Monday, Apr. 06, 1981
Passing the Hat for Zimbabwe
By John S. DeMott
Washington drops in a bundle, but also irks some black leaders
Part of the deal for ending the long civil war in Zimbabwe was a massive international aid program to help the nation get back on its feet. Last week Zimbabwe benefited from just such a display of compassionate check writing. In a remarkable pass-the-hat meeting in Salisbury, representatives of 36 nations--some of them not much better off than Zimbabwe itself--pledged nearly $1.4 billion in aid to the nation once known as Rhodesia. Even tiny, impoverished Sierra Leone weighed in with $90,000. But the pledge that probably pleased Zimbabwe most came from the U.S.: $225 million over the next three years. "The creation of Zimbabwe is one of the most remarkable political and diplomatic achievements of this generation," declared U.S. Delegate M. Peter McPherson, newly appointed head of the Agency for International Development. "In committing our support we are also providing support for peaceful settlements to international conflicts."
To many black Africans, the U.S. generosity was an encouraging sign at an otherwise disturbing moment. It was an obvious attempt to shore up the government of Prime Minister Robert Mugabe--even though he is a Marxist--and it ran counter to the Reagan Administration's recently announced cuts in foreign aid. Still, the American pledge came just as the U.S. seemed to be warming up to white-ruled South Africa. The combination of events suggested that the White House was trying to reverse a policy that has been in force for two decades. The policy said, in effect: the U.S. could either embrace South Africa and apartheid, or continue with efforts to befriend black Africa, but not both. For years, the U.S. has pursued the latter course. Now, many black Africans fear, Washington will place more importance on South Africa's mineral wealth and strategic position on the southern oil lanes than it does on racial justice.
The first inkling that the new Administration might be considering a change came March 3 in an interview between Reagan and Walter Cronkite. South Africa was a friendly power, Reagan said, and the U.S. could scarcely abandon a country that has "stood behind us in every war we ever fought." Two weeks ago, Reagan officials were toying with the idea of inviting Prime Minister P.W. Botha to Washington after his expected victory in national elections later this month. The Administration has asked Congress to repeal the 1976 Clark amendment, which bars covert U.S. aid to rebel guerrillas in Angola. For its part, South Africa may have used the tough new U.S. stance against terrorism to accelerate a war against leftist guerrillas in Namibia, which South Africa has administered since 1920.
Perhaps the most disturbing sign to black African countries was the revelation last week that on March 15 Jeane Kirkpatrick, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, had met with Lieutenant General P.W. Van der Westhuizen, chief of South Africa's military intelligence. South African officers are barred from visiting the U.S. on official business, but after Reagan's television statement, the general and four aides flew to Washington anyway.
They were turned away by the State Department, but on their way home they stopped off in New York, where they met Kirkpatrick at a private luncheon. Later, Kirkpatrick denied knowing Van der Westhuizen's identity before the meeting. U.S. blacks were unconvinced. The Congressional Black Caucus called for her resignation, drawing parallels between her encounter and former Ambassador An drew Young's secret meeting with a representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1979. That breach enraged U.S. Jews and cost Young his job.
Not surprisingly, the thought of the U.S. drawing closer to South Africa troubles Africa's black leaders. Says Joaquim Chissano, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mozambique: "Reagan's policy is extremely dangerous for peace in Africa and peace in the world." Yet the hefty do nation to Zimbabwe during a time of austerity seems to signal a willingness to expand U.S. commitments in black Africa. The Salisbury aid conference was widely seen as a test of Western willingness to support Mugabe's experiment in nonracial democracy. It was also a chance for the U.S. to steal a march on Moscow in the Third World. Said one Western diplomat: "We felt there was a certain risk involved in Zimbabwe in the sense that if we came in there and didn't give generously, Zimbabwe might look elsewhere for its help."
Though the Salisbury conference fell short of its $2 billion goal, Mugabe was pleased with the results. The money will be used to repair war damage, resettle refugees, develop agriculture and redistribute land. Despite continuing tribal warfare, Mugabe pledged to press ahead with Zimbabwe's reconstruction. "While they may not have been turned into plow shares," he said, "the swords of war have nonetheless been rendered blunt, and within our country we are determined to keep them that way." The only economic sour note for Mugabe was sounded in Pretoria, which announced last week that it would end its preferential trade agreements with Zimbabwe in a year.
Secretary of State Alexander Haig notes that U.S. policy toward South Africa is under review, but Administration officials insist there is no major shift in the works. They do say, though, that Ronald Reagan's dealings with South Africa "will not be exactly the same" as Jimmy Carter's. "You have to realize that there are elements of change in South Africa," says one State Department analyst. "We must reinforce them and speed them up." Blacks and whites in Africa are waiting anxiously to see how that translates into deeds.
-- By John S.DeMott.
Reported by Marsh Clark/Salisbury
With reporting by Marsh Clark/Salisbury
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