Facing A World of Worries

By GEORGE J. CHURCH

Can Reagan and Haig handle the larger global challenges?

It was a week that tested the limits of diplomacy. Even as British forces attacked a small Argentine garrison on South Georgia Island, the two sides were still exchanging ideas through Washington in hopes of settling the Falkland Islands dispute. Israeli bombs fell on southern Lebanon, but the Palestine Liberation Organization did not immediately retaliate. Resisting the pleas of religious zealots, the Israeli Cabinet voted unanimously to carry out the final withdrawal from the Sinai and sent in some 6,000 troops to drag defiant militants from the last Jewish settlement. The action cleared the way for Sunday's successful return of the Sinai to Egypt.

While the Reagan Administration struggled to contain these volatile situations, it faced a host of nagging problems on other fronts, domestic as well as foreign. The unresolved budget crisis contributed to fears that the recession would linger and interest rates would stay high, even though the White House had one bit of good news: the consumer price index actually went down in March for the first time in 17 years (see ECONOMY & BUSINESS).

Ground Zero, a week of quiet protests against the perils of nuclear war, symbolized the growing pressure on the White House to negotiate a strategic weapons freeze with the Soviets--a position that is morally worthy of debate but diplomatically dangerous. Meanwhile, the Administration was still trying to work out a stance to adopt in strategic arms control negotiations with Moscow. And other problems loomed: with China, angry over the White House support for Taiwan; with Central America, where rightists were forming a government in El Salvador, and the Nicaraguans were asking for talks; with Cuba, where the U.S. reacted to a bid for negotiations by imposing even tighter restrictions on travel to the island.

Around the world, indeed, a question was being asked ever more insistently by foes, friends and even some U.S. diplomats: Does President Reagan really have a foreign policy? Supporters of the Administration argue that there are clearly defined major policy goals--to rebuild U.S. defenses, to repair old alliances and forge new ones with anti-Communist regimes, to confront the adventurist meddling of the Soviets and their clients--but that these have been somewhat obscured by indifferent execution. Critics contend that these apparent goals are really just a set of attitudes, that under Reagan and Secretary of State Alexander Haig, U.S. foreign policy has essentially become a series of scrambles to ward off disaster.

It was not supposed to be that way. As now seems to happen whenever a U.S. election changes party control of the White House, the new Administration takes office with one overriding imperative in foreign affairs: to do things differently from its predecessor. In Reagan's case, that meant abandoning Jimmy Carter's vacillating and sometimes mushy moralism and proclaiming a back-to-basics foreign policy. The U.S. would treat the Soviets as outlaws and villains, sternly oppose their expansionism--by force if need be--and consider Moscow's enemies to be friends deserving support.

But these precepts have proved an inadequate guide to dealing with the complexities of the real world, in which bellicose anti-Soviet rhetoric sometimes frightens U.S. allies more than it does the leaders in the Kremlin, and in which friends (actual and potential) insist on pursuing their own explosive quarrels rather than subordinating them to any common anti-Soviet cause. The President, who came to office lacking experience in foreign affairs, has given such matters only intermittent personal attention. Haig, beset with bureaucratic battles, has tended to focus his formidable energy on one foreign problem at a time. In the words of a U.S. diplomat at an embassy in the Middle East, speaking of his own region but voicing a comment that has broader application: "We do not even have a framework, a bare outline of ideas, let alone a complete policy. All we are doing is playing fireman."

With some success, it should be said. The basic good fortune that has followed Reagan throughout his political career has held to date in foreign policy. No situation has gone beyond a point of no return. Indeed, the U.S. and the world may yet muddle past the menaces that last week were pressing in on every side. But the week was a potent reminder of how ominous and difficult to control events have become.

The Falklands. By the time Haig returned to Washington, he had set an exhausting new record for shuttle diplomacy: 32,965 miles covered during 71 hr. 40 min. in the air on six flights between Washington, London and Buenos Aires in twelve days. And still negotiations continued, with no resolution. British Foreign Secretary Francis Pym came to the U.S. for two days of talks, even while the British fleet was closing in on South Georgia Island, a probable staging area for an invasion of the Falklands.

Were all those trips necessary? The U.S. obviously had to try to head off a war that could put intense strains on American alliances in Europe, Latin America .or both, and foreign policy experts praised Haig's conduct of negotiations as being, in the admiring word of one Indian diplomat, "professional." Doubtless, too, Haig got a better sense of the British and Argentine positions in face-to-face talks than Washington would have garnered through an exchange of messages. Even so, it is questionable whether Haig should have committed himself to an all-consuming mission that prevented him from watching other festering trouble spots that call for attention--especially the Middle East--and involved U.S. prestige so heavily in what could too easily evolve as a no-win situation for Washington.

As worthy as U.S. mediation might seem, the risks are enormous. There is a danger of lasting damage to the uniquely intimate U.S. relationship with Britain, Washington's closest ally. Though Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's government expressed understanding of the U.S. desire to maintain neutrality while trying to mediate the conflict, unofficial voices were asking: Where are the Americans, now that we need them? Warned the Economist, a prestigious and firmly pro-American British weekly: "Have-it-both-ways irresolution on the part of the United States will lose British popular support for America's nuclear policies and deployment, and for its European, its NATO and its Soviet policies." In fact, the U.S. has privately told both sides that if negotiations collapse, it will openly back Britain. But then it would lose Argentina's vocal support for U.S. Central American policy and alienate much of Latin America, even if Argentina does not follow through on its threats to seek Soviet political and economic support for its efforts to hold on to the islands.

The Middle East. A deadline long regarded with something close to dread by U.S. policymakers passed by safely at week's end. For months the U.S. has been concerned that something might delay the scheduled Israeli pullout from the Sinai on April 25. As he started his Falklands shuttle, Haig dispatched his No. 2 man, Deputy Secretary of State Walter Stoessel, in the hope that his mere presence would have a calming effect. The Israeli bombing of Lebanon at midweek stirred U.S. officials to private fury, but the State Department contented itself with a mild public statement while getting messages to the P.L.O. urging that nothing be done to give Israel an excuse for a wider attack.

The Administration does not seem to have a plan for what to do next. Haig's early hope of persuading Israel and the moderate Arab states to subordinate their enmities to a "strategic consensus" against Soviet penetration of the area died long ago. Since then, says one disgruntled U.S. policymaker, the American attitude has been "Don't face anything until someone rubs our nose in it." It is a posture that has won no friends. A long series of mild and ineffectual rebukes to Israel--about the bombing of both the Iraqi nuclear reactor and Beirut last summer and the de facto annexation of the Golan Heights--has angered moderate Arabs far more than U.S. arms sales have soothed them. Even some American officials fear that Prime Minister Menachem Begin now believes the U.S. will do nothing to restrain Israeli actions, and that in consequence he may yet order a full-scale strike against the P.L.O. in Lebanon.

Haig belatedly recognized that there can be no real cooling down of the Middle East without some progress toward settlement of the Palestinian question. With the April 25 deadline past, he hopes to get Israel and Egypt to intensify negotiations about autonomy for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. His lieutenants hardly sound hopeful that much will be accomplished. There are worries in Washington that the Israelis may snuff out the diminishing hopes for progress in any negotiations by continuing the process of "creeping annexation" until it becomes a fait accompli. The situation, said one U.S. official last week, "requires presidential leadership to ward off the disasters down the road. I really don't know if Ronald Reagan sees that."

Soviet-U.S. Relations. Despite the bluster from both sides, the two superpowers are negotiating seriously in Geneva, although without results so far, about limitations on theater nuclear weapons in Europe. Although Reagan pledged during his campaign to move for negotiations toward a significant reduction in nuclear arms, aides are only now readying a list of possible negotiating options; they hope to have it on the President's desk next week. If all goes well, he will announce the U.S. position either just before or during his trip to Europe in June. That will be none too early; the Soviets have been playing adroitly on worldwide fears aroused by loose Administration talk about whether the superpowers could survive a limited nuclear war.

Central America. U.S. policy still seems constricted by rigid antiCommunism. Responding to overtures from Mexico and Nicaragua, the Administration in early April offered the Sandinista government in Managua what amounted to a deal: if Nicaragua would pledge to stop fomenting insurrection in neighboring countries (meaning primarily El Salvador), the U.S. would vow not to take actions that could destabilize the regime in Nicaragua, and might even resume economic aid. At the moment, Washington is putting off a Nicaraguan request to open formal negotiations, in part because Haig has been tied up with the Falklands crisis, but also because it is still not convinced that the Sandinistas are really willing to deal.

Cuba. President Fidel Castro has been sending signals that Cuba also wants to talk with the U.S. Not only has the Administration said no, but last week it severely tightened credit restrictions on American businessmen and tourists traveling to Cuba. Some foreign policy experts fear that the Administration is missing an opportunity: Cuba is known to be in deep economic trouble, and Castro may be seriously looking for a way to lessen his country's total dependence on Soviet aid.

Haig last week told a gathering of business executives that Castro was "agonizing" over whether to stay in the Soviet orbit, which would seem to be a substantial overstatement. But Haig and his aides believe that the way to detach Castro from the Soviets, if there is one, is to tighten the American pressure that has isolated Cuba from the rest of the hemisphere. "Whenever we have sat down with Cuba in the past, it has cost us dearly," one ranking U.S. official argues. "The minute we agree to one small concession, they turn around and tell the world we are selling out our friends to Communism."

China. Peking has been threatening to downgrade relations with the U.S. out of displeasure over American sales of military equipment to Taiwan. Reaganauts point out that the current proposed sale, involving a mere $60 million worth of spare parts, is the bare minimum required by the Taiwan Relations Act, and much lower than sales that the Carter Administration made without arousing any Chinese protest. One reason: hard-liners are pressing pragmatists among Peking's leaders to show that they can be tough in dealing with the U.S. The Chinese also remember Reagan's many campaign pledges of loyalty to Taiwan. Vice President George Bush, a former envoy to China, may stop in Peking during a Far Eastern tour this week, but it seems unlikely that he will be able to talk the Chinese into a more reasonable attitude.

Reagan's embrace of the "zero option" on intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe and his Caribbean Basin Initiative of increased aid, trade and investment have won applause from friendly nations. But even these initiatives came late, in response to the pressure of events, and they are far from outweighing the situations that have been allowed to drift. Part of the problem is Haig. The Secretary has always swung between a cool, unflappable demeanor and irascible outbursts. Strangely, even as he has overcome most of his rivals for pre-eminence in foreign policy, the brittle side of his character has become more visible. Stories abound in Washington about his belittling of subordinates; he is said to have called Stoessel "a burned-out case." Haig's morning staff meetings, says one official, sometimes turn into "a monologue about who is undermining him."

More important to the substance of foreign policy, says one subordinate, "Haig has a tendency to stir the pot, then turn that problem over to someone else while he finds another pot to stir." Meanwhile, the Secretary keeps the details of foreign troubles largely to himself, giving his aides inadequate guidance on handling those problems to which he is not devoting his efforts. Indeed, the broadest charge against Haig also reflects his greatest strength: he is a doer rather than a thinker. He is a man of action who learned the operational skills of diplomacy from his mentor in the Nixon Administration, Henry Kissinger, but who basically lacks Kissinger's vision of global strategy. In this sense, his epic shuttle showed him both at his strongest--striving to mediate an explosive confrontation--and at his weakest, because he was not home minding the global aspects of U.S. policy.

The final responsibility for the foreign policy dilemma rests, of course, with the President, who to date has limited himself to enunciating broad policy principles and establishing friendly personal relations with foreign leaders. Asked to enumerate U.S. diplomatic successes, Reagan invariably mentions the stream of visiting heads of government and state to whom he has played gracious host. Queen Beatrix of The Netherlands was the latest. Reagan welcomed her last week at a White House ceremony featuring a review of a new fife-and-drum corps dressed in white wigs and red coats.

These protocol-laden formal festivities are essential, and can be pleasant, but they have little to do with the hard task of defining policy. That is a job that Reagan neglected during his first year, leaving subordinates to set priorities by default. Aides insist that the President is immersing himself more in the substance of strategy these days. They say, for example, that he has demanded that arms control planners present him with specific proposals for an actual reduction in nuclear weapons, and not just a slowdown in the rate at which the U.S. and U.S.S.R. are building them. Reagan needs to take the same tough approach to the entire range of issues that his Administration faces. The U.S. is unlikely to develop any consistent and forceful foreign policy unless the President pushes his aides to produce one--and follows through on its formulation and execution.

--By George J. Church. Reported by Johanna McGeary and Gregory H. Wierzynski/ Washington, with other bureaus

With reporting by Johanna McCeary, Gregory H. Wierzynski

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.