Sending in the Marines

By WALTER ISAACSON

Reagan tentatively offers troops to help evacuate Beirut

The conditions were far from ideal for making a foreign policy decision so fraught with risk. Alexander Haig, who had tried and failed to take charge of Administration policy, was vacationing at a mountain resort in West Virginia after his removal as Secretary of State. His designated successor, George Shultz, was in San Francisco, packing for his move to Washington and awaiting his Senate confirmation hearings this week. President Reagan was on an extended Fourth of July holiday at his five-room adobe ranch house in California's Santa Ynez Mountains. With most of his top aides scattered, the President relied chiefly on his National Security Adviser, William Clark, who is unproved in global affairs but is loyally committed to proving that Reagan can put his own stamp on foreign policy. In a bold move with uncertain ramifications, Ronald Reagan did precisely that last week: he declared that he would be willing to send a contingent of Marines to Lebanon to assist in the evacuation of Palestinian guerrillas from West Beirut.

"I have agreed in principle to contribute a small contingent of U.S. personnel, subject to certain conditions," said the President in a Los Angeles speech to a gathering of legislators from 13 Western states. A battalion of 1,800 Marines, currently sailing with the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, was ordered to prepare for possible deployment as part of a multinational peace-keeping force. Under the conditions laid down by Reagan, troops would be dispatched only if his special envoy, Philip Habib, can work out a peace arrangement among all the parties involved, and if at least one other nation, notably France, agrees to participate.

Reagan's high-stakes offer could spur resolution of the dangerous deadlock in Beirut. But there were rumblings at home and abroad last week that the risks might exceed the potential rewards. Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev sent a letter to Reagan stating that if the U.S. sent its Marines to Lebanon, the U.S.S.R. might counter with moves of its own in the region. Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker of Tennessee called President Reagan to express his concern about the plan. Even within the Administration there were qualms. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, who has consistently opposed committing U.S. troops abroad, expressed support for the decision. He also noted, however, that it was a "risky business" and stressed that any involvement would be "a very limited, short-term, specific kind of mission." In general, most lawmakers were willing to support the plan if the troops would be limited to overseeing a quick evacuation from Beirut, but there was strong resistance to any mission that might involve American forces in armed conflict.

Reagan discussed with his advisers the possibility of using American forces in Lebanon, "if it would help end the bloodshed," shortly after Israel invaded on June 6. But the decision was not made until the eve of the Fourth of July weekend, when Habib sent a 17-page cable from Beirut emphasizing that a U.S. military commitment could be an important key to producing a settlement among Israel, Lebanon and the Palestine Liberation Organization. Saudi Arabia also pressed for such involvement on the theory that American protection for the P.L.O. might eventually lead to a direct political dialogue between Washington and the Palestinian leadership.

Habib's proposal circulated through the Administration's widely dispersed foreign policy apparatus. Haig, who was still theoretically in charge at State, phoned Weinberger and argued strongly that a limited, temporary involvement by the Marines might help Habib's peacemaking efforts. The Defense Secretary reluctantly agreed to recommend that Reagan approve the plan. Habib's proposal was also endorsed by the "Lebanon watch group," a high-level interagency body chaired by Robert McFarlane of the National Security Council staff. Shultz was also consulted by phone, as was Vice President George Bush. Late on the evening of July 2, Reagan received the reports and tentatively agreed that this was a job for the Marines.

Even the mechanics of getting presidential instructions to Habib underscored the continuing foreign policy disarray within the Administration. Haig had agreed to remain in office to handle the Lebanese crisis while Shultz awaited confirmation. Anxious to the bitter end about protecting his turf, Haig became upset when the cables to Habib were signed by his No. 2 at State, Deputy Secretary Walter Stoessel. After a series of calls, Haig, Reagan and Shultz "mutually agreed" that it was time for Haig to step down. On Monday, Haig officially gave way to acting Secretary of State Stoessel.

Clark quickly moved to fill the policy-making vacuum. Throughout last week, he rose at 5 a.m. in his hotel cottage on the Santa Barbara coast (20 miles from the Reagan ranch) for telephone reports from the Lebanon watch group, which was meeting each morning back at the White House. Clark spent the week working through stacks of classified cables and documents to prepare his briefings for the President. A Marine Sikorsky helicopter ferried him up to what White House aides call "the top of the mountain" for his meetings with Reagan. Even on the flight to Edwards Air Force Base, to observe the landing of the space shuttle Columbia, Clark pored over his papers, occasionally shaking his head in dismay, while other members of the presidential party helped themselves to doughnuts and watched the mountains pass below.

A former California judge who last January replaced Richard Allen at the NSC after serving for almost a year as Haig's deputy, Clark came into office with a noteworthy lack of knowledge about world affairs. He has yet to display a sharp analytic ability in the field. He apparently sees his role as being "an honest broker of ideas," presenting options to the President for consideration, rather than advocating a policy line of his own. "I would hope my viewpoints are no different from the President's," Clark has said. According to one top adviser, Clark also has one other important attribute: he is "totally dedicated to making the President appear in control."

The immediate task that Reagan and Clark faced was justifying the plan to send troops to Lebanon. Reagan's decision had been kept secret by the Administration, but much to U.S. chagrin, it was made public early last week by the notoriously leaky Israeli government over the national radio network. Reagan confirmed the decision during his speech in Los Angeles, while White House spokesmen stressed that carrying out the proposal depended on the results of Habib's difficult and sensitive negotiations.

Reagan and Clark hurriedly telephoned key Congressmen and Senators to brief them on the plan. Many agreed with California's Democratic Senator Alan Cranston that the move was dangerous but the U.S. should probably "shoulder some of the risk" for ensuring a peaceful solution in Lebanon. Said Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Charles Percy of Illinois: "We are all reluctant to commit U.S. troops, but it should be considered if that is the only way to evacuate the P.L.O." But there was also considerable wariness about placing American servicemen in jeopardy. Democrat John

Glenn of Ohio asked some pointed questions: "If the cease-fire breaks down, are we going to have to shoot back at both sides? What happens when that first personnel carrier hits a land mine and four or five guys die?"

If U.S. troops were involved in combat, Congress might then invoke the War Powers Resolution. That 1973 law effectively allows Congress to forbid the stationing of troops overseas for more than 60 days. "I am sure that if there is a confrontation and we lose a few Marines, Congress will take action to get them out of there," said House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Clement Zablocki of Wisconsin. Added Glenn: "I don't think the American people are prepared to see body bags coming back from the Mideast."

The Administration was not seriously concerned about the Soviet reaction. "It didn't bother us one bit," said an Administration official. Brezhnev's letter, delivered by Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin to the State Department, was interpreted as a mild warning that Moscow might respond to any deployment of U.S. troops in Lebanon by sending a battalion of its own to Syria; both of these actions would violate an unwritten understanding between the superpowers, dating from 1973, not to send any forces into the Middle East. White House Spokesman Larry Speakes said that Reagan had received the Soviet leader's letter in California and was working on a reply. But officials added that the Kremlin's discomfort would not affect U.S. plans if Habib's diplomatic efforts proved successful.

Another difficult problem for the Administration was the conducting of peace negotiations amid growing anger among even moderate Arabs over Israel's siege of West Beirut. The Administration was also dismayed. "Israel's theory of pressure is counterproductive if not barbaric," said one high State Department official. The President was particularly upset by televised scenes of civilian suffering in Lebanon. His warning to Begin, that the U.S. might negotiate directly with the P.L.O., would nullify a pledge made by Henry Kissinger in 1975 that Washington would not deal with the Palestinian organization un til it acknowledged Israel's right to exist.

Whether or not his offer to send in the Marines is accepted, Reagan has become more deeply involved in a policy area that once failed to hold his interest. "You will see more of the foreign policy decisions brought over to the White House," predicts a top aide. Perhaps so, but the apparatus for handling those issues is in an uneasy transition stage at a critical time. It remains to be seen whether Clark's current pre-eminence as an adviser is a foretaste of the new order or is due simply to the immediate vacuum around Reagan. Even within the White House there are worries not only about Clark's inexperience but also about the quality of the NSC staff. If foreign policy is indeed going to be made at the White House, the President is sure to need more help than he is getting at the moment. --By Walter Isaacson. Reported by Johanna McGeary/Washington and John F. Stacks with Reagan

With reporting by Johanna McGeary, John F. Stacks

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.