Moscow's Aim: Split NATO

By Thomas A. Sancton

SOVIET UNION

The "peace"offensive against Europe tries to block U.S. missiles

With the rows of medals on his full-dress uniform gleaming under the television lights, Soviet Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov stepped to the podium in the Kremlin's modernistic Palace of Congresses late last week to report on the state of the country. In his address, delivered on the eve of a national holiday marking the 64th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, Ustinov lectured Washington on its belligerent rhetoric. Charged Ustinov: "Its high-ranking representatives declare with cynical disregard for the destinies of peoples that 'there are things more important than peace' and that a so-called limited nuclear war is not only possible but even acceptable."

That was only the latest salvo in a Soviet peace offensive that has been building to a crescendo over the past few months. The ultimate goal of this intense propaganda campaign is to drive a wedge between the U.S. and its Western European allies. The more immediate intent is to encourage opposition to the stationing of a new generation of U.S. medium-range missiles in Western Europe, a policy that NATO adopted in 1979 to offset the prolific deployment of SS-20s and other weapons in the western Soviet Union. Ustinov's remarks were carefully targeted and timed. Moscow's campaign will soon face two key tests: the opening on Nov. 30 of the Geneva talks on limiting Soviet and American theater nuclear forces (T.N.E) in Europe, and Leonid Brezhnev's visit on Nov. 22 to West Germany, where opposition to the NATO missile plan is already strong enough to endanger Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's hold on the government.

Never had the European climate seemed more favorable to Moscow's appeals for peace. Extensive demonstrations in Bonn, London, Brussels, Paris and Rome last month brought nearly a million people into the streets to protest the scheduled deployment of 572 NATO missiles beginning in 1983. Moreover, Europeans were increasingly jittery over U.S. nuclear strategy in the wake of Ronald Reagan's casual remark three weeks ago that an "exchange of tactical weapons against troops" in Europe was conceivable without escalating into an all out exchange between the two superpowers. Although it was misleadingly quoted out of context, the remark revived a recurring fear that the U.S. was prepared to sacrifice its European allies without risking its own survival. Washington later reiterated its total defense commitment to Europe, but Soviet propagandists deftly exploited Reagan's gaffe.

Nor did Secretary of State Alexander Haig help matters when he told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last week that NATO contingency plans included exploding a nuclear device as a "demonstration" to persuade the Soviets to fall back, should they seek to overrun Western Europe. Grumbled a Western diplomat in Bonn: "Which sounds best to the West Germans in the present circumstances, Brezhnev waffling about his desire for peace, or Haig waffling about firing a warning nuclear shot above the Russians' heads?" Lamented a member of Schmidt's divided Social Democratic Party: "Those who say 'Better red than dead,' have certainly received a boost."

Nothing, in fact, has given Moscow's peace campaign more emotional appeal than the bellicose remarks in Washington. Declared Denis Healey, deputy leader of the British Labor Party, as he addressed the House of Commons last week: "You must speak softly when you carry a big stick. We have unfortunately during the last twelve months had [from the U.S.] all too often a combination of belligerence and rhetoric with carelessness and confusion in defining the purpose and roles of these [nuclear] weapons." Political Science Professor Lincoln Bloomfield of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology agreed, arguing that by talking tough for domestic consumption, "we've played right into the hands of Moscow and the peace movement in Europe."

West Germany has been the main target of the Kremlin's latest propaganda barrage, and for good reason: Helmut Schmidt's country is scheduled to be the principal site of the NATO missile deployments; without West German participation, the plan would likely collapse. Says Brookings Institution Sovietologist Helmut Sonnenfeldt, a top aide to Henry Kissinger when he was Secretary of State: "The Soviets see attitudes there changing to their advantage, and they want to encourage that."

Against that background, Brezhnev showed a masterful sense of orchestration as he prepared for his trip to Bonn by granting an interview published last week by the West German magazine Der Spiegel. Striking a tone of benevolence and sweet reason, he stated: "The Soviet Union does not threaten anybody and is not planning to attack anyone. Our military doctrine is of a defensive character. It rules out preventive wars and the 'first strike' concept."

The Soviet boss maintained that "approximate parity" in European-based medium-range missiles already existed, making further buildups on the Western side unwarranted. Brezhnev claimed that the Soviets had 975 medium-range weapons within striking distance of Western Europe. He admitted that the new SS-20s could carry three warheads, but said that "their total detonating power" was less than one of the outmoded missiles that were being replaced. By contrast, he said, NATO had 986 medium-range weapons within 600 miles of the Soviet Union.

Brezhnev criticized the U.S. for allegedly seeking military superiority but declared his willingness to negotiate reciprocal arms reductions. To complete his dovish appeal, he reiterated previous calls for a moratorium on new medium-range missiles and pledged never to use nuclear weapons against countries that did not deploy such arms on their soil.

For all its skillful packaging, Brezhnev's propaganda ploy was basically only a restatement of longstanding Soviet positions. It drew little public response from Western governments, although there was some worry about the problems it would cause in the long run. The main leaders of the European peace movements, possibly finding Brezhnev's stratagem too obvious, were restrained. West Germany's ex-Chancellor Willy Brandt remarked that while appreciating Brezhnev's concern over the NATO buildup, "we expect him to understand that we feel threatened by the new potentials developed by the Soviets in recent years."

Brezhnev's pose as a peacemaker was also undermined late last week when Sweden charged that the Soviet submarine that ran aground in Swedish waters on Oct. 27 was probably carrying nuclear weapons. For the Soviets, who have been pushing hard for a Nordic nuclear free zone, the incident was an embarrassing blow to their peace offensive. Swedish Foreign Minister Ola Ullsten declared the affair "a frightening reminder of how close we are to the precipice, how great the risk is for a nuclear war."

More broadly, the credibility of the Soviets' peace campaign suffers from fundamental flaws in their main arguments. Most Western experts flatly reject Moscow's oft-repeated assertion of an "approximate parity" in theater nuclear weapons. Said a State Department spokesman last week: "The Soviets have been claiming now for several years that a balance exists, although in that period they have been increasing their capabilities and we have not."

Indeed, while the Soviets have more than 250 new SS-20s within striking range of Europe, NATO as yet has no weapons with a reciprocal capability. The original 1979 decision to deploy the U.S.-built T.N.F was intended to offset precisely that advantage. The "roughly equal" figures cited by the Soviets are juggled and distorted. Moscow counts all nuclear-armed U.S. and allied aircraft capable of reaching the Soviet Union, but conveniently omits the hundreds of their own planes with the same range. Secretary of State Haig pointed out last week that the Soviets have enough missiles and aircraft to give them about a 3-to-l advantage over the U.S. in European-based nuclear forces.

Moscow's repeated proposals for T.N.F. reductions invite similar skepticism. So far, the Soviets have merely offered to reduce the number of SS-20s in exchange for NATO'S scrapping its new deployment plans altogether. That, obviously, would be a good deal for the Soviets. So would their call for a moratorium on new T.N.F, which would leave all of Moscow's existing weaponry in place. Addressing this point last week, Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle explained, "We have categorically rejected a freeze because that would leave the Soviets with a monopoly of long-range theater nuclear missiles."

Another theme of Moscow's peace campaign is its call for a U.S.-Soviet pledge disavowing the first use of nuclear weapons. Although Haig last week said that such professions of "moderation and sensitivity on the question [were] not unwelcome," Washington had sound reason to be dubious. For one thing, the Soviets have shown little willingness to respect grand-sounding declarations they have signed in the past, such as the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Accords.

Moreover, a pledge not to use nuclear weapons first would weaken the doctrine of "extended deterrence," the American nuclear umbrella that covers Western Europe. For that doctrine to remain credible, the U.S. must retain the option of first using nuclear weapons against an attack on Western Europe by the Warsaw Pact's numerically superior conventional forces. If a war in Europe were limited to conventional arms, the Soviets would be heavily favored to win.

Although Moscow's latest peace overtures were obviously self-serving, experts from a wide variety of backgrounds also saw a sincere desire for some arms control behind the latest Soviet peace moves. According to Dimitri Simes, a Soviet emigre and scholar at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Moscow seriously wants negotiations but expects little progress as long as the Americans refuse to revive the overall SALT negotiations.

Says Brookings' Sonnenfeldt:

"They do feel jeopardized by what is brewing in the West and genuinely want to slow that down if they can." In Moscow, Historian Roy Medvedev, one of the Soviet Union's leading independent thinkers, says: "Our military budget is already at the limit of what the country can afford without cutting back on vital sectors of the civilian economy. Our leaders sincerely do not want an arms race."

Just how sincere the Soviets are on that point will be tested when the T.N.F. talks begin on Nov. 30. As Sonnenfeldt puts it, "If Brezhnev really has something up his sleeve, we'll see it when they sit down at the table, not before." But if the Soviet leader's counting methods are any indication, there may be considerable wrangling before the two sides even agree on a common starting point for discussion. Furthermore, despite their professed desire to negotiate, the Soviets have little incentive to make serious concessions as long as the peace movement in Europe threatens to block NATO's missile deployment.

For its part, the Reagan Administration has not yet even drawn up its final bargaining proposals. There is still disagreement between the State and Defense departments over which systems to count, how to verify the desired limitations and prohibitions, and how much latitude to give U.S. negotiators to work out compromises.

As the long-awaited negotiations approach, both sides clearly have far to go before any solid arms control agreement can be reached. And in the interim, Leonid Brezhnev and other Soviet officials will surely continue to try to discredit the U.S. and weaken NATO, by exploiting the growing fears in Europe of nuclear warfare.

--By Thomas A. Sancton. Reported by Eric Amfitheatrof/Moscow and Strobe Talbott/Washington

With reporting by Eric Amfitheatrof, Strobe Talbott

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.