Sky Spies

TWO days before Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands on April 2, the Soviet Union launched Cosmos 1345 and Cosmos 1346, two satellites programmed to monitor military activity in the area. The Soviets had apparently detected preparations for the attack through their regular intelligence network. Since then, the Soviets have launched at least six other reconnaissance satellites in orbits that take them over the South Atlantic, where they can watch both Argentine and British military movements. The intelligence-gathering space vehicles perform various functions. Two were put up to intercept communications. Two others were radar-sensing satellites designed to pick up radar transmissions, particularly from ships. Several were reconnaissance satellites that photograph objects on land or sea and eject capsules of exposed film when the satellites pass over the U.S.S.R. The capsules parachute to earth for recovery and processing.

Intelligence analysts do not believe that all the new Soviet satellites are still in orbit. While their U.S. counter parts have longer life spans, most Soviet spycraft cannot sustain their low or bits for more than two weeks. As a result, the Soviets tend to launch more satellites more frequently than the U.S. When political crises arise, Moscow increases its output of satellites. During the 1973 Middle East war, the Soviets launched them at the rate of about one a day.

The U.S. designs its satellites to stay in orbit for months or even years, and to perform a greater variety of functions. The U.S. currently has at least two photographic systems orbiting over the South Atlantic, the twelve-ton Big Bird and the newer KH-11. The systems are more sophisticated than the Soviet satellites. Big Bird can swoop from as high as 170 miles (for wide-angle views) to as low as 100 miles (for close-up shots). The KH-11 records images in digital form, rather than on film, and can beam pictures to ground stations around the globe for instant use.

Britain has access to much U.S. satellite intelligence. There is no evidence that the U.S. told the British where they could find the General Belgrano, as Argentina has charged, but U.S. eavesdropping and surveillance capability is enabling British naval commanders to receive copies of orders transmitted by the Argentine Defense Ministry almost as soon as they are issued.

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