Still Shuttling for a Deal

By Marguerite Johnson

U.S. Envoy Habib struggles to defuse the missile crisis

The threat and the danger were still there. Syrian SA-6 missiles last week streaked into the sky over the Bekaa Valley to down at least one Israeli reconnaissance drone. Israel and Syria remained at loggerheads over the deployment of the Soviet-made missiles, and there was always the grave risk that one side or the other could miscalculate and ignite the region in conflict. But for the first time since the confrontation began, there was cautious optimism in both Jerusalem and Damascus that U.S. Special Envoy Philip Habib, 61, might succeed, through his patient, peripatetic diplomatic shuttle, in fashioning a resolution to the crisis--a mission that was given virtually no chance of success when he undertook it three weeks ago.

The first glimmer that Habib's talkathon might be paying off came early in the week, when Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin made the surprising announcement that his Cabinet had unanimously voted "to put no time limit whatsoever" on Habib's efforts to solve the problem through diplomatic channels. At the outset of the crisis, Begin had darkly hinted that Secretary of State Alexander Haig's envoy had only a week to work his magic, or Israel would attack the missiles. Two days after the Cabinet meeting, in what seemed to be a reassuring signal to Syria's President Hafez Assad, Begin spoke before a gathering of war veterans and flatly declared that Israel would not be the first to use force. Said an Israeli diplomat: "I would say that the chance of war now is almost nothing."

As he went about his duties, the Lebanese American, whose patient, stubborn diplomacy appeared to be the last best hope for peace in the area, was as tight-lipped as ever about his mission. "I know you guys have to make a living too," he told reporters, "but this is a serious effort that in no way would be served by public comment." Habib has skillfully managed to cool tempers during his meetings with Begin and Assad. Remarks an American diplomat involved in the shuttle: "He has a knack for timing, knowing when to act as conceptualizer one moment and a street-wise Brooklyn type the next."

After three tense and exhausting weeks on the diplomatic trail, Habib could already be credited with helping to forestall an Israeli air raid on the missile sites. But the future joustings of bitter Middle Eastern rivalries remained uncertain, even if the immediate crisis could be resolved. Said a Western diplomat: "I hate to think that he might have to live like this for a couple of years."

Increasingly it appeared that the key to a solution of the present threat might lie with Saudi Arabia, where Habib had spent two days in talks with Crown Prince Fahd and other Saudi officials. The Saudis deeply fear that if a Syrian-Israeli confrontation were to take place, the Soviets would strengthen their influence in the region. Damascus and Moscow signed a 20-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation last October. In the Saudi view, a military conflict might also foster radical politics in the area, posing yet another threat to stability and conservative Arab regimes.

The Saudi strategy seemed to be to rally a public show of Arab support for Syria against Israel--and then use Saudi dollars to buy Syrian cooperation with the Israelis on a settlement. The reputed sum: a colossal $4 billion. In return, the Saudis were said to want a restructuring of the Syrian-manned Arab Deterrent Force in Lebanon. The A.D.F. came to Lebanon in 1976 under an Arab League mandate as peace keeper in the Lebanese civil war. Originally, it included troops from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Sudan and South Yemen, but these units have since been withdrawn, leaving only the 30,000 Syrians. The Saudis would like to see the A.D.F. again broadened to include other Arab countries, a step that would help defuse charges that Syria is using the A.D.F. to occupy and control Lebanon.

In addition to the Saudi aid to Syria, the essential elements of the deal Habib was trying to shape consisted of two basic parts. First, Lebanese army units would occupy Zahle and the strategic Sannin Ridge, several miles northwest of the city, so bitterly fought over by the Syrians and the Christian Phalangists. Initially, the Lebanese units would be under Syrian control, but in time command could shift to officers sympathetic to the Christians. Second, the Syrians would quietly remove their SA-6 missiles from Lebanon's Bekaa Valley, possibly after a formal request from the Lebanese government. Israel, in turn, would exercise more discretion in its reconnaissance flights over Lebanon. Israel would also tacitly agree not to engage Syrian forces. In short, no more Syrian helicopters would be shot down in incidents like the one that sparked the present crisis. The Palestinians, meanwhile, were considering going along with an understanding that they stop shelling northern Israel in return for a halt in Israeli bombardment of their strongholds in southern Lebanon.

For all the behind-the-scenes maneuvering, neither Israel nor Syria was publicly giving in on the sticking points. Begin continued to insist that Israel would not agree to any limitations of Israeli air activity over Lebanon. Last week he appeared to be upping the ante again, when he declared that Syria must remove all missiles deployed "after the outbreak of the crisis," including those just inside the Syrian border that can strike at Israeli planes--a demand almost impossible for Damascus to meet. There also was growing concern in Jerusalem over the Saudis' emerging role as peacemaker. Some Israelis claim that the Saudis are trying to get credit for easing the crisis so that the U.S. Congress will vote to let them have supersophisticated Airborne Warning and Control System planes (AWACS).

Still, Begin, who is waging a rugged campaign for re-election on June 30, knew that there was no disposition whatsoever in Israel for a full-scale war with Syria. In fact, the SA-6 issue was superseded on the front pages last week by a national teachers' strike.

In Damascus, Assad took the unusual step of calling in U.S. reporters for a two-hour interview, his first since the missile tension began, to "address the American public." Assad had P.L.O. Chairman Yasser Arafat waiting in an anteroom as he explained that Syria had deployed the missiles "only after Israel committed direct aggression against us, attacking our helicopters, which carried food provisions to our troops in Lebanon." He charged that Israel's use of airspace over Lebanon was illegal. "Will Israel give Lebanon free access to its airspace? Will Israel allow Lebanese planes to carry out reconnaissance missions in Israeli airspace?" He concluded: "If it depended on us, I would say there would be no war. But if we are attacked by Israel, we shall fiercely defend ourselves."

At week's end Habib arrived back in Beirut to the scream and thud of some of the heaviest shelling and artillery fire since the civil war. He needed no further reminder of the urgency of attaining a broader U.S. goal: to work out a settlement among the warring factions in Lebanon so that crises would not keep on exploding like a series of land mines. To that end, Habib has also been seeking ways to strengthen Lebanon's army, to get the Syrians to take more responsibility for disruptive left-wing activities in and around Beirut, and to ease the growing militancy and sometimes separatist notions of the Lebanese Christians. Emissary Habib could be riding his shuttle for some time. -- By Marguerite Johnson. Reported by David Aikman/Jerusalem and William Stewart/Beirut

With reporting by DAVID AIKMAN, William Stewart

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