Monday, Dec. 07, 1981
Tense Summit in Bonn
By Henry Muller
Schmidt fails to convince Brezhnev that the U.S. wants serious arms talks
The conversation in the grand, neoclassic Beethoven dining room of Bonn's 18th century Redoute palace hushed as the ailing, 74-year-old guest rose ponderously from his chair. While his host, West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, unceremoniously popped a stick of chewing gum into his mouth, Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev began to deliver his first public statement since President Ronald Reagan offered to cancel deployment of new U.S.-built nuclear missiles in Western Europe if the Soviets would dismantle the counterparts in their growing arsenal.
Brezhnev, who in previous weeks had artfully presented the Soviet Union as the superpower genuinely interested in peace, was expected by some to use the banquet at the Bonn summit to present a new idea to encourage the antinuclear weapon movement that has mobilized millions of Western Europeans in opposition to the deployment of U.S. Pershing II and cruise missiles. Holding the sheaf of white pages far from his body so that he could read the large-type Cyrillic characters without his eyeglasses, Brezhnev at first seemed to confirm his audience's suspicions by announcing in his heavy, measured monotone that he had come to Bonn with a "new, essential element" in the Soviet position. Then he said, "In the course of genuine negotiations with the U.S., we would be ready to reduce [mediumrange weapons] not by the dozens but by the hundreds. I repeat: by the hundreds."
The assembled ambassadors, ministers and government officials could barely conceal their reaction. Dramatic as the proposal may have sounded to a layman, it was nothing more than a dusted-off version of an idea Brezhnev first offered in a speech in East Berlin more than two years ago when he was still trying to thwart NATO'S decision to install new weapons in response to the Soviet buildup of SS-20 missiles aimed at Europe. Brezhnev, who was making his first trip to the West since the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, had been successfully upstaged by Ronald Reagan. Concluded a State Department official: "The Soviets found themselves playing catch-up."
The three-day Bonn summit came on the eve of the opening this week in Geneva of a new round of U.S.-Soviet arms talks devoted specifically to the problems surrounding medium-range missiles. Launched largely at the instigation of NATO's European members, these negotiations will seek to find ways of reducing the numbers of, if not eliminating altogether, the 250 Soviet SS-20s and 350 older SS-4s and SS-5s already trained on Western Europe, and the 572 U.S. Pershing II and cruise missiles scheduled to be deployed by 1983 in West Germany, Britain, Italy, Belgium and The Netherlands.
Hoping to encourage Soviet cooperation in Geneva, U.S. officials greeted Brezhnev's proposal in Bonn politely. "They've got an interest and a stake in legitimate negotiations, and we're going to pursue that as far as we can," Reagan said in an interview with ABC-TV. Said Secretary of State Alexander Haig: "Our message is going through." But, speaking privately, U.S. diplomats saw no great change in the Soviet approach.
European officials, who had warmly welcomed Reagan's proposal, echoed the Administration's view. They made it clear that Brezhnev's announcement did not change their commitment to install the new U.S. missiles on their soil.
The leaders of Europe's peace movement, meanwhile, were assuaged by the statements of neither Moscow nor Washington. Wim Bartels, international secretary of Holland's Inter-Church Peace Council, which helped organize an antimissile demonstration that brought 350,000 persons to Amsterdam, promised to pursue his campaign for the elimination of both the Soviet and American missiles. Said he: "We will stick harder than before to the same goals."
Although Soviet and West German diplomats had drawn up long agenda of topics for Brezhnev's visit to Bonn, including follow-up proposals to the estimated $15 billion pipeline that will bring Siberian natural gas to Western Europe (see ECONOMY & BUSINESS), the missile issue dominated the summit. Riding with Brezhnev in the Mercedes limousine that brought him from Cologne airport to Schloss Gymnich, the country mansion set aside for the Soviet leader and his elaborate entourage (see box), Schmidt told his guest: "You should not fall victim to your own propaganda about the Americans." Reagan was not the warmonger the Soviets made him out to be, the Chancellor argued, and the U.S. Administration genuinely wanted to negotiate arms control. "I know what you are saying," Brezhnev replied, "but I don't believe it."
Calmly but firmly Schmidt repeated the point throughout the two leaders' nine hours of talks. Speaking mostly from prepared texts and occasionally shouting at his host, Brezhnev rejected Schmidt's arguments. He and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko insisted that NATO and the Warsaw Pact had roughly equal nuclear forces within Europe and described the U.S. Administration as the most hostile to the Soviets in 30 years. Brezhnev confided that the only U.S. President Moscow had ever trusted was Richard Nixon. Schmidt insisted that Reagan was prepared to "negotiate, negotiate, negotiate" in order to achieve peace. Said Schmidt: "We have known each other for a long time, and I have never lied to you."
The lack of understanding between the leaders was evident in a series of acerbic exchanges during press briefings conducted jointly by Kurt Becker, Schmidt's spokesman, and his Soviet counterpart, Leonid Zamyatin. When Becker stated that the Soviets were not able to "correctly assess the intentions of the American Administration," Zamyatin snapped back that the Soviet leadership had no such problem, since the U.S., with its "violent" rhetoric, had "declared the Soviet Union as its military enemy." Later, as Becker reported Schmidt's complaints to Brezhnev that one SS-20 could destroy his home town of Hamburg, Zamyatin leaned toward the microphone and added coldly, "and Cologne and Bonn."
If the trip produced no breakthrough, it served a positive purpose in exposing the aging Soviet leadership to some realities. The leaders of West Germany's four largest political parties, including Social Democrat Willy Brandt, the former Chancellor who has encouraged the peace movement, told Brezhnev that they stood behind the Schmidt government's decision to allow the installation of 108 Pershing II and 96 cruise missiles in their country. The lower-level Soviet officials and newsmen who preceded Brezhnev's party were treated to demonstrations different from those shown on television back home. In Bonn's cobbled Marktplatz, peace demonstrators called for the removal of Soviet as well as U.S. nuclear weapons. One young protester held a placard showing a caricature of Brezhnev astride an SS-20. Along Bonn's main street, some 40,000 demonstrators marched to protest the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
The summit also confirmed to Western diplomats that whatever they may be saying in public, the Soviets appear intent on negotiating seriously in Geneva. The main reason is that they are genuinely worried about NATO's proposed new missiles, the first weapons that would be able to strike deeply into the Soviet Union from Western Europe. The Pershing IIs would need only five to eight minutes to reach targets in the Soviet Union; the ground-hugging cruises are slower but capable of slipping through Soviet air defenses. The Soviets argue that these new weapons would not only destabilize the global balance of forces, but make accidental war more likely. Says a Soviet diplomat: "If you launched your [U.S.-based] Minuteman missiles, we would still have nearly 20 minutes before we had to launch our own missiles. Our leaders would have time to grab the hot line and ask, 'Is this a real attack or a mistake?' Once the Pershing IIs are based in West Germany, this margin of safety would be wiped out."
As the Geneva talks begin, Moscow's opening position is expected to be far from Washington's "zero option," which would cancel the planned U.S. missiles and remove the existing Soviet arsenal. The U.S. counts only the Pershing IIs and cruises as medium-range weapons, but the Soviets include nuclear weapons that can be launched from "forward-based" U.S. submarines and aircraft in the Atlantic and Mediterranean as well as independent nuclear forces in France and Britain. Said a Soviet diplomat: "Zero cannot just mean zero for the Soviet Union."
Reagan's plan, Brezhnev argued, would give the U.S. a 2-to-l advantage. "The Soviet Union will never agree to such a version," he declared. To strengthen their hand, Soviet diplomats have started dropping a new and disconcerting hint: that they could decide to station SS-20s in Cuba if the Geneva talks fail.
The U.S. delegation, headed by Paul Nitze, 74, an experienced and hawkish arms negotiator, is going to Geneva with different arithmetic. According to U.S. calculations, which include nukes carried by Soviet-based aircraft, Moscow currently has not parity but a 6-to-1 advantage in medium-range weapons. Thus, Nitze will press vigorously for the Reagan proposal. Mindful of the Soviet Union's outright, not to say contemptuous, rejection of President Jimmy Carter's 1977 proposal for deep cuts in strategic arms, the Administration is determined to avoid what it considers to have been Carter's principal error. Unlike his predecessor, Reagan will not announce a fallback position in advance. Still, the President said in his speech that the U.S. delegation would "listen to and consider the proposals of our Soviet counterparts." Arriving at Geneva airport last week, Nitze declared: "I'm going to be reasonable--and tough."
Visibly enjoying the worldwide attention he was receiving, Schmidt described his role as that of an "interpreter" of U.S. policy. To dispel any doubts about his loyalty to the Western alliance, he was meticulous in keeping Washington informed. Both before Brezhnev's arrival and after his departure, he phoned Reagan with progress reports.
But Washington bridled at the news that West German and Soviet diplomats would maintain regular contact on the missile issue as the Geneva talks progressed. Despite West German assurances that no "back channel" was contemplated, one State Department official declared: "It is certainly a complication." State fears that separate Bonn-Moscow discussions might only help the Soviet Union's attempt to play NATO members off against one another.
The Bonn summit revealed agreement on at least one issue: neither Brezhnev nor Reagan is anxious for a summit face-off of their own. Schmidt's efforts to promote the idea of a Brezhnev-Reagan meeting were quickly brushed aside by his Soviet guests. In Washington, officials continue to believe that such a confrontation would be counterproductive in the present climate. "Without a guaranteed outcome, it would fall flat," an official explains. Whether and when the leaders of the two superpowers will get together may depend on the progress of the arms talks that begin in Geneva this week.
--By Henry Muller. Reported by Erik Amfitheatrof and Roland Flamini/Bonn
With reporting by Erik Amfitheatrof, Roland Flamini/Bonn
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