"I Have Been Given a Mission'

Chun ponders the North, and his own power

In just 15 months, President Chun Doo Hwan has consolidated his political grip on South Korea to a degree that nearly rivals that of his assassinated predecessor, Strongman Park Chung Hee. Two weeks ago, Chun's Democratic Justice Party swept to a healthy majority--151 seats --in the country's 276-member National Assembly. After formally taking office last August, the tough former general first tightened, then abolished martial law, launched an anticorruption campaign, and promulgated a new constitution. He spared the life of Dissident Leader Kim Dae Jung, an act that contributed to the success of Chun's February call on President Reagan. Chun has also shrewdly challenged Dictator Kim II Sung to attend a precedent-setting Korean unification summit. Last week, in an interview with Time Inc. Editor in Chief Henry Anatole Grunwald, Tokyo Bureau Chief Edwin Reingold and Correspondent S. Chang in Seoul's executive mansion, Chun discussed policy problems and his belief that "providence" guides his rule. Excerpts:

On his party's electoral victory: I received an overwhelming vote of confidence. This indicated to me that I have learned what the people want--political stability, sustained economic growth and the ability to maintain peace on the Korean peninsula.

On his purge of political opponents: In the past there were many politicians whose names were connected with corruption of the political process. There are those who violated the law by promoting, instigating, agitating disturbances, advocating violence, all contrary to political modernization. It is to be understood that this could not continue. The government could not evade its moral responsibility to change the political climate of the past. [The politicians] are not restricted from any nonpolitical activities. They are simply not participating in political campaigns and so on. If you talk about general principles, then I agree, every citizen ought to be able to participate in politics.

On inviting North Korean Communist Boss Kim II Sung to talk about reunification: I made my proposal as an unconditional offer of a dialogue. This is prompted not because there were hopeful signs. On the contrary, the North is as hostile toward us as ever. But we are maintaining peace at a considerable cost to ourselves and our allies. To make war less likely, it is important that I meet with Kim II Sung. He has experienced the Korean War and has personal recollections of that war. If he should die, his son would take over. Now here we would have a man who does not know what fear means, does not know the horror of war.

Distrust and hostility have been reinforced by concrete evidence of North Korean provocations, so you cannot blame the people for distrusting the North Koreans--and I suppose they do not look upon us kindly. It is useless to talk to anybody other than Kim II Sung, so he and I must meet and begin a dialogue. Let us talk first of the relatively easy problems, so as to build up gradually an atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence. We should persevere through this effort to begin the dialogue, which could make peace a little more secure, a little less precarious. The U.S. should support this position and also mobilize world opinion so that Mr. Kim will find it very difficult to refuse.

On the prospect of a "German" solution* for the Koreas: There is a fundamental difference between North Korea and the German Democratic Republic [East Germany]. There may be a cult of personality in other Communist countries, but Kim II Sung is idolized as a demigod in

North Korea. There have been changes of the guard in East Germany and other places, but there has never been a change in North Korea since the end of World War II. This is unique on earth. If you want to understand how peculiar this situation is, ask yourself this question: Could Brezhnev or even Mao Tse-tung himself nominate his own son to be his successor and get away with it?

On Asian security and the Soviet military buildup: Together with the U.S., in Korea we are defending not only northeast Asia but by extension global peace. It is the view of many that each country throughout the world must do its share. The U.S. has been the defender of the free world, but today it cannot do it alone. Japan could make a greater contribution and help the U.S. defense budget. It could help to keep the sea lanes open and get involved more in air defense.

Soviet strategic policy is expansionist.

This is of grave concern for Pacific basin countries. The effect of Soviet air and naval expansion [could] be aimed at an isolation of China and, depending on the degree, isolation of the U.S.

On South Korea's relations with Communist nations: We are as a matter of principle in favor of exchanges of goods and people with countries that do not agree with us ideologically, provided that those countries do not take hostile action against us. But I do not believe it will be easy to improve these relations rapidly. The U.S. could help us, for example, by helping to persuade China to engage in an exchange of goods, to recognize the Republic of Korea and [help] the R.O.K. become a member of the United Nations. Then the U.S. could recognize the existence of North Korea.

On South Korea's economic outlook: I rule out dramatic economic growth. We seek stable economic growth based on stable prices. During the '80s, we would like to achieve an average annual growth rate of 7%. I am optimistic. Our export trade is improving steadily, and we have highly competent public servants to deal with the problem of planning an economic policy. We also have a hardworking, zealous, dedicated labor force.

On the uses of power: I have never personally wanted or worked for [it], but people in Korea say, "God help the President." That means providence is involved in power and authority. You do not grab it just because it is there. Rather than achieving this power, I have been given a mission and responsibility. That is how look at it. And whatever your job is, it is important that you win, if not the respect, at least the trust and confidence of rour colleagues and the people you serve, can tell you my philosophy: balance is if great importance. In other words, avoid extremes.

* Espousal of reunion in principle, while effectively being two separate states, as in the case of East and West Germany.

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