NIXON AND THE JEWS

My relationship with Nixon, never easy, was particularly complex with respect to the Middle East. Nixon was convinced that he owed nothing to Jewish votes and that he could not increase his Jewish support regardless of what he did. Deep down, he wanted to impose a comprehensive Middle East settlement. In October 1972, I forwarded to Nixon a memorandum from Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird urging secret contacts with Egypt to take advantage of Sadat's expulsion of the Soviets and to move closer to the Arab position. Nixon sent me the memo with a note: "K--I lean to Laird's view. The conduct of the American Jewish community on the Soviet visa problem clearly indicates they put Jewish interests above U.S. concerns. This we cannot do."

Such comments illustrate our strange relationship.

Nixon shared many of the prejudices of the uprooted California lower middle class from which he came. He believed that Jews formed a powerful cohesive group; that they were predominantly liberal; that they put Israel's interests above all else; that they were more sympathetic to the Soviet Union than other ethnic groups were; that their control of the media made them dangerous adversaries; that Israel had to be forced into a peace settlement and could not be allowed to jeopardize our Arab relations.

None of this kept him from having cordial relations with many Jews or from elevating them to key positions. His prejudices would break forth in commands reflecting the emotion of the moment. I did not keep track of how often I was told to cut off all aid to Israel in retaliation for the actions of some wayward Jewish members of Congress; Senator Jacob Javits seemed to have a special ability to get under Nixon's skin.

Yet in every crisis Nixon stood by Israel more firmly than almost any other President save Harry Truman. He admired Israeli guts. Though convinced that Israel's occupation of Arab territories strengthened anti-Western radical forces, he understood that the reverse was not true; pressuring Israel in concert with radical forces was more likely to further Soviet than Western interests. By a different route, Nixon came to the same conclusion as I: the American national interest required a demonstration of Soviet and radical inability to achieve Arab objectives, and no progress could be made until at least moderate Arabs were willing to make a peace of genuine compromise.

I started at the other end of the emotional spectrum.

Though not practicing my religion, I could never forget that 13 members of my family had died in Nazi concentration camps. I had no stomach for encouraging another Holocaust by well-intentioned policies that might get out of control. Yet, like Nixon, I had to subordinate my emotional preferences to my perception of the national interest. Given the historical suspicions toward my religion, I had a special obligation to do so. Occasionally it proved painful. But Israel's security could be preserved only by anchoring it to a strategic interest of the U.S., not to the sentiments of individuals. On this basis the Communist-baiter from Southern California and the refugee from Nazi Germany joined to break the deadlock of Middle East diplomacy.

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