Monday, Oct. 12, 1981
Collision Course for AWACS
By WALTER ISAACSON
The White House sends a Saudi deal to a surly Congress
There was no compromise. The Senate had fervently hoped for some modification of the Administration's plan to sell five Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) jets to Saudi Arabia, some face-saving deal that would give the U.S. more control over use of the sophisticated radar planes. Yet Ronald Reagan decided last week to place his presidential power and prestige behind a proposal that most members had already declared unacceptable. "I have proposed this sale because it significantly enhances our own vital national security interests in the Middle East," he said at a news conference a few hours after officially submitting the agreement to Congress.* The head-on battle he thus opened will be the first major congressional test of his foreign policy.
Reagan argued that the AWACS sale, one of several topics he touched on at the news conference (see following story), was needed to keep Saudi oilfields safe, and that the planes posed no threat to the security of Israel. Said Reagan: "By contributing to the security and stability of the region, it serves Israel's long-range interests."
The President also broached a sensitive issue: "It is not the business of other nations to make American foreign policy," he said. The nation he meant was Israel, and it was Reagan's strongest attack yet on the lobby that has been highly effective thus far on Israel's behalf in encouraging opposition to the sale. The American Israel Public Affairs Committee, the organization leading that effort, has been presenting a detailed case against the sale to Senators and Congressmen for the past five months. The lobbying also has a strong grass-roots component, with Jewish leaders in each state who agree with the lobby's aim being asked to contact their Congressmen. For their part, the Saudis have hired a high-priced Washington consultant, Frederick Dutton, but efforts on their behalf have generally been quieter. Says Dutton: "The Saudis take the position that this is a battle for the Administration to fight, not them. If I had my way, I'd have bumper stickers plastered all over town that say REAGAN OR BEGIN."
From the beginning, the Administration has mishandled its own AWACS lobbying effort. Secretary of State Alexander Haig, who recognized that the sale might be doomed, suggested to the White House that National Security Adviser Richard Allen be put in charge of it. The recommendation, some insiders claim, was a clever way to cripple further one of Haig's rivals by sloughing off on him a thankless task. In fact, Haig had facetiously suggested that Vice President George Bush, another sometime adversary, might be the best man to take charge of selling the sale.
Some sympathetic White House aides say that Allen, who reports to the President mainly through Counsellor Edwin Meese, is now being unfairly cast as a scapegoat. Most insiders, however, feel that he has managed to make a difficult situation worse by his inept efforts on the Hill. "He had neither the clout nor the brains to pull it off," said one Senate aide.
Allen was, in fact, relegated to the sidelines this week as efforts by Democratic Senator John Glenn to put together a compromise continued. Glenn, who emerged as the Administration's last best hope in making the sale acceptable to his colleagues, had been pushing a plan that would allow American airmen to share control of the AWACS with the Saudis. At the beginning of the week, however, the talks seemed stalled. The White House version of a compromise did not include any of the important written assurances --including a provision to buy back the planes if U.S.-Saudi relations soured --that Glenn said were necessary to win his support. Haig canceled meetings at the U.N. and flew down to Washington to take control. Yet the Secretary of State was reluctant to force the Saudis into new concessions or to include key Senators in the discussions. And the reports Haig received from the new U.S. ambassador in Riyadh, Richard Murphy, who rushed there on Monday, were pessimistic: the Saudis would not accept joint control of the planes. After one last 24-hour postponement in sending the package to the Hill, Haig was forced to present a plan that included only the Administration's own unwritten "understanding" that American instructors would be flying on the planes for at least the next ten years.
Haig tried to put the best face on the deal. In closed session, he told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that he was "proud" to announce "new" assurances on protection of the planes and access to the data they collect. The Senators were not buying. Later, in an open session, when Haig argued that the sale was a test of U.S. friendship with Saudi Arabia, Republican Rudy Boschwitz of Minnesota waved a computer printout listing $38 billion in previous U.S. arms sales to the Saudis. Snapped Boschwitz: "What's the next test?"
Fifty Senators, including Glenn, promptly re-signed a resolution opposing the sale, and they said they had at least six other firm supporters. But even if they can block the transaction, there will be no real victors. As Reagan said in his press conference: "Other countries must not get a perception that we are being unduly influenced one way or the other with regard to foreign policy." And American relations and influence with the Saudis, who will probably end up buying similar surveillance planes from the British, will be strained.
Lamented Glenn: "I honestly appreciate, very fully, Saudi needs and our needs in this area. I'm still hopeful something can be worked out." Reagan, however, is not about to withdraw his plan and negotiate a new one. He has already begun a campaign of persuasion like the one that helped roll over opposition to his tax and budget cuts. "It will be as active and vigorous an effort as anything done in this Administration so far," says Meese. This time, however, it may not work. --By Walter Isaacson. Reported by Laurence I. Barrett and Johanna McGeary/ Washington
*The plan will almost surely be defeated in the Democratic-controlled House. The big battle will come in the Senate, where it also seems doomed. To block the sale, both chambers must reject it within 30 days of last week's submission. Amendments are not allowed.
With reporting by Laurence I. Barrett, Johanna McGeary/Washington
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