A Sadly Deteriorating Relationship

By James Kelly

Conflicting goals continue to strain U.S.-Israeli ties

Israel's preoccupation with its domestic maelstrom has momentarily turned attention away from another topic that has been consuming the country's passions and energy: the ever growing rift between Jerusalem and Washington. U.S. Special Envoy Philip Habib discovered for himself last week just how absorbed Prime Minister Menachem Begin was in his own troubles. When the peripatetic troubleshooter showed up in Israel to discuss a new U.S. plan for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon, Begin found only 45 minutes for him. Said an Israeli official: "Nothing of substance came up at the meeting."

The silence was deceptive because the report on the Beirut massacre and Ariel Sharon's subsequent resignation as Defense Minister may have a profound effect, for better or for worse, on U.S.-Israeli relations. At stake is not only Washington's attempt to break the deadlock over the withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon, but also the far broader objective, set out in Reagan's peace initiative last September, of solving the Palestinian problem by linking the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip to Jordan.

The commission's report was published as relations between the U.S. and Israel sank to one of their lowest points in a quarter-century.* From the President's anger over the siege of Beirut last summer to Begin's curt rejection of Reagan's peace plan to the stalemate over the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, everything has seemed to conspire to heighten tensions and deepen distrust. Perhaps the simplest and most basic example: the more President Reagan expressed his disapproval of new settlements in the West Bank, the faster the Israelis built them. Says a senior Administration official: "There is questioning on high as to whether we and the Israelis really do share fundamental goals in the Middle East."

Indeed, only 15 hours before the commission released its findings last week, Reagan had taken the unusual step of criticizing Israel for stalling in the negotiations over a withdrawal from Lebanon. "Israel is delaying unnecessarily," the President told a group of television newsmen. "For them not to leave now puts them technically in the position of an occupying force."

The Pentagon added more fuel to the fire last week when Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger flatly rejected Israel's terms for sharing military intelligence gleaned by Israel in its Lebanese victory. Weinberger's decision to speak out just as the Israeli Cabinet was meeting to discuss the massacre-investigation report presumably was no coincidence. It was his way of saying that the Pentagon prefers not to deal with Ariel Sharon.

The most immediate source of friction between the two countries, which have so long been proud of their "special relationship," is the stalemated troop-withdrawal talks between Israel and Lebanon, now in their eighth frustrating week. Simply put, the U.S. considers the Israeli presence illegal and suspects that Jerusalem is seeking a permanent role in its neighbor's affairs. Begin's strategy, in the U.S. view, may be to stall on a withdrawal from Lebanon long enough to ensure, in part through the furious pace of settlement building, that Reagan's peace plan for the West Bank has no realistic chance of success.

Israel argues that unless it can obtain certain security guarantees, a withdrawal of its 30,000 troops in Lebanon would invite the return of the Palestine Liberation Organization and thus the renewed cross-border shelling of towns in northern Israel. As a result, the Begin government has been insisting on a statement ending the state of war between the two countries, open borders, and a residual force of Israeli soldiers stationed at three patrol bases in Lebanon. Siding with Lebanese President Amin Gemayel, the Reagan Administration says that such conditions would both alienate potential allies of Lebanon, such as Saudi Arabia and Syria, and make a mockery of the country's supposed sovereignty.

Israel, ironically, has rarely had a better friend in the Oval Office than Ronald Reagan. During his first year as President, Reagan rarely wavered in his support for Israel, even in the aftermath of its bombing raid on an Iraqi reactor in June 1981. But then, slowly, tensions began to build, and U.S. officials pin much of the blame on Defense Minister Sharon. In the months immediately after his appointment in August 1981, Sharon had nothing but praise for America. He signed a "Memorandum of Understanding" with his U.S. counterpart, Caspar Weinberger, that called for closer strategic ties between the two countries. At a meeting with Israeli military commanders in Tel Aviv, he boasted, "They told me at the Pentagon that Israel saves the U.S. from building and keeping another 20 aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean."

The turning point came with the invasion of Lebanon last June. As early as last February, according to Israeli officials, Sharon had briefed the Administration on its military plan, but Reagan objected vigorously. Then, over the summer, Reagan became increasingly angry as Begin and Sharon escalated their public goals from the initial aim of wiping out P.L.O. guerrillas in a 25-mile strip along Israel's northern border. Time and again, the President's advisers believe, Israeli officials deceived or lied outright to the U.S.

Once in mid-August, Reagan called Begin to express his "outrage" about the latest heavy bombardment of West Beirut, but Begin assured him that the raids had stopped. A few minutes later, the President learned from Habib that bombs were still falling on the besieged city, so Reagan called the Israeli Prime Minister back. Yet not until nightfall did the Israelis stop bombing Beirut. "The bad blood of that day will never disappear," admits an Israeli Defense Ministry official. "It will always remain as a barrier between Begin and Reagan."

Since then the friendship has suffered further strains. Begin defiantly and hastily rejected Reagan's peace plan last September. He totally ignored the President's request for a freeze on West Bank settlements, and only four days later conspicuously gave the O.K. for eight new settlements in the occupied territories. What especially infuriated U.S. officials was Israel's entry into West Beirut after the assassination of Lebanese President Bashir Gemayel. The move broke a pledge made to Washington, and created the conditions in which Sharon and his commanders could be held indirectly accountable for the Beirut massacre that began one day later.

Recent weeks have brought a series of minor brushes as Israeli units tried to pass U.S. Marine checkpoints outside Beirut and were turned back; in the ugliest incident so far, a Marine captain brandished a pistol and turned away a trio of Israeli tanks. U.S. officials are convinced that the tank ploy was a deliberate act of provocation and that Sharon was behind it. Said a U.S. official: "Someone was trying to make some points."

Just how testy Sharon could be was perhaps best illustrated by his relationship with U.S. military officials. After some diplomatic skirmishing with the Israeli Defense Minister, Weinberger last November dispatched Andrew Marshall, the Pentagon's chief intelligence analyst, to Israel to seek a full report on how U.S. and Israeli weapons systems had performed during the invasion of Lebanon. Sharon demanded that the U.S. not transmit any of the information given by Israel to any ally, including NATO countries, without specific permission from Jerusalem. Moreover, if the data led to the development of any new U.S. defense systems, Israel would share in their production as well as the profits. Finally, Sharon demanded full details on certain existing American weapons, including advanced communications gear.

The Pentagon rejected Sharon's demands, briskly informing him that the exchange of military data could be handled under one of the 27 existing agreements of cooperation between the U.S. and Israel. Officials pointedly noted that the British had willingly shared all their military data gathered during the Falklands war.

Israeli officials blame the U.S. for the deteriorating relationship. Washington, they argue, may think it is only advocating compromise, but in fact the U.S. is asking Israel to trade away its security. Jerusalem insists that it is the Arab nations, especially Jordan and Saudi Arabia, that are the stumbling blocks in any negotiations in the Middle East and that the U.S. should stop hectoring Israel and start pressuring the Arabs. Israeli officials also complain that Washington sometimes sends mixed signals; they contend, for example, that last year some Administration officials, notably former Secretary of State Alexander Haig, seemed to indicate that they would not mind if the Israelis crushed the P.L.O. in Lebanon. On a personal level, Israeli officials distrust Weinberger and feel that he consistently tilts toward the Arabs.

Administration officials privately expressed the hope last week that with Sharon out of the Defense Ministry, Begin would prove more flexible on both the troop-withdrawal talks and the West Bank and Gaza Strip. "Sharon was the most serious obstacle to everything this government has been attempting to do," said a Government expert on Middle East affairs. "He had his own agenda, his own foreign policy." From Washington's viewpoint, it would also be best if Begin did not call elections in the foreseeable future because an interim government would probably only mark time, and thus precious months for negotiation would be lost. If, as is widely expected, Begin then won the election handily, he would be emboldened further to resist U.S. pressures.

To a large extent, the U.S. Jewish community's misgivings expressed last fall about Begin's policies are now gone. American Jewish leaders were nearly unanimous in calling for Sharon's removal in the wake of the massacre commission's report, but they also stressed that his departure should not lead to a change in Israeli policies on Lebanon or the West Bank. Said Howard Squadron, president of the American Jewish Congress: "It doesn't make a particle of difference."

The U.S. has few means at its disposal to pressure the Begin government. Any threats to cut foreign aid to Jerusalem would not only infuriate Begin and harden his position, but would be almost impossible to carry out. Capitol Hill is highly susceptible to Israeli lobbying efforts, no matter what Begin does; two months ago, Congress voted $200 million more in aid for Israel in fiscal 1983 than Reagan had requested. Still, the U.S. appears at least to be contemplating putting some new pressure on Israel. By describing the Israelis last week as an "occupying force" in Lebanon, Reagan was making an oblique reference to the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, which prohibits the use of U.S.-supplied weapons in offensive operations. The fact that he decided to drop the hint at all shows just how impatient the President has become.

If Reagan and Habib push hard, the Administration will probably be able to forge an agreement on Lebanon over the next few months. Israeli reasons for remaining there diminish daily. The occupation is not politically popular at home, the casualty list is growing, however slightly, and the cost--both economic and moral--is high. But when Reagan presses for his peace plan, tempers are sure to flare again.

Even a different government in Jerusalem would probably bring a change in tone rather than substance. The acrimony and strains of the Begin years have tended to mask a painful truth: the long-term interests and goals of the U.S. and Israel often diverge and sometimes clash directly. That does not mean that compromises cannot be explored or accords worked out. What it does mean is that the conflicting objectives make it incumbent upon both countries to be especially scrupulous about maintaining ties and to strive harder to understand each other. That has not been the case over the past two years, and both the U.S. and Israel have suffered as a result.

--By James Kelly. Reported by David Halevy/Jerusalem and Gregory H. Wierzynski/Washington

* Relations reached their lowest ebb during the Eisenhower Administration, when Israeli forces, together with British and French troops, invaded Egypt in October 1956 after Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal. The British and French pulled out after two months, but the Israelis stubbornly remained. Eisenhower castigated Israel on national TV in February 1957 and privately threatened sanctions. Two weeks later the Israelis departed.

With reporting by David Halevy, Gregory H. Wierzynski This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.