The Perils of Negotiating

By WILLIAM A. HENRY III

U.S. officials oppose dealing with the Salvadoran rebels

As the civil war worsens in El Salvador, enthusiasm grows in the U.S. to find some new way out of the bloodshed, an undefined "negotiated settlement" in place of the elections scheduled for March 28. The sentiment has spread from diehard liberals to the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, and has surged increasingly through Capitol Hill. The House of Representatives last week voted 396 to 3 for a carefully hedged resolution that sought "unconditional discussions" among the warring factions in El Salvador. In addition, 104 Congressmen, including twelve Republicans, signed a letter that in effect urged President Reagan to support Mexico's President Jose Lopez Portillo's offer to inaugurate negotiations.

Mexico and France continued to press for talks, which are also favored by West Germany and other European allies. Pope John Paul II last week told thousands gathered in St. Peter's Square in Rome that the sins of the El Salvador junta have been "no less harsh and severe" than the terrorism of the rebels. He called for "a common effort without foreign exploitation," and advised diplomats privately that he believed only negotiations would achieve peace.

But the Reagan Administration and the military-civilian government headed by President Jose Napoleon Duarte in El Salvador are steadfastly opposed to talks that might lead to voluntary power sharing with the militant Marxists among the rebels. Secretary of State Alexander Haig and Mexican Foreign Minister Jorge Castaneda touched on the negotiation issue at week's end in a Manhattan meeting. Even so, says one top U.S. diplomat: "It would be folly to negotiate." The reason: fears that a negotiated settlement would lead inevitably to a Marxist-Leninist takeover. Says Thomas Enders, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs: "Negotiation would give the leftist minority a share of power it cannot win on the battlefield or earn at the ballot box."

The Administration is privately concerned that the present power structure in El Salvador is unlikely to last more than another year or so. Given that possibility, Reagan's advisers argue that it is still far too soon to write off the elections as a means of shifting power, however questionable their chances of working. Sums up an Administration official: "We are willing to discuss how elections might be carried out. But we will not negotiate as an alternative to elections."

The two sides on the issue of negotiations start with widely differing assumptions. American backers of negotiations argue that giving the rebels some share of power is the only way to achieve a truce and thus stop the killing. Says Father Robert Drinan, a former Massachusetts Congressman, now president of Americans for Democratic Action: "Eventually we must negotiate with the left, because they are not going to give up."

Settlement supporters also invoke the American traditions of compromise and consensus, and argue that negotiation could produce a tolerant, pluralistic government. Democratic Congressman Michael Barnes of Maryland, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, insists: "We can go to the table knowing what we will not concede--ultimate power. To say the only outcome is a Marxist-Leninist dictatorship is absurd." Adds Senator Gary Hart, Democrat from Colorado: "I'm not wildly optimistic about negotiations working, but at least we would be honest brokers rather than military promoters."

Many, perhaps most, proponents of a quick settlement argue that a chancy compromise is better than a sure loss--that the longer fighting continues, the more likely the left is to win. Supporters further warn that if the militant right-wingers gain power at the polls, they may trigger an even more brutal civil war of resistance. Underlying these arguments is a widespread liberal presumption that the rebels are--in the phrase of TV Actor Edward Asner's protest group, Medical Aid for El Salvador--"the most representative group in the country."

That claim is dubious in the splintered world of Salvadoran politics. The extreme left is not testing its strength in the election, which it is boycotting and hopes to discredit. The country also has a strong right, and Duarte and the centrists may have trouble holding power in the election. But Reagan Administration officials are sure that the centrists would lose outright in negotiations. The prime example of what the White House fears would happen is almost next door to El Salvador.

The revolution in Nicaragua was settled by negotiations in 1979 in which the Marxist Sandinista guerrillas, who had driven Dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle into exile, agreed to share power with the moderates. But from the beginning the pluralism failed. The government and, crucially, the army were dominated by the Sandinistas. Moderates were forced out of office, or quit in frustration. Says a ranking military analyst: "Only the Sandinistas came out on top. If I had the least hope that a negotiated settlement would produce a tolerable government [in El Salvador], I'd want to help them. But I don't think that the few moderates will survive the transition. The true hard-liners aren't even showing themselves yet."

There is even some question whether the guerrillas in El Salvador could keep bargains made in good faith. The rebel collective is an uneasy lashing-together of at least five factions with conflicting programs. The most radical, the Popular Liberation Forces, led by Salvador Cayetano Carpio, believe in the traditional Marxist guerra prolongada, a war sustained until ultimate, total victory. Neither negotiations nor elections would necessarily stop this group from fighting.

Perhaps the most ominous sign of rebel intentions is that the crucial issue in any negotiations would be control of El Salvador's army and arsenals. Some rebel factions demand a complete purge of the current military leadership because of its ties to the old ruling oligarchy and the savage right-wing "death squads" that still roam the country. Whatever group takes charge of the country's firepower--as the Sandinistas did from the outset in Nicaragua--will be able to impose its will on the rest of the country.

There are some indications of how Marxist the rebels would be. Asked about the philosophical basis of a new government, Jose Rodriguez Ruiz, a member of the rebels' directorate, said ideology must be adapted to each country. As examples of Marxist adaptation he cited some of the most ideologically extreme, even repressive, regimes of modern times. Said he: 'There are parts of Ho Chi Minh, parts of Mao, parts of Kim II Sung [Premier of North Korea] that appeal to us."

That specter has reinforced the Reagan Administration's determination to resist what it calls "a gift of power to the left." Pledged Secretary of State Alexander Haig last week: "We are not going to be active participants in the distribution of power that would abuse the interests of he people."

--By William A. Henry III.

Reported by James Willwerth/Mexico City

With reporting by James Willwerth/Mexico City

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