At Odds with Nearly Everybody

By GEORGE J. CHURCH

After AWACS vote, the Administration is adrift in the Mideast

They want to be pro-Arab and pro-Israel, for Prince Fahd's peace plan and for Camp David; they want to avoid alienating [Jordan 's King] Hussein but still stay anti-P.L.O. I wish them luck in making that miracle work.

That was the impression of Ronald Reagan's Middle East policy that one American Jewish leader drew from briefings of his colleagues by White House aides and State Department officials last week. The Administration might quarrel with portions of his description, but in spirit it was accurate enough. Seeking to balance conflicting pressure from Israelis, Arabs and European allies in the wake of winning Senate approval for the sale of AWACS radar planes to Saudi Arabia, the Administration found itself at odds with nearly everybody. Luck most certainly will be needed to avoid provoking even more anger, and the President and his aides did not have much luck last week.

There were a few positive developments, notably indications of a renewed Israeli effort to accelerate negotiations with Egypt toward finding some form of autonomy for Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. But any hopeful signs were overshadowed by a vituperative Israeli blast against the Administration's friends in Riyadh and by tough talk from the newly outspoken Saudis, who went so far as to suggest bringing the Soviet Union into Middle East diplomacy. Even Reagan's success in forging a warm, personal relationship with Hussein was less cheering than it might be: at the end of a visit to Washington, the Jordanian King surprised his host by disclosing that he had agreed to buy SA-6 antiaircraft missiles from the Soviets. Altogether, the week's news reinforced an impression that the Administration is improvising day to day in Middle East diplomacy rather than following a careful strategy. Said one American lobbyist for Israel, alluding to U.S. efforts to build a radar-eluding airplane: "Reagan's Middle East policy is like the Stealth--you can't see it or hear it, but it sure bombs a lot."

The focus of much of the trouble was the eight-point plan put forward in August by Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Fahd. The plan envisions creation of an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, with predominantly Arab East Jerusalem as its capital. But the plan also hints at recognition of Israel's right to exist, and that has belatedly aroused Washington's interest.

In the first flush of euphoria after his AWACS victory, Reagan asserted that "we couldn't agree with all the points, nor could the Israelis," but nonetheless called the Fahd plan "a beginning point for negotiations." He elaborated later: "The most significant part is that they [the Saudis] recognize Israel as a nation to be negotiated with."

Those remarks only intensified Israeli fears that the AWACS sale confirms a swing of U.S. diplomatic support away from Israel toward the Arabs. Opening the winter session of Israel's parliament, the Knesset, Prime Minister Menachem Begin assailed Saudi Arabia as "the petrodollar desert kingdom where the darkness of the Middle Ages reigns, with the cutting off of hands and heads, with a corruption that cries out to high heaven." The Fahd plan, said Begin, is merely "a plan designed for Israel's liquidation." He added: "Those eight points cannot serve as any basis for any discussion whatsoever." Begin's essential objections are that the Fahd plan does not really recognize Israel's right to exist, and that an independent Palestinian state would be dominated by the Palestine Liberation Organization, which Israelis view as a terrorist gang bent on the destruction of the Jewish state.

As a sign of displeasure, Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon postponed a planned visit to the U.S. to discuss "strategic cooperation" between America and Israel. Later, Sharon agreed to go after all at the end of this month, but in opening a new Jewish settlement on the West Bank, he declared: "Our answer to the eight [Fahd] points is eight new Israeli settlements." Israeli Ambassador Ephraim Evron lodged a protest in Washington against U.S. praise for the Fahd plan, and Begin followed up by announcing plans to send a bipartisan Israeli delegation, representing both his own Likud bloc and the opposition alignment led by the Labor Party, to the U.S. to lobby against it.

The Reagan Administration hastened to reassure the Israelis that it was not endorsing the Fahd plan, merely looking for a way to involve Arab states other than Egypt in peace negotiations with Israel. The U.S., officials said, remains committed to the peace process laid down in the Egyptian-Israeli accords reached at Camp David in 1978. Secretary of State Alexander Haig broadcast that message in testimony to Congress, in a meeting with leaders of the United Jewish Appeal and in a letter to Begin. One Administration official conceded that Reagan had "badly miscalculated" in mentioning the Fahd plan publicly. But a senior Reagan aide added: "It is unreasonable for anyone to expect us to say that if there is no progress in pursuing the Camp David accords, we will never ever think of anything else. That's sort of crazy."

The Saudis did nothing to help the Administration reassure the Israelis. Officials in Riyadh talked as if they were intent on confirming Begin's darkest suspicions. Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al Faisal asserted that the Fahd plan implied that recognition of Israel's right to exist might not come until after creation of a Palestinian state, and Fahd added that such a state would indeed be run by the P.L.O. Said Fahd: "I cannot imagine an independent Palestinian state without the P.L.O.'s approval and leadership." Worse still, from the U.S. viewpoint, Foreign Minister Saud declared that the proper forum for negotiating an Arab-Israeli settlement would be the United Nations Security Council, in which the Soviets participate, and he predicted that the Soviets will give the Fahd plan their support.

How much weight should be given to these Saudi statements is problematic. The Saudis have no diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. and have often denounced Communism as "godless." They may merely be trying to win a consensus in favor of the Fahd plan from pro-Soviet states at an Arab summit scheduled to convene in Fez, Morocco, on Nov. 25. Says one European diplomat in Beirut: "The Saudis want Syrian and, if possible, Libyan support, and they want Washington to realize that America is not running the only game in town. So even though they still fear the Soviets, they find it useful to mention them." Whatever the Saudi game, the Reagan Administration sold the AWACS deal partly as a way of enlisting Saudi support in a "strategic consensus" against Soviet penetration of the Middle East. Saudi talk of involving Moscow in the diplomacy of the area is just about the last thing Washington needs.

The Reagan Administration could take no comfort, either, from the outcome of a visit to Riyadh last week by British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington. Speaking for the Council of Ministers of the European Community, of which he currently is president, Carrington reportedly expressed some reservations about the Fahd plan. But he also was said to have agreed that nothing more can be expected from the Camp David process after Israel's scheduled withdrawal from the last portion of the Sinai Peninsula next April, and that the Palestinians must be brought into negotiations with Israel. Haig at week's end protested those remarks to the British government. The Secretary of State said he had urged Lord Carrington to "cool it."

In trouble with Israel, the Saudis and its European allies, the Reagan Administration eagerly welcomed Hussein on a state visit to Washington early last week. American Administrations have long viewed Jordan as being among the most moderate of Arab states, and have been eager to involve It in negotiations with Israel. Reagan in last fall's campaign called Jordan "the key" to peace in the Middle East, since the West Bank had been ruled by Jordan before the Israelis conquered it during the Six-Day War of 1967.

Reagan and Hussein seemed to get along well, and the Jordanian King pronounced himself "more reassured" than after any of his many previous visits to Washington. (He first came to the U.S. during the Eisenhower Administration, and has now conferred with six U.S. Presidents.) Hussein's young American-born wife, Queen Nur, the former Lisa Halaby, and Nancy Reagan also posed amiably for pictures. But little of substance was accomplished. Hussein politely but firmly repeated his refusal to join in the Camp David process, called the Fahd plan "worthy of consideration," and insisted that the P.L.O. ought to be brought into any negotiations with Israel. His announcement that he had agreed to buy ground-to-air missiles from the Soviets was an especially startling setback for U.S. officials, who knew that Hussein had been talking to Moscow, but had no inkling that such a deal had actually been concluded.

Hussein's action is probably the result of his impatience with the U.S., which has hesitated to provide Jordan with weapons to counter an ominous military buildup by its pro-Soviet neighbor, Syria. Even so, Washington must now cope with a Soviet effort to court both Syria and Jordan. Jordan's arms buying in Moscow, growled one senior State Department official, "will clearly complicate our relationship in the defense-supply field, and we would just as soon not have that complication."

The most hopeful note in all this activity was struck by Menachem Begin. The Israeli Prime Minister had preceded his blast against the Saudis and the Fahd plan with a pledge to strive for a "breakthrough" in ministerial-level negotiations with Egypt on autonomy for the 1.3 million Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, talks that are to resume in Cairo this week. Begin promised a major effort to define the powers of a Palestinian self-governing council, and even hinted that Israel might begin a military withdrawal from the West Bank before an autonomy agreement is concluded. The Reagan Administration at present is reluctant to assign a special envoy to mediate the talks, but if they show evidence of solid progress It might do so. The envoy might even be Secretary of State Haig.

The welcome indication that there could be life in the Camp David process was, however, clouded by two troubling developments. On the West Bank itself, Palestinian youths stoned Israeli vehicles and set fires in the streets protesting against autonomy in favor of a P.L.O.-ruled state. In response, the Israeli military authorities closed Bir Zeit University, the first such action in more than a year. Worse, a dispute arose about the composition of a multinational peace-keeping force in the Sinai after Israeli withdrawal.

Britain, France, Italy and The Netherlands have agreed in principle to join such a force, a move hailed both by the U.S., whose soldiers also would participate, and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. But Begin declared last week that Israel "will never agree" to participation in the force by European countries that continue to push for P.L.O. participation in peace talks. At the same time, Saudi Arabia counseled the Europeans not to join because the presence of their soldiers in a Sinai peace-keeping force would imply approval of the Camp David process rather than the Fahd plan.

The Reagan Administration compounded its Middle East troubles last week by asking Congress to approve a sale by a subsidiary of Ford Motor Co. of $79 million worth of components to a French company that is building three communications satellites for a 22-member Arab consortium. Members of the consortium include pro-terrorist Libya, Marxist South Yemen and the P.L.O. After Israel and its American supporters protested that the U.S. was planning to help sworn enemies, the Administration hastily withdrew the proposal. Both Haig and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger said they had known nothing about it. Trivial in itself, the incident was one more disconcerting indication that the Administration still lacks a well-thought-out strategy for dealing with the Middle East.

--By George J. Church. Reported by David Aikman/Jerusalem and Johanna McGeary/Washington

With reporting by DAVID AIKMAN, Johanna McGeary

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