Closing a Window, Slowly

By James Kelly. Bruce W. Nelan/Washington

Reagan decides to build the MX and B-1 but leaves a few doors open

The "window of vulnerability" is one of the more intriguing, and unsettling, concepts to occupy the restless minds of defense planners in years. It holds that the increasing size and accuracy of Soviet missiles will soon make the U.S. land-based nuclear force vulnerable to a first strike. Ronald Reagan last week moved to close that window, slowly, but serious doubts remained about whether he had succeeded.

In a press briefing at the White House, Reagan announced that he had decided to go ahead with production of both the MX missile and the B-1 bomber. Those much disputed weapons systems would be part of a $180 billion modernization of America's nuclear forces, a program that would upgrade all three legs of the nation's strategic triad of air, sea- and land-based nuclear weapons. With Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger at his side, Reagan said he plans to deploy at least 100 MX missiles, which are capable of traveling 8,000 miles and dropping their warheads within 100 yards of a target. The first ones will be ready by 1986. But the President scuttled the much criticized "shell game" plan, first proposed by former President Jimmy Carter. Under that scheme, also known as the "race track" or "drag strip" option, 200 MXs would be shuttled periodically among 4,600 shelters in Utah and Nevada to keep the Soviets guessing. Said Reagan: "No matter how many shelters we might build, the Soviets can build more missiles, more quickly and just as cheaply."

Instead, the President proposed placing the first batch of 36 missiles, each carrying ten warheads, in rebuilt and "superhardened" Titan II missile sites in Arizona, Arkansas and Kansas. The President said he wanted to keep his options open on how to base the missiles permanently and pledged to make up his mind no later than by 1984. Three possibilities for that are now being studied:

> To load the missiles onto a new, as yet undesigned generation of large, slow aircraft, dubbed "Big Bird," which would carry the MX aloft on permanent patrol and launch it in midair.

>To perfect an antiballistic missile that would protect silos containing the MX by knocking out incoming enemy warheads.

> To place the MX in extra-deep silos sunk into mountainsides, thus allowing the missile to survive a nuclear attack.

Reagan also announced that he wants to build 100 new B-1 bombers, at a cost of $200 million apiece. The plane will be more sophisticated in both wing design and electronic equipment than the 1977 version scrapped by Carter. It is expected to start rolling off the assembly lines of Rockwell International by 1986. Meanwhile, some of the nation's 349 aging B-52s, whose ability to penetrate Soviet air defenses has been steadily eroding, will be modernized to serve as carriers for the cruise missile. Reagan also declared that research would continue on an entirely new bomber, the "Stealth," whose design enables it to thwart enemy detection by means of its streamlined shape and radar-absorbent coating. The Stealth, however, will not be finished until the 1990s; the refurbished B-52s and the new B-1s are designed to fill the strategic void until the next decade.

Among Reagan's other proposals:

> To continue building one Trident nuclear submarine every year. The Pentagon will also steam ahead with its plan to develop a new missile for the Trident, called the D5, which would be the first submarine-launched rocket with warheads accurate enough to destroy enemy missile silos.

> To upgrade radar and satellite systems so the President would be kept in better touch with American forces during a nuclear attack.

> To improve North America's air defense, in cooperation with Canada, by adding six AWACS radar planes and five squadrons of F-15 fighters.

> To continue research on antiballistic missile systems, including some that might be based in outer space.

The decision to drop the gargantuan desert shell game was immediately praised by residents of Utah and Nevada who did not want to see their states turned into a missile range. "It's a great victory," exulted Susan Dutson, publisher of the Millard County (Utah) Chronicle. Republican Governor Robert List of Nevada said he "couldn't be happier. We would have been simply totaled out by the thing. I spell relief n-o-M-X." Said John Hooper, a public land specialist with the Sierra Club: "It's good news. We're very pleased."

The leadership of the powerful Mormon Church had opposed the project, as did Republican Senator Paul Laxalt of Nevada, a good friend of Reagan's. Laxalt freely admits that he "used all the influence I could bring to bear" to dissuade Reagan from the shell-game option, but Administration officials denied that politics--or friendship--played a part in the President's decision. "That is absolutely wrong," said Weinberger. Nonetheless, White House officials were mindful of the opposition, and realized that the drag strip approach might have got bogged down in court challenges for years.

The President's plan was generally well received on Capitol Hill. "Good, sound and sensible," pronounced Republican Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker. In the House, Democrat Ronald Dellums of California called the MX decision "a limited first step toward sanity." Yet Republican John Tower of Texas, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, declared himself "gravely disappointed" with Reagan's decision not to play the MX shell game. Said Tower: "This program seriously degrades the planned modernization of our land-based leg of the triad."

Will Reagan's plan indeed slam shut the "window of vulnerability"? The Pentagon claims that the program will by 1990 roughly double the number of U.S. strategic weapons that could survive a Soviet nuclear attack. But this claim is neither explained nor justified by Pentagon officials. Indeed, the Administration has done nothing to move Minuteman missiles out of the vulnerability window, and the MX has no basing mode of its own as yet. As long as either remains in a fixed-site silo, it is vulnerable to attack.

Of all the basing options for the MX, Weinberger clearly favors the "Big Bird" alternative. But the plane is still a drawing-board fantasy, and it is doubtful whether enough could be built at a reasonable price by 1989, when all 100 MX missiles are scheduled to be completed. Perfecting an anti-ballistic missile to defend the MX raises a whole new range of hazards. An ABM system must be close to 100% effective to be worth building at all, and senior Defense officials admit that no technology exists to meet that exacting standard. In addition, an ABM system could not be deployed unless the U.S. renounces or renegotiates the 1972 ABM treaty with the Soviet Union.

As for the B-1 bomber decision, critics contend that the new plane will be obsolete by the late 1980s, when the Soviets will have beefed up their air-defense system. Indeed, Politics Professor William Kaufmann of M.I.T. argues that the Reagan plan proves the Administration is not worried about short-term vulnerability, and has only delayed solving the long-term problems. Says Kaufmann: "The window of vulnerability is not closing. It has simply been moved."

Despite the fact that most of the Pentagon brass backed the race track option for the MX, the White House rejected the plan both because of its high price tag (estimated cost: $75 billion) and because it is believed the system would still be vulnerable to Soviet missiles. Says a top White House aide: "The race track was dead as far back as the election campaign."

With the drag strip dumped, Weinberger preferred simply developing the smaller, so-called common missile--it could be fired from submarines or planes --rather than the more accurate MX; he then switched to a preference for basing the MX temporarily in C-5A transport planes. The wrangling dragged on for months, with the White House growing frustrated over Weinberger's dithering. Finally, Reagan chose to house the MX temporarily in the Titan missile silos while other options are studied further.

Though serious doubts remain about the wisdom of Reagan's package, the President will probably win most, if not all, of his program from a defense-minded Congress. And the President pointedly remarked at his briefing that he considered all the new weapons systems negotiable in any future arms talks with Moscow. But the judgment still lingers that Reagan, after claiming that the U.S. had allowed a window of vulnerability to fly open, had still failed to shut it tight. --By James Kelly. Reported by Bruce W. Nelan/Washington

With reporting by Bruce W. Nelan/Washington

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