An Interview with Haig

The how and why behind America's mandate for change

Early one morning last week, TIME Correspondents Roberto Suro and Gregory Wierzynski were ushered into the wood-paneled office of Alexander Haig for the first on-the-record interview for a U.S. magazine that the Secretary of State has given since the Inauguration. The Secretary's pace has been exhausting for days, and his eyes were red from fatigue. But he was unhesitant, almost ebullient, throughout the 45-minute interview. He emphasized his points with a full panoply of theatrical gestures, everything from a stage whisper to his booming general's voice. Excerpts from his remarks:

Q. Are you pleased with the direction El Salvador has taken as a foreign policy issue?

A. I don't think the issue lends itself to assessments of personal gratitude or displeasure. We found an ongoing situation, an extension of what we've been seeing since Soviet proxy forces went into Angola during the Ford Administration. And you'll recall at that time it was the Legislative, not the Executive, Branch which prevented action designed to support those who were opposed to the Soviet-supported outcome. Since that time, we've been plagued with similar situations in Ethiopia, in South Yemen, North Yemen, Afghanistan, in Kampuchea [Cambodia]. And we now see a very clearly delineated Soviet-Cuban strategy to create Marxist-Leninist regimes in Central America --Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras in the first phase.

The problem here is a critical one for the American people and for those who share our values. That is, whether or not we are going to continue to turn our back on these illegal interventions or whether we are going to insist--as we, the Executive Branch, have been doing--that the future of El Salvador must be up to the people of El Salvador. That is the issue.

Q. Has El Salvador been overblown as a foreign policy issue?

A. I am concerned that with modern communications there is a penchant for episodic emphasis. It always includes the risk that we will lose sight of the forest for preoccupation with the trees.

Q. In your first answer, I sensed a frustration with congressional restraints on Executive action.

A. No, I have no basis for any frustration whatsoever. The support we have had from the leadership in both Houses has been extremely encouraging. You will find that most of the opposition has come from a minority. I don't mean to suggest by that that there is not a great deal of justified and strongly held concern among the American people about the situation in El Salvador, and the experiences of Viet Nam have certainly heightened this concern. We have to deal with it--with a great sensitivity to that concern.

Q. You have said that the largest issue in the Middle East is the extension of Soviet influence, but most Middle East experts believe Palestinian autonomy is the central problem. How do these two questions balance off?

A. The broad strategic issues raised by Soviet imperialism are the fundamental reality that Arab-Israeli disputes must be related to. An exclusive preoccupation with the Arab-Israeli dispute would not remove overriding strategic dangers that those of us who share common values --Arab and Jew, and America and other Western nations--have got to confront.

Now, this does not mean that the urgency in the search for an Arab-Israeli agreement is to be subordinated to the broader East-West concerns, but rather that these are mutually reinforcing concerns that must be dealt with in parallel. But never with an exclusive preoccupation. In the past we have had a tendency to do that.

Q. The Carter Doctrine says the U.S. will go to war to defend the oil flow from the Persian Gulf. How can we defend the region?

A. I am always repelled by such extreme simplifications. Western industrialized societies are largely dependent on the oil resources of the Middle East region and a threat to access to that oil would constitute a grave threat to the vital national interest. That must be dealt with; and that does not exclude the use of force if that is necessary.

Q. Should the U.S. station troops in the area of the Middle East?

A. This is a difficult problem. A problem we are seized with right now, we inherited it... If in the act of establishing that presence we were to upset the current favorable trends in the Arab world--which include a heightened sensitivity to the dangers of Soviet imperialism--and thrust these Arab states into the Soviet orbit, then we might be indulging in self-defeating moves. It is a very delicate matter and one which we are studying with great care.

Q. You are going to the Middle East next month. What do you hope to accomplish?

A. First and foremost to learn. We have two ongoing negotiations: the autonomy talks and the negotiations associated with the establishment of a peace-keeping force for the Sinai, which would be the triggering mechanism for the final Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai. My visit is designed to give me a firsthand feel for the viewpoints of both sides.

Q. Would you clarify your China policy?

A. I think this is clearly and definitively outlined in President Reagan's Aug. 25 statement. He visualizes continued efforts to normalize our relationship with the People's Republic. That is a fundamental strategic reality and a strategic imperative. It is of overriding importance to international stability and world peace.

He also visualizes adherence to the communique associated with the normalization agreement with Peking. And he visualizes a nonofficial status with the people of Taiwan, based on adherence to American law established in the Taiwan Relations Act. We do not view these --the communique and the act--as mutually exclusive.

Q. The immediate issue at hand is the sale of fighters to Taiwan.

A. I don't consider that to be the immediate issue at hand.

Q. Are you saying you're going to sell the fighters?

A. No, no, I'm not saying anything of the kind; in fact, I'm very consciously avoiding saying anything.

Q. Brezhnev's speech to the Party Congress included certain overtures to this Administration. Can the U.S. afford not to make some positive overtures to the Soviet Union?

A. I don't consider that our initial response to Mr. Brezhnev's speech was devoid of positive elements. We found the speech extremely interesting. We noted that it had a number of innovative facets. We emphasized that talks between ourselves and the Soviet Union were an inherent aspect of the conduct of our East-West policy. We believe it is in the interest of international stability and the American people to avoid the tendency that we have experienced on occasions in the past to rush to summitry for summitry's sake and to bring about euphoric expectations ... and then to dash that euphoria against the rocks of ill-prepared summitry. We want to avoid that. We want to prepare steps for summitry very carefully ... and only then to indulge in that kind of diplomacy.

Q. But the President also indicated that summits will have to wait for the resolution of problems that he sees as linked to summit issues.

A. Why, of course.

Q. And that could be a long haul?

A. That is in the hands of the Soviet leadership. East-West relations have never been a one-way street and must not be.

We consider that the fundamental premises of improvement of East-West relations and achievements of summitry or negotiations in general have got to be characterized by reciprocity and restraint.

In the current scene--with the situation in El Salvador, the situation in Afghanistan, the potential dangers in Poland, and proxy activity--that situation does not prevail.

I do not know how anyone could have confidence in a strategy that involved failure to take cognizance of Soviet global activity. You know, people debate whether there should or there should not be linkage. That is not the issue. Linkage has always been an inherent aspect of international affairs.

Q. What can the U.S. do to prevent a Soviet invasion of Poland?

A. First I would want to make it clear that a Soviet intervention in Poland, directly or indirectly, is neither inevitable nor imminent. It is our view that the Polish people must be able to deal with their own current dilemmas with their own resources, free of external involvement. And it is our view that should this external involvement occur, it will have grave consequences for an extended period on East-West relations.

Q. The Polish economy is on the verge of collapse. You have said that you do not want to send aid to Poland unless the government institutes economic reform. Are you near a decision on an aid package?

A. There are several issues here. One is a very urgent issue of release on debt servicing, and we have joined other nations in making a contribution to assist the Polish dilemma in this area. Beyond that, we are in negotiations which would meet the urgent humanitarian needs of the Polish people, as we have in the past. We think this is in our interests, and we think it is also a moral imperative.

Q. You have said that human rights diplomacy is best conducted through private channels. Do you favor some change in the law that requires the State Department to give annual human rights reports to Congress?

A. We are concerned that open societies sometimes get victimized by the practical consequences of their openness and by the lack of access to information about totalitarian regimes where, it is our conviction, the major abuses to human rights are occurring today. But this is an ancillary problem related to our more strongly held concern that past human rights policies have in many instances been counterproductive, not only to the objective of strengthening human rights but also from the standpoint of vital American interests.

There are a number of questions related to this. First and foremost, we must continue to be deeply concerned about abuses to human rights wherever they occur; but, there are such questions as whether amelioration of those abuses is best achieved under the glare of public criticism and animosity and confrontation, or whether it is best achieved in a quieter dialogue between states with a healthy relationship.

Q. You have said that this Administration has a mandate for change in foreign policy. Is the post-Viet Nam paralysis over?

A. I do believe that the American people voted for change and I think that change involves a number of inadequacies in the status quo ... The American people are concerned about what they perceive to be a declining level of effectiveness abroad.

Do I think the days of the so-called Viet Nam syndrome are over? No, I do not think they will ever be over. There were many valuable lessons which our anguish and experience have crystalized for the American people. I hope we would never lose sight of those lessons.

On the other hand, the excesses that followed the Viet Nam experience --which suggested that the U.S. could no longer afford to engage itself in global leadership--have proved their own fallaciousness. The escalating setbacks to our interests abroad, increasing lawlessness and terrorism, and the so-called wars of liberation are putting in jeopardy our ability to influence world events constructively and assure access to raw materials. All these suggest to the American people that we need to modify our approach. So do the unchallenged seizure of American citizens, the murder of American diplomats and officials, kidnapings ... Soviet interventions around the world are an extension of the Brezhnev Doctrine outside the sphere of Soviet hegemony. We will tolerate such interventions in the future only at great risk to world peace.

Q. Sounds like you have a tall order before you. Are you enjoying your job?

A. I don't think that is a term that would be appropriate. I find it extremely challenging. I find it more satisfying than any job I've had because I feel that my ability to contribute to policy has been enhanced, and therefore it is satisfying. I suppose this has been a lifelong endeavor for me and the greater your responsibilities, the more satisfaction one derives.

I remain basically optimistic. In an historic sense, we are witnessing the unraveling, if you will, of the greatest challenge to the world peace today, and that is the Marxist-Leninist movement. While one can take comfort from this historic reality, one must be increasingly alert.

When such a situation coincides with an unusual accumulation of military power by Marxist-Leninist states, the opportunities for miscalculation are increased rather than decreased. That is why there is an overriding need for this Administration and for the American people--and indeed, for all of those who share our values--to insure, in the near term, that we are willing to make the sacrifices necessary to maintain the military capabilities that we must have.

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