Struggle for a Compromise

By Thomas A. Sancton

Hussein urges Arafat to ease his stand on the Palestinian issue

It was a meeting of historic dimensions, not so much for what it accomplished as for what it set in motion. On one side was Jordan's King Hussein, head of the ancient Hashemite dynasty and ruler of a country whose population is about 65% Palestinian. On the other was Yasser Arafat, leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization, who had just been driven out of Lebanon along with thousands of his guerrillas after a ten-week Israeli siege of their West Beirut stronghold. Bitterness and mutual suspicion had often divided the two men since Hussein's violent expulsion of P.L.O. guerrillas from Jordan in 1970. But a dramatic new set of circumstances brought them together in Amman last week for four days of private talks and lavish banquets that Arafat described as a "significant and destiny-shaping" event.

The main subject of their discussions was President Ronald Reagan's plan to establish Palestinian self-government in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip that would be associated with Jordan in exchange for Arab recognition of Israel's right to exist. Arafat said that the plan had "some positive elements," although he criticized its rejection of full Palestinian statehood. Still, there was some reason for encouragement in Arafat's seeming openness to consider the idea. "Reading between the lines," said an Administration official, "I think there is a realization on Arafat's part that the Reagan initiative is the only practical way to go for the foreseeable future." Describing the P.L.O. leader's apparent shift from military bravado to pragmatic diplomacy, a Middle East expert in Amman remarked, "It is time to fish or cut bait. The hour has arrived when Arafat must become a political leader and not just a guerrilla leader."

According to sources close to the talks, that is precisely what Hussein told Arafat last week. The King reportedly repeated his support of a Palestinian-Jordanian federation, an idea that the P.L.O. has rejected in the past. Hussein warned Arafat that the Palestinians might be forced to accept something like confederation, despite their desire for a separate nation. Arafat was told by Hussein and West Bank leaders that he had little time to lose: the Israeli settlement program in the West Bank was in effect annexing the area.

Hussein also sought some compromises from the P.L.O. on the question of recognizing Israel's existence, and asked for a clear-cut mandate to speak for the P.L.O. in future negotiations with the U.S. Arafat and a dozen other top P.L.O. leaders assembled in Amman were reluctant to make any firm commitments on the major issues. The P.L.O.'s executive committee must endorse any major changes in policy. Moreover Arafat may seek a mandate from the Palestine National Council, the Palestinian parliament-in-exile. But Arafat authorized Hussein to communicate to Washington the P.L.O.'s interest in at least pursuing the Reagan initiative. That put the burden on Washsington to persuade Israel to be less obdurate about holding on to the West Bank.

The Amman meeting inevitably raised some fears within the Arab world. The Syrians, hostile to Jordan and fearful of losing their role as a champion of the Palestinians, wasted no time in condemning the talks. The Syrian news agency reported that five of the 15 groups constituting the P.L.O. had blasted the Jordanian federation idea as a product of "American schemes" and "reactionary Arab regimes." Three of those groups disavowed that statement, however, and Arafat's leadership did not appear to be seriously threatened. Arab moderates like Saudi Arabia and Morocco, moreover, were quietly encouraging the Jordanian-Palestinian relationship.

Two days after the Arafat-Hussein talks ended, another conciliatory meeting took place in Washington between Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir, Secretary of State George Shultz and Vice President George Bush. U.S. officials reported that the Israelis' attitude was much more constructive and flexible than in previous sessions. Shamir stressed the importance of getting the autonomy talks back on track, although he made no concessions that would pave the way toward an early agreement on that issue. In a clear-cut signal of support for Jerusalem, Shultz warned that the U.S. would withdraw from the U.N. General Assembly if that body voted for an Arab-backed move to exclude Israel.

On Lebanon, Shamir insisted that the 5,000 to 6,000 Palestinian guerrillas still in northern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley should leave before any Israeli withdrawal began. But he did not totally reject the idea that the P.L.O. might depart at the same time as a mutual Syrian-Israeli withdrawal. Among the security arrangements Shamir did insist on was establishment of a 40-km security zone north of the Israeli border as a buffer against future P.L.O. incursions.

Washington has no objection to such a zone, but policing it may cause problems. Israel will probably not accept the redeployment of U.N. forces there, and Lebanese President Amin Gemayel, who visits Washington this week, is reluctant to endorse the joint Lebanese-Israeli force favored by Jerusalem. The only solution may be a multinational force with U.S. participation, a prospect that neither the Pentagon nor the American public is likely to relish. --By Thomas A. Sancton. Reported by William Stewart and Roberto Suro/Amman

With reporting by William Stewart, Roberto Suro

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