More Signals to the World

By Ed Magnuson

Some clear, some mixed, but all intended to break with the past

It was a cold, rainy day, but the smile on President Reagan's face was warm and friendly as he and Wife Nancy stood on the South Portico of the White House. A limousine drew up to deliver their first visiting head of state: Chun Doo Hwan, the balding former paratrooper who is now strongman of South Korea.

That Chun, who seized power in a coup last year, was Reagan's first ruling foreign visitor was no accident. The President wanted to show that violations of human rights, such as Chun's imprisonment of his former political rival, Kim Dae Jung, will no longer have a decisive impact on relations between the U.S. and an ally that stands as a bulwark against Communist expansion. Explained a senior State Department official: "It is not the purpose of this Administration to look into the internal affairs of Korea."

At an hourlong meeting with Reagan in the Oval Office, Chun got some highly welcome news. Reagan told him that the U.S. will not pull any of its 39,000 troops out of South Korea. Reagan also assured Chun that the Administration will fulfill Carter's promise to sell Seoul 36 advanced F-16 jet fighters, and that U.S. military assistance to Korea will not be cut from this year's level of $160 million. At lunch Chun raised his glass to toast his host for bringing a "great renewal" to the U.S.

Chun's visit was only the first of the messages that the Administration sent to the world last week. In another unambiguous signal, Secretary of State Alexander Haig removed Robert White, a career diplomat, as U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador. White had urged El Salvador's ruling junta to consolidate its power through land redistribution and other reforms. When the Reagan transition team criticized him for acting "in the capacity of a social reformer," he complained to reporters that his effectiveness as ambassador had been undermined.

By replacing White with Frederic Chapin, another experienced career diplomat, Haig indicated that the U.S. probably will send more military aid to the junta. At the same time, he served notice on all U.S. diplomats not to voice their opinions publicly unless they are in line with those of Reagan and Haig. Said a State Department official of the White-Haig relationship: "It was a clear case of mutual incompatibility."

The Administration's fuzziest signals involved its continuing internal debate over foreign aid. David Stockman, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, has recommended that instead of increasing foreign aid to $8 billion, as proposed by Carter for the 1982 fiscal year, Reagan should slash it to $5.4 billion, about the same as it was in 1979. This strikes many experts as wholly out of step with the Administration's determination to make the U.S. a more forceful world power. In the conduct of foreign policy, economic aid can promote peace or security, as in the volatile Middle East, or help thwart Communist subversion in poor countries by improving living conditions.

As Haig said at a press conference two weeks ago: "Both foreign assistance and foreign security assistance is sometimes a very cost-effective vehicle for ensuring that the ideals and interests of this country are carried out effectively abroad." Translation: money is muscle.

The U.S., however, expends surprisingly little of it. At current levels (somewhat more than $6 billion budgeted for 1981), the U.S. ranks about 15th--slightly above Italy--among industrialized nations in the percentage of gross national product it devotes to foreign aid (less than .2%).

Senior diplomats from all the European Community embassies in Washington acted with astonishing speed to protest the proposed cuts in a joint plea to Haig. One of them warned: "If you don't have foreign aid, you don't have a workable foreign policy." The Secretary hardly needed the advice: he was already at work stopping any real gutting of his foreign aid budget. Reagan's aides predicted that, in the end, the President will approve about $6.5 billion for 1982. Congress might cut another $1 billion, leaving the total foreign aid funding at about its current level, which is roughly the same as it was in 1979. Allowing for inflation, that would mean a $600 million cut in real dollars, a lamentable situation for the nation that leads the free world.

In his informal chat with reporters at the White House, Reagan sent out other puzzling signals. He surprised the State Department's Middle East specialists by contending that Israel's settlements on the West Bank were not illegal, contrary to the past U.S. position. He did say, however, that they were "ill-advised" and were "maybe, at this time, unnecessarily provocative." That seemed to be Reagan's first public hint of any disagreement with the Israeli government.

Reagan also suggested that the U.S., after consultation with its European allies, might want to establish "a ground presence" of troops in the Middle East. He quickly added that he did not mean enough troops to stop a Soviet invasion: "We know that we couldn't do that." But he added: "You don't just plant a flag in the ground and walk away and leave it. There would be Americans there." This would show the Soviet Union, he said, that "this is of interest to our national security and they're going to have to take that into their computations."

At his first press conference as Defense Secretary, Caspar Weinberger stumbled onto the same topic. He was asked a hypothetical question about whether the U.S. would be willing to station troops in Israel. He replied that the Israelis would have to ask for them, and that he would be "surprised if they did." But if Israel did make the request, "we would certainly examine it with a very sympathetic viewpoint." In Jerusalem, Foreign Ministry Spokesman Naphtali Lavie reminded reporters that "we never expected foreign troops, American or others, to come here to fight for Israel."

While Weinberger's well-hedged statement stirred considerable concern among those Americans who oppose the stationing of U.S. troops anywhere in the Middle East, his more substantive revelation was that the Administration is inclined to grant Saudi Arabia's request for fuel tanks and bomb racks for the 60 F-15 fighters that it purchased during the Carter Administration. This would give the jets a longer range and greater offensive capability, which upsets the Israelis.

Weinberger also alarmed diplomats in Europe by saying it was "very probable" that the Administration would seek to deploy the so-called neutron bomb with NATO forces. Haig promptly cabled U.S. diplomats abroad, calling attention to Weinberger's further statement that no U.S. decision had been made and that none would be made without full consultation with U.S. allies in Europe.

Finally, Reagan sent some blunt signals to Moscow. He repeated his harsh characterization of Soviet leaders, but also said he would be willing to negotiate a new treaty on limiting strategic arms "any time that they want to sit down and discuss a legitimate reduction of nuclear weapons." Reagan said later that he does not think his tough statements have harmed U.S.-Soviet relations.

He also disclosed that he has no immediate plans to end Carter's embargo on U.S. grain shipments to the Soviet Union, despite his campaign criticism of it. Reagan did not explain his decision, but Haig has argued that grain sales to the Soviets should not be resumed unless Moscow gives the U.S. something in return. Moreover, lifting the embargo would clearly dilute the tough signals that Reagan has been sending the Kremlin.

Thus, for reasons of geopolitics, the farmers who voted for Reagan partly be cause they had lost money from the grain embargo will have to wait for relief. The realities of wielding power seem to be catching up quite early with Ronald Reagan.

-- By Ed Magnuson.

Reported by Roberto Suro and Gregory H. Wierzynski/ Washington

With reporting by Roberto Suro, Gregory H. Wierzynski

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