Reward for a No Man

A general who spoke up is picked to head the Joint Chiefs

As commander of U.S. forces in Korea in 1977, General John W. Vessey Jr. courageously told a House committee that he was against then President Jimmy Carter's plan to withdraw American troops from that nation. Carter retaliated when the time came to pick an Army Chief of Staff; he reached past Vessey to elevate General Edward C. Meyer to the top post. The Pentagon buzzed with rumors that Vessey's career was finished. But last week President Ronald Reagan surprised everyone by revealing that Vessey, 59, was his choice for the highest uniformed post of all. If the Senate concurs, Vessey will replace Air Force General David C. Jones as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when Jones retires in June.

Vessey, whom Reagan called "a soldier's soldier," was a 21-year-old sergeant when he won a battlefield commission for his heroics on the Anzio beachhead in Italy in 1944. Described by colleagues as "cool," "articulate," "meticulous" and possessing "a fantastic memory," he was executive officer of the 25th Infantry Division Artillery during combat in Viet Nam. "It's good to have a guy in there who has been shot at," said one officer in praise of Vessey's selection. Instead of pouting over the snub from Carter, Vessey has served loyally as Army Vice Chief of Staff to Meyer, his former subordinate. Meyer, who had passed the word that he did not want to be Chairman, lauded Vessey's promotion, predicting: "He will do the kinds of things that the Chairman ought to be doing, looking at broad policies and articulating the issues."

Precisely what the Chairman of the J.C.S. should do, however, is at the heart of a delicate debate being pressed by Chairman Jones with the other four Chiefs, including Meyer. At issue is whether the current structure of the J.C.S. really best serves the nation or merely protects the parochial interests of each service.

Jones' basic concern is that the Chairman of the J.C.S. is a mere "adviser, moderator, implementer and integrating influence." He has no authority to settle disagreements among the others, who enjoy the advantage of actually commanding their services. Since any decisions the J.C.S. makes in its role of advising the Secretary of Defense must be unanimous, each member can wield a veto. Rather than continually report their disagreements to their civilian boss as they are required to do, the Chiefs tend simply to add up what each service wants, or to seek some minimum agreement with the aim, notes Jones, of "not goring anyone's ox."

Jones wants to strengthen considerably the powers of the Chairman. Even on critical budget matters, Jones would permit the Chairman to override the other services and make his own recommendations to the Secretary. He would decide such priorities as whether the Navy should grow to 600 combat ships or the Air Force should get both of the new strategic bombers it wants. Under Jones' plan the Chairman would also be in charge of overall strategic planning. Currently, such questions as, for example, what kind of military presence the U.S. should maintain in the Indian Ocean as against the Persian Gulf are thrashed out among all the Chiefs.

To handle all of these enhanced powers, Jones would give the Chairman a large, high-ranking staff at least equal to that of each Chief. He would, in fact, transform the J.C.S. from a committee system to one in which a powerful Chairman seeks advice from the service bosses, but holds authority second only to that of the Secretary.

"We could implement many of the things that I have advocated if we could all get together," Jones says of the members of the J.C.S. But he concedes: "We are not going to agree." A former bomber pilot, Jones is trying to jolt his colleagues into thinking beyond themselves before he hands the controls to Vessey and grounds himself in retirement.

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