Nonnegotiable

U.S. torpedoes test-ban talks

In Geneva, one team of U.S. negotiators has been bargaining with its Soviet counterpart to limit each side's medium-range nuclear missiles. In meetings that started last month, another team aims to reduce the arsenals of intercontinental nuclear missiles. But the White House last week sent out a different, dissonant signal concerning arms control. President Reagan and his National Security Council decided against resuming negotiations, suspended for almost two years, toward a comprehensive ban on testing nuclear warheads. The Administration said that it is not opposed to the test ban, and only wants first to make compliance with earlier, partial bans more "verifiable" technically. In fact, the most plausible motive for the decision is simply that the Administration wants to keep on testing America's nuclear warheads.

The verification procedures that the Administration says it wants to "strengthen" before negotiating a comprehensive ban are in two treaties. The 1974 Threshold Test-Ban Treaty (TTBT) outlaws all underground detonations of warheads having an explosive yield larger than 150 kilotons. (Detonations above ground or under sea are prohibited by a previous treaty.) The 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNE) provides for the same explosive limits if nuclear blasting should ever be used in such enterprises as mining or canal digging. TTBT requires a U.S.-Soviet exchange of relevant data, which can then be checked against seismic sensor readings. PNE goes even further: U.S. negotiators persuaded the Soviets to allow U.S. inspectors to watch and measure any blasts. (Of course, the Soviets in turn could observe U.S. detonations.)

"At present," says one senior White House official, "we cannot effectively verify" explosions carried out under the two treaties. Yet a catch-22 is at work: the elaborate verification procedures become operative only when the Senate ratifies the treaties, which it has not done, although both countries have agreed to abide by the treaties' other provisions. While the Soviets have apparently committed violations by exploding warheads as large as 300 kilotons, there is no evidence that the treaties' still untried verification techniques are, in fact, inadequate.

The comprehensive test ban would eliminate all nuclear blasts and thus prevent test-firing of warheads for the next generation of U.S. missiles. Apparently Reagan believes those tests are essential, even if for political reasons he is unwilling to say so. As for the Soviets, the official news agency TASS commented that Reagan's stated dissatisfaction with verification was "no more than a pretext for sabotaging the [test-ban] talks."

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