Monday, Feb. 02, 1981
Unrest in Iran
There too: Was it a good deal?
"Who has really served or betrayed the revolution?" So asked a senior Iranian politician as a debate began in Tehran--remarkably like the one in Washington--over whether the hostage deal was honorable, as claimed by the fundamentalist clergymen who negotiated it, or a sellout of the national interest. Similar questions were pointedly put to Behzad Nabavi, Iran's chief hostage negotiator, when he spelled out the terms of the agreement on Tehran radio. An Iranian phoned to ask him: If the hostages were spies, why were they not tried? If they were not spies, why were they arrested in the first place? Nabavi dodged the questions, but many close observers of Iran's complicated internal politics believe that he may not be able to do so much longer.
The issue of whether Iran should continue to hold the hostages festered throughout the Americans' captivity, as they were used by one faction or another as pawns in the struggle for power. Eventually the right-wing clerics, who until recently wanted the Americans to be kept captive, managed to subdue the more Western-oriented moderates led by President Abolhassan Banisadr, who would have preferred to release the hostages. The mullahs gained control of the Cabinet, parliament and judiciary and forced Banisadr to accept Fundamentalist Mohammed Ali Raja'i as Prime Minister. Then Banisadr, as commander in chief of the Iranian armed forces, gained great popularity with the people by leading the war against Iraq. He cannily avoided any involvement in the fundamentalists' negotiations with the U.S., thus dissociating himself from the inevitable fallout when the Americans left Iran.
Tehran critics of the accord immediately noted that Iran so far has received only $2.8 billion in gold and cash instead of the $24 billion originally demanded. For the moment, the cash has saved Iran from imminent financial disaster, and the agreement has released the country from its economic isolation from the West and Japan. But a resumption of normal trade is a long way off. Iranian industry is running at 30% capacity because of a shortage of spare parts and raw materials, basic foodstuffs are scarce, and unemployment is close to 40%. The bazaris, the small businessmen who initially backed the Islamic revolution, have become disillusioned with the mullahs' mismanagement. Says a moderate politician: "Bogus victories fill no stomachs." Moreover, adds the moderates' newspaper, Enghelab-e-Eslami, in a series on Iran's hostage-related losses: "Part of the legacy consists of the arousal of sentiments against Iran and Islam all over the world."
At the same time, Banisadr's popularity seems to be rising. Gone are the days when every wish of Ayatullah Ruhollah Khomeini's was a command, but he still has an enormous public following. For the past month, he has been urging support of Iran's war effort, as well as support of Banisadr. One incident last week indicated that the clerical establishment may realize that its public image has indeed been hurt. When Parliamentary Speaker Hojatolislam Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a fundamentalist Muslim, scheduled an address for Feb. 12, the second anniversary of the Shah's fall, Banisadr announced that he would also give a speech that day. Afraid that Banisadr would outdraw him, Rafsanjani canceled his appearance. Said an optimistic Western diplomat in Tehran: "The demagogues are coming to he end of the line. We might witness the triumph of reason soon."
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