Needed: Money, Ships, Pilots--and the Draft

It is painful but true. The U.S. armed forces have been neglected to the point that their very ability to defend the nation's interests is in jeopardy. There are two basic remedies: a lot more money and a revival of the draft.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff last month appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee to speak about the military's readiness to combat the Soviets. General David C. Jones said that in certain areas of the world the Soviets have "substantial advantages." The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, described the Carter-proposed 1982 budget as "wholly inadequate." Such growls are a traditional feature of the budget process, but this time the military commanders are right. The U.S. armed forces today are undermanned, underequipped and underpaid.

The most urgent problem does not concern the strategic weapons of Armageddon. There the U.S. has a rough parity with the Soviets and seems ready to respond to any vulnerability that might arise. But there now are critical shortages of all the more commonplace weapons that are essential to the kind of conflict that is most likely to occur: some sudden clash with the Soviets or their proxies on the borders of Central Europe, in the Persian Gulf or in the Middle East.

Of the Air Force's 3,813 tactical aircraft, for example, between 26% and 48% on any given day are "not mission capable." One reason: a spare parts shortage so severe that some planes are simply cannibalized to keep others in action. The U.S. Army has only about half the trucks it needs. The Navy now has 456 warships (down from 702 in 1972), and says it needs 600. That would provide for three new carrier battle groups, in addition to the present twelve, which would allow the U.S. to maintain a permanent presence in the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean and the western Pacific.

Equally alarming is the steady loss of skilled and experienced soldiers and technicians. The Air Force is short 1,650 pilots (the retention rate for Navy pilots has dropped from 62% in 1977 to 31% in 1979). The Army still has its 16 authorized divisions, but the ten based in the continental U.S. are understrength, and a confidential Army report rated six of them as "noncombat ready." Overall, the Navy is short 20,000 petty officers, the Army 7,000 NCOS. One of the most important military requirements is the capacity to airlift combat troops to a crisis area, but the Rapid Deployment Force established by President Carter last March cannot begin to deploy rapidly. It lacks airlift and sealift capability and even such basics as adequate communications gear. Its command function is mired in a jurisdictional dispute between the Army and the Marine Corps.

For years the basic problems of military supply and maintenance have been neglected. Congressmen prefer to vote funds for expensive new weaponry that provides jobs for key defense industries back home, rather than put the same money into something as mundane--but vital--as maintenance. It has also proved easier to get funds for designing ever more sophisticated weapons than to increase the supply of prosaic ones.

Nearly eight years ago, the U.S. embarked on an ambitious experiment: to maintain a superpower military force composed entirely of volunteers. The experiment has not worked well. The racial balance does not reflect that of the nation; the percentage of blacks has risen from 18% to 33%. Since 1973 nearly 40% of the Army's recruits have not finished high school. Many commanders argue that the Army can and does provide poorly educated recruits with valuable skills. Although General Jones told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the all-volunteer force "could be made to work," he said he feared that it might become "a 'volunteer' armed force peopled by economic conscripts--and ones without the discipline, aptitudes or cohesiveness needed for a modern global strategy."

For a number of reasons, it seems time to conclude that the all-volunteer force is not a success, and that the draft, abandoned in 1973, should be restored.

TIME proposes the following guidelines for a new draft.

.Military service should last two years, starting either at age 18 or upon graduation from high school. The number to be drafted each year would depend on the needs of the armed forces. At present those needs total 350,000 per year. While enlistments currently fulfill about 99% of the Army's quota, a draft would provide it with a more representative cross-section. The pool of males available in that age group is 2.1 million. Women would be exempt.

.The selection would be by lottery a year before service was to begin. Anyone not chosen would be exempt from any further call except in a case of national emergency.

.There would be no exemptions from the lottery except for crippling illness. Anyone drafted but considered physically unfit for combat training would be assigned to noncombat duties. Conscientious objectors would be conscripted for a form of nonmilitary service.

.Draftees would be paid substantially less than long-term volunteers.

.The G.I. Bill of Rights, abandoned in 1976, would be revived to provide substantial educational payments or equivalent insurance benefits.

The draft and the revived G.I. Bill would remedy some of the problems in recruiting, but would not help solve a quite different manpower problem: the diminishing ability of the armed forces to retain their essential core of middle-level noncommissioned officers, officers and technicians. A pilot, whose six years of training can cost as much as $1 million, earns only $24,000 a year on reaching the rank of captain.

A senior captain with a commercial airline can easily earn more than twice that much. .

Eight years ago, salaries in the service and civilian life were much closer than they are today. But military pay increases and fringe benefits have lagged behind increases in civilian pay and the cost of living. By 1978, enlisted pay had declined 7.4% in real dollars, and the trend has continued since. Last year the Government provided an 11.7% military pay increase, but that was more than canceled by 12.4% inflation. All branches of the services are struggling to find ways to retain NCOs: bigger re-enlistment bonuses, better housing allowances, better discipline and esprit de corps. One attractive idea being discussed: permitting a career soldier to transfer his present education benefits to his own children or spouse. All told, the cost of needed pay increases and benefits is estimated at $4.4 billion for this year.

Any effort to restore the strength of the armed forces will be very costly. The Pentagon received $160 billion last year, and Carter asked for $171.2 billion for fiscal 1981. (Estimated Soviet military spending this year is the equivalent of $225 billion.) Reagan aides are talking of increasing Carter's 1982 request from $194.6 billion to $220 billion--even as they consider slicing $50 billion out of spending on nonmilitary programs. Finding the right amount to invest in America's security will be one of the most difficult budget questions facing the Reagan Administration and Congress. But just as difficult will be the question of how to spend that money wisely.

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