Taking a Great Leap Forward

By James Kelly

Haig forges ties with China but angers Moscow

"It was somewhat of a nervous time, but we did take care of a lot of good business." So said Secretary of State Alexander Haig to President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines in Manila last week, summarizing his three days of talks with Chinese leaders in Peking. Haig probably understated both the achievements and the hazards of what had been accomplished. The Secretary not only enhanced a U.S.-China relationship that had been deteriorating since Ronald Reagan took office but moved the two countries closer to a partnership that was sure to alarm the Soviets. The most visible symbol of the new relationship: an announcement that the U.S. was willing, in principle, to sell arms to China.

There was both peril and promise in that offer. The Soviets are all but paranoid about the Chinese, with whom they share a 4,100-mile border. To the Kremlin, Haig's trip was one more proof that virtually every policy move by the new Administration is dictated by its anti-Soviet stance. The announcement of the arms sale, no matter how small, added to tensions. In Moscow, Georgi Arbatov, director of the Soviet Institute for the Study of the U.S.A. and Canada, told TIME Diplomatic Correspondent Strobe Talbott that the Haig trip was "all part of a campaign of blackmail against the Soviet Union and is just further proof that the talk coming out of Washington about resuming relations is insincere."

Some diplomatic observers wondered about the timing of the arms-sale decision, which was made with seeming haste at a National Security Council meeting shortly before Haig flew off to Peking. At the moment, the Soviets are intensely concerned about liberalizing trends in Poland. A new U.S.China accord might well increase Moscow's sense of isolation and lead the Kremlin leaders to conclude that nothing would be lost by cracking down on the Poles. U.S. officials insist that the arms-sale offer was merely a natural step in improving relations with Peking. They contend that the U.S. has retained flexibility in future dealings with China and, as a consequence, with the Soviet Union as well.

The Secretary of State down-played the weapons announcement, pointing out that no specific request for arms had been received from the Chinese and that each application would be reviewed on a "case-by-case basis" after consulting with Congress and America's allies. Though the Chinese will most likely be interested in purchasing defensive hardware, such as antitank weapons and antiaircraft missiles, their shopping list will not be long. Strapped for funds, Peking has placed a ow priority on modernization of its military forces and has slashed its defense budget for this year by 17%. Said one U.S. official: "As an arms market, the Chinese are somewhere between Togo and Zaire."

Haig, who had helped arrange Richard Nixon's historic visit to China in 1972, was treated with respect by his hosts. He met first for two rounds of talks with Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Huang Hua, then conferred with Vice Premier Bo Yibo, who is in charge of China's economic policy. When Haig described Reagan's plans for deregulation and decentralization of the U.S. economy, Bo Yibo, who has overseen sweeping budgetary and tax reforms in China, exclaimed: "Your program sounds just like ours!" Haig then met with Defense Minister Geng Biao and spent two hours with Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping. Said one observer: "They really hit it off." The Secretary also had a session with Premier Zhao Ziyang, who accorded Haig a high honor: he received him inside the walled section of the old Imperial City, where China's top officials live.

Foremost among Haig's objectives was to strike a strategic consensus with the Chinese in order to "limit the Soviet Union's opportunities for exploiting its military power." With Huang, Haig launched into an impassioned presentation of the Administration's foreign policy, pointing out that where U.S. and Chinese policies diverged, such as in southern Africa and the Middle East, the differences were in tactics rather than objectives. In effusive toasts at the inevitable eleven-course banquets, Haig noted that "our objectives in practically every part of the world are similar if not identical." In talks with reporters, he constantly described China as "a friendly, nonaligned nation." The Chinese were considerably more restrained. At the farewell feast in Peking's Great Hall of the People, Huang noted that "our two sides do not entirely share the same views" and expressed polite skepticism that the Reagan Administration would do any better than Jimmy Carter's in living up to its promises.

The thorniest issue, as expected, was American support of Taiwan. Huang argued that Reagan's friendliness toward the Taipei government had stiffened its resolve against reconciliation with Peking. Haig responded that the U.S. would continue its "unofficial relationship" with Taiwan and afterward told reporters cryptically that "this was understood" by the Chinese. He assured Huang that no decision had been made on whether to sell Taiwan the FX jet, an advanced American fighter plane, and that Taiwan's arms needs would be determined strictly on military--not political--terms.

In addition to the arms-sale offer, Haig made one important concession. He promised his hosts that the Administration would introduce legislation in Congress to amend more than 100 U.S. laws that treat Peking as a Communist enemy and, as the Secretary put it, "lump China with the Soviet bloc." The loosening of export controls will allow Peking to purchase sophisticated hardware that has civilian as well as military uses, such as radar equipment and computers.

The Reagan Administration last week also announced the resumption of military aid to Pakistan. Under the proposal, Islamabad would immediately be allowed to buy U.S. weapons, including F-16 fighter planes. Starting in 1982, the U.S. would grant Pakistan economic development loans and military sales credits worth $3 billion over the next five years. President Carter suspended aid in April 1979, after Pakistan refused to submit its nuclear development program, widely considered capable of producing atomic bombs, to international inspection. The Reagan Administration views Pakistan, which borders Afghanistan, as a bulwark against Soviet expansion in the region and argues that building a security relationship with the dictatorial and unpopular regime of General Mohammed Zia ul-Haq is the best way to persuade Islamabad to curb its nuclear ambitions.

Restrictions on the sale have been waived by the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee but not by its counterpart in the House; the Pakistani arms deal needs majorities in both houses. Congress will probably approve the package, but questions about Reagan's commitment to nuclear nonproliferation will linger. Says one congressional aide: "It is a singularly awkward moment to appear easy on Pakistan's nuclear doings." --By James Kelly.

Reported by Johanna McGeary/Washington and Gregory H. Wierzynski with Haig

With reporting by Johanna McGeary, Gregory H. Wierzynski

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