Hardening the Line

By GEORGE J. CHURCH

The President talks tough, but the policies are not always in train

Ronald Reagan has never shown any particular longing to be his own Secretary of State, nor any reticence about expressing his strongly held views about the state of the world and America's role in it. But of late something seems awry in the connection between these two propositions. It was only last summer that moderation, pragmatism, flexibility were the words that nearly everyone used in anticipating the Administration's post-Haig approach to foreign policy. Those were the qualities George Shultz was expected to contribute as Reagan's second Secretary of State. But they are scarcely the words that leap to mind today. On issue after issue, Shultz has let others take the lead in defining policy, sometimes joining them in harsh speech, sometimes keeping silent. The result over the past month or so has been an Administration swing to tough talk, especially on El Salvador but on other subjects as well, that surprises many observers at home and abroad. Says one French government official: "What we are seeing in Washington these days is the comeback of the hard-liners."

That perception may be overdrawn: the shift is far more noticeable in oratory than in the substance of policy. But on the rhetorical level it is fully deliberate. White House advisers fear that the Administration is losing the consensus for a rapid U.S. military buildup that President Reagan had created. Says one of Reagan's advisers: "We need to give a better justification for our military plans." The best way to do that, aides believe, is to emphasize once again the threat of Soviet expansionism.

The President, whose natural inclinations run to hard anti-Soviet rhetoric anyway, needed little urging. In a fire-and-brimstone speech last week to a convention of evangelical Christians in Orlando, Fla., he decried Communism as "the focus of evil in the modern world" and summoned the U.S. to resist "the aggressive impulses of an evil empire."

In a speech to the National Association of Manufacturers in Washington, Reagan drew an ominous picture of worldwide consequences that would result from a Communist victory in El Salvador. "If guerrilla violence succeeds," he said, ". . .El Salvador will join Cuba and Nicaragua as a base for spreading fresh violence to Guatemala, Honduras, even Costa Rica. The killing will increase, and so will the threat to Panama, the Canal and ultimately Mexico." That, he added, would advance the aims of "Soviet military theorists [who] want to tie down our forces on our own southern border and so limit our capacity to act in more distant places such as Europe, the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, the Sea of Japan."

To what extent does the escalation of rhetoric mirror a real shift in policy? The evidence is mixed. In some areas, policy appears to be unchanged; in others it seems to be hardening, although not to the bellicose point that Reagan's words might suggest; and in very few does Shultz appear to be having a tempering effect. Perhaps the Secretary of State's mild manner was misconstrued as moderation in policy; indeed, when his past experience in Government and business is examined closely, there is little evidence to suggest he is anything but conservative. In any event, his failure to be more forceful has contributed to the impression that U.S. foreign policy is on a shaky course. Positions on the major problems:

EL SALVADOR. In contrast to his predecessor Alexander Haig, who trumpeted the dangers of a victory by Communist-led guerrillas, Shultz left policy largely to Assistant Secretary Thomas Enders. The White House staff suspected Enders of not being sufficiently hardline. Worried by the advice of UN. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick that the situation was likely to deteriorate, National Security Adviser William Clark in effect took policy formulation away from the State Department and centralized it in the White House. The immediate result was a confusing debate among the President's advisers about whether the force of American military advisers (the Administration prefers to call them "trainers") would be increased beyond the current self-imposed limit of 55 and how big an increase in military aid to the Salvadoran government the White House would propose. Presidential aides first said $60 million, then suddenly nearly doubled it to $110 million.

Reagan last week settled the debate and approved a $110 million package of military aid, on top of a relatively uncontroversial $67 million in economic assistance. The military program was artfully shaped to minimize opposition from the many Congressmen who fear the U.S. is repeating some of the mistakes it made in Viet Nam. None of the $110 million would be new money. Some $60 million would be redirected to El Salvador from military-aid funds already appropriated for other countries; it will be used mainly for ammunition and spare parts for military equipment. Congress as a whole will not vote on this switch, but two Senate committees and one in the House must approve, reject or modify it within 15 days. The first vote comes this week in a House appropriations subcommittee, and it is expected to be very close.

The remaining $50 million would be switched to El Salvador from military-assistance funds that the Administration had earlier requested for other countries, and would be spent largely to bring Salvadoran government troops to the U.S. for training. Congress can reject this proposal, but only, Reagan and his aides warn, at the price of spurring the Administration to do what many legislators dread most: send more Americans to El Salvador. If Salvadoran soldiers cannot be brought to the U.S., officials explain, they will have to be trained "in country," and that would require more than 55 U.S. advisers.

Although this proposal has prompted some howls of "blackmail," the chances are slightly better than fifty-fifty that Congress will vote the money. The question is what strings it will attach. At minimum, it might legislate a ban on the use of U.S. combat troops in El Salvador. At maximum, some liberals are talking of making increased aid conditional on American-promoted negotiations between the Salvadoran government and the guerrillas. Administration officials warn that they would reject the money and, by inference, that they would send more advisers to El Salvador, rather than prod the government of that country into sharing power with the insurgents.

A compromise is possible. In his speech to the manufacturers, Reagan laid stress on a "political solution," with negotiations aimed at getting the guerrillas to participate in the Salvadoran elections, now tentatively scheduled for December. Since congressional critics also favor open elections, the two branches might be able to agree on an aid plan requiring some sort of talks.

EUROMISSILES. The victory of Chancellor Helmut Kohl's Christian Democrats in the West German elections March 6 has strengthened the voice of a coterie of advisers in the Pentagon and White House who urge Reagan to hold fast to the zero option in talks with the U.S.S.R. at Geneva, rather than propose an "interim solution" favored by many European governments (including Kohl's) and a group in the State Department. Under the zero option, the U.S. would cancel plans to station 572 single-warhead Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe if the Soviets dismantle 351 triple-warhead SS-20s already in place. An interim solution would trade deployment of fewer U.S. missiles for a reduction in the Soviet SS-20 force, leaving a roughly equal number of warheads (possibly 300) on each side.

Kohl during his campaign specifically reaffirmed his commitment to subcommittee the U.S. missiles if there is no agreement at Geneva, while some of his foes argued against any American missiles under any conditions. Thus, Kohl's triumph, in the Pentagon's view, lessened Moscow's hopes that widespread antinuclear agitation will force European governments to reject the American missiles without any Soviet concessions at all. The Pentagon's conclusion: the pressure is on the Kremlin, not on Washington, to make the next move at Geneva. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger argued once more last week against any interim agreement, contending that negotiating one would make it more difficult to get the Soviets back to the table "for the follow-up."

European governments unanimously warn, however, that standing pat on the zero option would be a calamitous mistake. In their view, European public opinion will accept U.S. missiles only if it is convinced that Washington has made an all-out effort to limit the number of warheads on both sides, and now, with Moscow on the defensive as the result of the German elections, is the time to make a new proposal. Italian Foreign Minister Emilio Colombo visited Washington last week to press on both Reagan and Shultz the case for an interim formula. Colombo had talked with Kohl by telephone before leaving and emphasized in Washington that other European governments agreed with his stand.

Though Reagan has talked vaguely of flexibility at Geneva, Weinberger and Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle are dominating discussion within the Administration. State Department advocates of a new missile offer at times have been reduced to "conferring furtively by telephone. They can come out in the open only if Shultz takes their side and carries their arguments to the President, at the risk of a sharp clash with Weinberger. Most aides expect Shultz to do so. Says one: "He has got to deal with the alliance, and he knows how divisive this issue can be." His passive performance in recent months, however, could cost him on arms control. "You often prevail in Washington on the basis of momentum," says a former State Department official. "The more issues you win, the better chance you have of winning the next one." Not that Shultz has indicated a strong desire to win a more flexible approach in Geneva. To date he has kept so quiet on this subject that even his most intimate associates do not know what his views on arms control are.

MIDDLE EAST. Hopes rose last week that the U.S. may at last be close to mediating a withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon. Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir and Lebanese Foreign Minister Elie Salem scheduled trips to Washington to confer separately with Shultz, presumably about a withdrawal; there was some speculation that Shultz would conduct a kind of shoe-leather shuttle between adjoining offices to convey their views to each other. The Secretary of State was encouraged enough to begin planning a visit of his own to the Middle East in late March, though only if there is some breakthrough in Washington.

A breakthrough could not come too soon. Shultz's greatest triumph in foreign policy was to persuade Reagan to offer a peace plan last Sept. 1 for the Middle East; the proposal hinges on Israeli and Arab negotiators' reaching an agreement to grant self-government to the Palestinians living in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, in some kind of association with Jordan. But to get such negotiations started will require a kind of domino process: first, the Israelis and all other foreign troops must pull out of Lebanon; then, King Hussein of Jordan, in combination with the Palestinians, must offer to bargain with Israel; finally, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin must somehow be persuaded to negotiate on some basis other than Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank.

If negotiations do not begin soon, the peace plan is in great danger of going the way of so many previous ones?that is, of being ignored. Elias Freij, mayor of Bethlehem and one of the Palestinians the U.S. has been counting on to negotiate with Israel, commented last week: "The Americans can't even get the Israelis out of Lebanon. We have to take a second look at the whole thing." Even if the Israelis do pull out of Lebanon and the Arabs offer to negotiate, heavy American pressure may be required to get Begin to budge. The British Foreign Office has been quietly advising Washington that a threat of American sanctions, possibly extending even to an embargo on arms sales to Israel, may be necessary. This is a rare case of friends of U.S. foreign policy accusing that policy of not being hard-line enough.

On all these matters Shultz has moved with supreme caution and kept his own counsel. Even in talking with close aides, he always says "The President thinks ..." rather than "I think." Says one longtime associate: "Shultz moves like an elephant. He waits to put each foot down until he can be certain that the ground will hold him."

In the absence of a strong lead from Shultz, the President's ear has been captured by right-wing advisers such as Clark and Weinberger. Even on Middle East policy, Shultz is in some danger of being upstaged. The very pro-Israel Kirkpatrick departed Saturday on a trip of her own to Israel, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, from which she will return on March 26, doubtless with some strongly worded advice for Reagan.

Shultz, of course, might be playing his cards close to the chest for the simple reason that he has no real disagreements with the Administration's current line and thus feels no great need to speak up. Even so, both the Administration and the world ought to hear a strong, clear voice from the Secretary of State. ?By George J. Church. Reported by Johanna McGeary and Gregory H. Wierzynski/ Washington

With reporting by Johanna McGeary and Gregory H. Wierzynski/ Washington This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.