An Artfully Vague Policy

By Anastasia Toufexis

Reagan makes a China deal

During his campaign for the presidency, Ronald Reagan repeatedly protested that in pursuing a policy of rapprochement with Communist China, the U.S. was callously selling out its old ally Taiwan. He vowed that if elected he would reverse that trend and strengthen relations with the island republic. But last week Washington and Peking issued a joint communique that to Taiwan and to U.S. conservatives, at least, read suspiciously like a sellout. In Shanghai II (viewed as the direct historical descendant of the Feb. 27, 1972, Shanghai Communique signed by President Nixon), China affirmed as "fundamental policy" the quest for "peaceful reunification" of Taiwan with China. For its part, the U.S. declared its intention, for the first time ever, to reduce and possibly eventually halt arms sales to Taiwan.

The Reagan Administration sought to soft-pedal Shanghai II as a document of diplomatic necessity rather than menace. "We have paid particular attention to the needs and interests of Taiwan," said Reagan, as his Administration formally announced, only two days after Shanghai II was issued, the sale of 60 F-5E fighters, worth some $240 million, to Taipei. The Taiwan government was not mollified by the sale. It has denounced the agreement as a "contravention of the letter and spirit of the Taiwan Relations Act" that pledged the U.S. to supply Taiwan with weapons for its defense. And in the U.S., conservatives who regard support for Taiwan as an article of faith were voicing alarm. "It's one more little country we have doublecrossed," lamented Arizona Republican Senator Barry Goldwater. Declared North Carolina Republican Senator Jesse Helms, leader of the New Right: "I can't imagine any foreign policy acts that will disappoint more friends of Ronald Reagan."

Against this assault, the Administration maintained that the agreement, hammered out after ten wearing months of negotiations, was designed to maintain good relations with both Peking and Taipei. Soon after Reagan took office, Administration insiders say, Peking began pressing Washington for a settlement on the thorny issue of continued U.S. weapons sales to Taiwan. When Peking began demanding a firm date for the U.S. to halt selling arms to Taiwan, Washington countered by insisting that the Chinese formally renounce the use of force to achieve reunification with Taiwan, and the talks foundered. But last May, after Chinese Communist Party Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping completed a sweeping reorganization of China's top leadership, and U.S. Vice President George Bush visited Peking with a calming letter from Reagan, tensions began to ease. After one final blast in the People's

Daily in late July, the negotiating climate warmed. The result: an artfully vague document that allows each nation to make interpretations suggesting it got the best of the new deal.

The communique's key paragraph states that the U.S. "does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years ... and that it intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution." The Chinese interpret the "qualitative and quantitative" stipulation to mean that current U.S. sales of weapons are the bench mark for future sales. Administration officials insist that this language allows more advanced weapons to be sold to Taiwan if China upgrades its own armaments. Similarly, while the Chinese insist "final resolution" implies that the U.S. will eventually cease arms shipments to Taiwan, the Administration says the phrase refers to an overall solution to the reunification issue.

By this reasoning, the Administration can claim that it has made no real concessions. Reagan's aides point out that the Chinese failed even to get the U.S. to agree to consult with Peking before making future weapons sales to Taiwan, as they had previously demanded, much less to set a date for a complete arms cutoff to Taiwan. The Administration also insists that Peking's avowal of peaceful reunification with Taiwan as fundamental policy was a significant win for the Administration. Said Presidential Counsellor Edwin Meese: "We got all of our objectives."

That may be true, however discomfited Reagan's friends may be. As the noted semanticist and conservative Republican Senator S.I. Hayakawa pointed out, more in admiration than frustration: "The wonderful thing about language is its ability to mean whatever you want it to mean. There are enough ambiguities in the agreement so that no one should be seriously offended."

--By Anastasia Toufexis.

Reported by Douglas Brew and Johanna McGeary/ Washington

With reporting by Douglas Brew, Johanna McGeary

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