A Message for Moscow

The words echoed the harshest rhetoric at the height of the cold war. With a sharp edge to his normally amiable tone, President Ronald Reagan said at his press conference that he knew "of no leader of the Soviet Union since the revolution" who did not pursue the goal of "world revolution ... The only morality they recognize is what will further their cause, meaning they reserve unto themselves the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat."

No less sternly, Secretary of State Alexander Haig charged the Soviet Union with "training, funding and equipping international terrorism." Said Haig: "International terrorism will take the place of human rights in our concern because it is the ultimate abuse of human rights." Adding to the week's tough talk, General David C. Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that if the U.S.S.R. invades Iran, the U.S. might retaliate not only there but in some other part of the world. "There are areas where we could do quite well in clearing the seas of Soviet naval capability."

The barrage of criticism was a carefully planned strategy aimed at shifting the balance in Soviet-American relations. For too long, the President and his advisers think, the U.S. has quietly accepted an unrealistic notion of detente that has permitted the Soviet Union to behave aggressively throughout much of the world. The Administration is particularly disturbed by mounting indications that the Soviet Union is behind terrorist activity that is intended to destabilize Western nations and their allies in the Third World. State Department Spokesman William Dyess provided specifics: Soviet aid to the Palestine Liberation Organization, the use of Cuba and Libya as conduits to aid terrorists, inflammatory Soviet broadcasts to Iran reviling the U.S. Said Dyess: "This advocacy of violence as a solution to international problems creates a climate in which terrorism flourishes and consistently impedes movement toward peaceful resolution of international problems."

The first casualty of the new chill was that enduring symbol of detente, Soviet Ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin. During the past three Administrations, Dobrynin has been allowed to slip into the State Department building through its underground garage, thus keeping his visits private. But last week the Ambassador was informed that henceforth he must enter via the front door like all the other envoys. When his limousine nevertheless approached the garage as usual, it was turned back, a rebuff that seemed to underscore the verbal bellicosity.

There is a feeling among some foreign affairs experts that such a change in U.S. policy is overdue. Edward Luttwak of Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies feels that the "U.S. is now speaking to the Russians the way the Russians have been speaking to the U.S." The more belligerent they became, the more apologetically the Carter Administration responded. In the past two years, says Luttwak, the "wildest Soviet accusations have become routine." But there was also concern that Reagan's language was a bit intemperate. While agreeing with Reagan's position, former Ambassador to Moscow Malcolm Toon thinks that the President should have been more restrained. "It is important to try to work out a rational relationship with Moscow," he says. "The Soviets are sitting on a tremendous nuclear arsenal, and we ought to have some mechanism for carrying out an acceptable dialogue on the major issues. We must do this without any illusions about what they are up to." So far, the Reagan Administration has shown little evidence of such illusions.

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