Risking Political Fallout

By WALTER ISAACSON

Despite some European fears, the U.S. decides to build the neutron bomb

Criminal!" declared one Soviet commentator. TASS, the government news agency, said that the decision illustrated Ronald Reagan's "cannibalistic instincts," and was "an extremely dangerous step toward the further spiraling of the arms race and enhancing the threat of nuclear war." Some Western European officials worried that the political fallout would damage the Atlantic Alliance by bringing on a new surge of pacifism and neutralism. But President Reagan, relaxing at his California ranch, was unfazed by the outcry. Said he of the Soviets:

"They are squealing like they're sitting on a sharp nail simply because we now are showing the will that we are not going to let them get to the point of dominance where they can someday issue to the free world an ultimatum of 'Surrender or die.' " Reagan added that some of those "who under the name of pacifism in Western Europe" are opposing the decision "are really carrying the propaganda ball for the Soviet Union."

The uproar was over the Administration's decision to build the so-called neutron bomb, which is designed to kill as many people as a regular hydrogen bomb ten times its size, and yet cause less damage to nearby buildings (see diagram). U.S. military planners say that small neutron warheads installed on howitzer shells or Lance missiles, which have ranges of 20 and 70 miles, respectively, are the best way to deter or counter the most feared conventional attack by Soviet forces: a massive tank assault across Central Europe. (Warsaw Pact countries have 44,000 tanks compared with NATO'S 11,000.) Said the President: "This weapon was particularly designed to offset the great superiority that the Soviet Union has on the Western front." The Reagan Administration plans to stockpile the neutron bombs in the U.S. But they could be deployed in Europe, or any other area threatened by invasion, in a matter of hours. U.S. officials say that such deployment will occur only after consultation with allies.

But the Administration's announcement about the neutron bomb stirred some fears in Europe. The argument, which has evolved since deployment of the weapon was first discussed four years ago, is that the danger of the bomb stems from its very nature. Because it is so focused and so restricted in its effects, its opponents say, NATO generals might be too quick to use it if the Soviets attacked, thereby causing Moscow to retaliate with its own nuclear weapons. Thus it might become the catalyst for escalating a conventional war into a nuclear confrontation. Says retired General Wolf von Baudissin, who served as chief of NATO's planning staff: "There are already too many new technologies that threaten stability over the next decade. The only solution is to control armaments programs before production starts."

European neutralists, who want to dissociate their governments from becoming too involved in the superpower struggle, also fear that the weapon will make their soil the eventual battleground in an East-West confrontation.

Domestic political opposition to the neutron warhead is particularly acute in West Germany, where Chancellor Helmut Schmidt faces a strong disarmament movement within his own Social Democratic Party. The S.P.D. has called upon the government, in which it is the senior coalition partner, to make clear that "these weapons will not be deployed in Europe." Said Deputy Party Chief Hans-Juergen Wischnewski: "The Reagan Administration is obviously not yet well enough acquainted with the situation in Europe."

The U.S. decision to assemble the neutron bomb will further complicate other controversial weapons issues facing the allies, such as the upgrading of NATO's medium-range missiles as part of the planned modernization of theater nuclear forces (T.N.F.). Britain, West Germany and Italy have agreed to base new cruise and Pershing II missiles in their countries in an attempt to match the Soviets' tactical nuclear buildup. But they insisted that the T.N.F. modernization would proceed only on the condition that the U.S. would begin negotiations with the Soviet Union to limit tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. These talks are scheduled to begin later this year. Says Denis Healey, deputy leader of the British Labor Party: "The neutron decision will inflict severe damage on the Atlantic Alliance just when its cohesion is dangerously threatened by the argument over deployment of the cruise and Pershing II missiles."

Not all of the European reaction was unfavorable to the Administration's decision. France, which is not a member of the NATO military organization and is developing its own neutron warhead, gave what amounted to a qualified endorsement of the weapon. Said Charles Hernu, the Defense Minister in the new Socialist government of Franc,ois Mitterrand: "The neutron bomb must not obscure the reality of the threats posed by the [Soviet] Euromissiles." In West Germany, Franz Josef Strauss, who was the conservative Christian Democratic opponent to Schmidt in last year's election, said that the "dismal situation of defense budgets" in NATO countries had left Reagan with no real alternative.

NATO'S inability, or unwillingness, to match the Soviet buildup in Europe is one of the reasons the Administration has cited for launching a neutron program. In 1977, following the same reasoning, President Jimmy Carter tried to convince NATO allies to let the U.S. deploy the warheads in Europe. West German Chancellor Schmidt, despite the opposition within his own party, at that time privately assured Carter that his government would eventually allow their deployment if other NATO countries would follow suit. Publicly, Schmidt said then, as he did last week, that the production of the bomb was "solely an American decision." But other NATO nations kept postponing a decision about accepting the weapon. In April 1978 Carter finally, and abruptly, decided to quit trying to win European support for the bomb. The U.S., he said, would merely build the components of the weapon and defer final assembly or deployment of the warheads. Conceded Carter's Defense Secretary Harold Brown at the time: "We could have handled it better."

Caspar Weinberger, Reagan's Defense Secretary, had the Carter reversal in mind last week when he said: "Had we done anything other than go ahead with [assembling the bomb], we would have contributed enormously to the impression that the U.S. was ... no more decisive or strong or resolute than we were three or four years ago." Defending the decision to produce the bomb, Weinberger reversed the argument of the weapon's critics, who say that, since the weapon is more likely to be used than standard nuclear weapons, it is potentially more dangerous. Wrote Weinberger last week:

"The logical conclusion of this reasoning is that we should make our weapons as indiscriminately damaging as possible--so that we would be deterred from using them." The fact that the neutron bomb can be used with fewer civilian casualties and damage, says the Defense Secretary, is precisely what makes it credible as a deterrent. Addressing the Geneva Disarmament Conference last week, Charles Flowerree, the U.S. representative, said: "Enhanced radiation weapons are designed not to make nuclear war more thinkable, but to make aggression less so."

Although a strong case has been made for constructing the bomb, there remain serious questions about the timing of the announcement. Even those who approve of the warhead, such as Secretary of State Alexander Haig (his decision to resign as NATO commander in 1979 was precipitated in part by Carter's reversal on the weapon), argued that the decision should have been delayed until next spring. By then the program to introduce theater nuclear weapons into Europe would be farther advanced, U.S.-NATO relations would probably be better, and the start of arms reduction talks with the Soviets would likely have quieted antinuclear passions in Europe.

At the National Security Council meeting last month, when the question of when to announce the decision was discussed, Weinberger sharply disagreed with Haig. As he explained last week: "I think the same people who object to the manufacture of this weapon today are going to object in November and December and January and April."

He stressed that because the Administration would stockpile the warheads in the U.S., there was no need to consult with NATO partners.

Stated he: "The difficult decisions affecting U.S. forces ... cannot be turned over to even our closest allies." According to Presidential Counsellor Edwin Meese, Reagan sided with Weinberger because he felt that "any delay would have been too costly" and would "show a lack of resolve." last week's announce-Moscow implied that it would make its own neutron bomb. The prospect of a neutron bomb race increases the need for a resumption of some form of arms control talks between the two superpowers.

Speaking to the American Bar Association in New Orleans last week, Haig stressed the Administration's belief that the buildup in U.S. military strength would lead the Soviets to act more cautiously abroad. Said he: "We are creating conditions that make restraint and reciprocity the most realistic Soviet options."

But he also sounded a more conciliatory tone than he had in the past, promising that the U.S. would respond in kind to any Soviet efforts to reduce international tensions "that are so costly to both our societies." He did not specifically mention the neutron bomb in his address, but last week's events made his main theme all the more compelling: "We must compete with the Soviet Union to protect freedom, but we must also search for cooperation to protect mankind." --By Walter Isaacson.

Reported by Bruce W. Nelan and Roberto Suro/Washington

With reporting by Bruce W. Nelan, Roberto Suro

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.