1981: "We will expand ballistic missile defense research and development for active defense of land-based missiles. We will develop technologies for space-based missile defense."

* In 1979, President Carter cited with alarm aerial evidence that a 2,000-to 3,000-man Soviet brigade was training and operating in Cuba. He publicly asked that the troops be withdrawn; they are still there.

With reporting by Laurence L. Barrett, Douglas Brew/ Washington This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.