Instruments of Power at Sea

By Hugh Sidey

That remarkable American product, the aircraft carrier, is uniquely the instrument of Presidents. It is the hunkered-down warning of great power that can come alive instantly, as it did in 1972 in the mining of Haiphong harbor in Viet Nam. It can also serve as a floating fragment of American hospitality, as it did when the Kitty Hawk in 1979 helped rescue the displaced and frightened boat people of Viet Nam from their desperation in the South China Sea.

Anyone who has watched night operations from the bridge of the Enterprise or the Nimitz can claim to have witnessed the most dramatic spectacle of men and machines short of actual war. It is no wonder that a pivotal point in the new defense planning concerns aircraft carriers and the related idea of recommissioned battleships turned into platforms for cruise missiles.

Reagan's Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, 38, has felt the exhilaration of being catapulted off flight decks a hundred times as an A-6 jet bombardier-navigator in the Naval Reserve. He is a carrier man, arguing that the U.S. needs to go from twelve to 15 carrier-centered task forces to gain true "war fighting" capability. The numbers will be argued, but they are less important than the concept, which lies at the heart of the Reagan security doctrine.

Not since the advent of missiles has there been so much rethinking of how to prevent war by being prepared to fight it better. From the purpose of weapons to how to retain trained personnel, old theories are being ripped open and debated. Colorado Democrat Gary Hart belongs to a new cadre of efficiency-minded defense experts in the Senate, along with Georgia's Sam Nunn and Bill Cohen of Maine. Hart wants Lehman to think more of smaller, lighter submarines and smaller aircraft carriers for more flexibility and adaptability. Lehman works in a three-dimensional world where time, cost and efficiency so far dictate that big carriers and newly armed battleships (plus current submarines and other surface ships) imaginatively employed can make the Soviet Union a world island. But Lehman likes Hart and listens to his ideas.

The old notion that every time we needed to show our muscle we threw big budget figures at potential adversaries seems to be waning at last. True, the new national security will cost more. But even the conservative think tank, the Heritage Foundation, has called for caution in defense spending, more thought and imagination, fewer wasted dollars.

Some of the modern ferment comes from a retired fighter pilot named John Boyd, a tactical analyst who has lingered at the Pentagon for years studying the theory of war back to China's Sun Zi (Sun Tzu) around 400 B.C. Boyd's four-hour lecture has been given dozens of times to the top military and civilian officials at the Defense Department. Boyd's message, in essence, is that successful warfare is primarily psychological, not physical; the use of maneuver, surprise, deception and speed to find an enemy's weaknesses (not fight his strengths in big battles) is the way of the future. Boyd does not translate his strategic philosophy into hardware and tactics. Others, like Lehman and Chief of Naval Operations Thomas Hayward, are doing that.

So far, not a single new dollar has been appropriated for defense or a single new carrier's keel laid. But already, some Pentagon officials believe, there is new respect abroad for American determination and its power. Experienced warriors believe that when you begin to be serious about power, pretty soon the world begins to believe you.

The Independence and Forrestal hovered last week in the eastern Mediterranean. The carriers were there on Ronald Reagan's orders. They were his emissaries, signaling a nation's resolve by presence and movement. What we do about carrier task forces in the next years will tell much about the U.S. and its exercise of power.

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