A War Without End

By James Kelly

Three years after the Soviet invasion, the guerrillas fight on

The anniversary was marked in a peculiar but strangely appropriate way. The 35,000 Soviet soldiers stationed in Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, were put on the highest alert. Armored cars, their sirens wailing, raced through the streets as truck convoys dropped Soviet soldiers off at the main intersections. Roadblocks were set up every hundred yards or so, and citizens were stopped, searched and asked for their identification cards. Meanwhile, squads of soldiers went house to house, looking for high school graduates to fill the ranks of the unpopular and demoralized Afghan army. When the soldiers found a potential recruit, they would take him away at gunpoint. Says an Afghan exile living in New Delhi: "It is not what you would call winning the hearts and minds of the people of Afghanistan."

The Soviets, however, were not anxious to cause any trouble on the third anniversary of that cold day in late December 1979 when Soviet paratroopers landed at Kabul airport and began a prolonged, costly and so far unsuccessful campaign to control Afghanistan. Babrak Karmal, 53, the Kremlin's hand-picked leader, remains in power, but the Soviet Union's 105,000 troops have failed in rooting out the mujahedin, the ragtag but stubborn guerrillas who control most of the countryside. Neither side has gained or lost much ground over the past three years, and all signs point to a continuing stalemate. Although diplomats began to speculate last November that new Soviet Leader Yuri Andropov would try to find a face-saving compromise that would allow the Soviet Union to withdraw from its Afghan quagmire, there has been no evidence of that so far. Says a senior British diplomat: "No one is winning, and short of a decision by Andropov to extricate himself from the country, of which we see no meaningful sign at present, it could drag on for years."

The anniversary prompted a worldwide chorus of statements and demonstrations calling for an end to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. "The United States does not intend to forget these brave people and their struggle," President Ronald Reagan said last week. The Socialist government of French President Francois Mitterrand did not mention the Soviet Union by name, but it "denounced all foreign intervention in Afghanistan's internal affairs." West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher was blunter, pledging support for "the Afghan people in their demand for freedom." In Tehran several hundred protesters marched outside the Soviet embassy, and in New Delhi hundreds of Afghan exiles demonstrated in front of the Soviet embassy, raising clenched fists and shouting, "Down with the KGB." Perhaps the harshest criticism came from China, where the official party newspaper, People's Daily, termed the invasion of neighboring Afghanistan "a grave threat to China's security" and called upon other nations to give "moral and material assistance" to the guerrillas.

Accurate information on the situation in Afghanistan remains scarce. Foreign correspondents were forced to leave the country in early 1980, and since then very few visas have been issued to Western journalists. As a result, the world must rely largely on accounts by American and West European diplomats in Kabul. The diplomats admit that much of what they pass along is unconfirmed, while reports from the rebels are often exaggerated.

Still, it is generally agreed that the Soviets control Kabul and other major cities such as Kandahar, in the south, and Herat, in the far west. But the sniper fire that rings out at night in urban areas shows that the rebels can infiltrate even cities at will. The countryside, on the other hand, belongs to the mujahedin, and it is there that the battle is waged.

In many ways, Afghanistan is a casebook example of how a well-equipped, conventional army can be frustrated by small, mobile bands of guerrillas. The Soviets, like the U.S. in Viet Nam, try to pinpoint guerrilla strongholds and then launch search-and-destroy missions against them. But often the Soviets discover that the insurgents have in the meantime disappeared. Returning to their base, the Soviet convoys of trucks and tanks are susceptible to ambush by the mujahedin.

The insurgents arm themselves primarily with weapons they capture from Soviet and Afghan soldiers, but they also receive and buy equipment, such as AK-47 rifles from Pakistan, SA-7 missiles and grenade launchers from China, and bazookas and 60-mm mortars from Egypt. Although Washington refuses to comment, it is widely believed that the U.S. is funneling arms to the rebels through Egypt. In November, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz accused the Soviets of using deadly chemical weapons against the mujahedin. As evidence, the State Department produced gas masks that had been found in Afghanistan and that carried traces of the toxic substances. Moscow vehemently denies all chemical warfare charges.

The Soviet army made some gains last winter, but during the summer the guerrillas returned to harass the Soviets in the province of Kandahar and in the verdant Panjshir Valley, about 40 miles north of Kabul. In two major offensives, the Soviets tried to trap the forces of Ahmed Shah Massoud, the onetime engineer who leads the largest group of guerrillas. Helicopters swooped down to drop off paratroopers, then joined MiG-21 jets in bombing the valley. Howitzers and rocket launchers bombarded the villages, and scores of tanks, led by the sophisticated T72, rolled over the roads. The rebels withdrew to higher ground, then returned later to kill the Afghan army units left behind by the Soviets to hold the position.

Like David fighting Goliath, the rebels sometimes score astounding hits. Three weeks ago, members of an Islamic guerrilla force waylaid a convoy in the province of Kandahar, near the Pakistan border. When a Soviet plane came to the aid of the soldiers, the insurgents shot it down with a portable SA-7 anti-aircraft missile. As a Soviet helicopter whirred overhead, one of the mujahedin grabbed an AK-47 rifle and fired at the pilot. The bullet hit its target, and the chopper came crashing down.

The Afghan army has turned into a major liability for the Soviets. Since 1979, when the army consisted of 100,000 troops, large numbers of soldiers have deserted to the rebel side, and 15,000 to 20,000 more have been killed. Today only 30,000 soldiers remain in the Afghan army, and their loyalty to the Soviets is dubious. According to high Pakistani government officials, the Soviets have taken some 5,000 teen-age volunteers for extensive military training in the Soviet Union. The goal: to develop an officer cadre for a revitalized Afghan army that could presumably maintain control if and when Soviet forces pull out.

The rebels, who are estimated to number 100,000, also have substantial problems. They are split into half a dozen major factions. The mujahedin have been unable to unite under a joint commander, and sometimes they battle each other. "If the six groups could get together, they just might force the Soviets to rethink staying on in Afghanistan," says a senior Western diplomat in Islamabad. "But their infighting inevitably encourages the Soviets to hang on."

Moscow cannot subjugate Afghanistan without sending in more troops, 1 million in the view of Pentagon analysts. But neither do the mujahedin have the firepower or numbers to defeat the Soviet army. That leaves the Kremlin two options if it wants to avoid an indefinite stalemate: escalate or pull out. There is no sign that the Soviets are prepared to do either.

Some of the mujahedin claim to have killed or seriously wounded up to 45,000 Soviet soldiers over the past three years, but U.S. defense experts estimate that the number is probably between 10,000 and 15,000. They say that even the higher number represents a tolerable level of casualties for a superpower like the Soviet Union, and that the current fighting could therefore be kept up indefinitely.

Nor is it certain how much the war is costing the Kremlin in economic terms. Some Western diplomatic sources believe that Moscow is forcing the Afghans not only to house and feed the Soviet troops but to pay for their own military equipment. That would leave Moscow only the cost of transporting men and materiel to Afghanistan. The Soviet Union may also be profiting from Afghanistan's natural resources: it has apparently tapped the country's water supply for Soviet farms in neighboring Uzbekistan.

Although similarities exist with the U.S. involvement in Viet Nam, there are also major differences. The Soviet Union, for one thing, is dealing with a neighbor, not a nation 10,000 miles away, and thus it is not plagued by long supply lines. More important, Moscow does not need to be concerned about domestic opposition to the war. Says a senior British official: "There has been no television coverage of the war in Afghanistan, so Moscow does not have to worry too much about what the folks back home are thinking."

Although Moscow initially was surprised at the fervor of the Afghan resistance movement, the Soviets may no longer be trying to crush the rebels. If the Soviet objective is to control the Afghan government, the major cities and the economy, as well as ensure that its neighbor does not fall prey to an Islamic revolution like Iran's, Moscow may have achieved its goals.

U.S. intelligence officials believe that Andropov would welcome a settlement in Afghanistan, but only on his terms. Shortly after the invasion, the Soviets cited their conditions for a political agreement:

the border with Pakistan, which serves as the guerrillas' supply route for weapons, would have to be sealed tight; all foreign aid to the rebels would have to stop; and Pakistan and Iran would have to recognize the Karmal regime as the country's legitimate government. For his part, Pakistani President Mohammed Zia ul-Haq insists that Soviet troops first must with draw, Afghanistan must once again be come a nonaligned nation, and the 3 million Afghan refugees must return home.

The likely scenario, therefore, is that the Soviets will continue to soldier through 1983, fighting the rebels when possible, press-ganging more Afghans when they can, and waiting to see whose side time is on.

-- By James Kelly.

Reported by Dean Brelis/New Delhi, with other bureaus

With reporting by Dean Brelis/New Delhi, with other bureaus This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.