Losing, Whoever Wins

By GEORGE J. CHURCH

The gulf conflict offers the U.S. scant room for action--or optimism

When Jimmy Carter left Washington Monday on a campaign flight to Illinois and the West Coast, Iraqi bombs were already falling on Iran--but National Security Council Spokesman Alfred Friendly Jr. assured reporters that "this is still not a war." That comfortable illusion did not last the afternoon. Late that day and all day Tuesday, a stream of messages to the communications center aboard Air Force One and worried phone conversations between the politicking President and officials back in Washington made clear the scope and fury of the fighting. By Wednesday morning, when Carter returned bleary-eyed to the capital to preside at a hastily summoned meeting of the National Security Council, the truth was appallingly obvious: Washington had to deal with a conflict that seemed bound to hurt what Carter has called the vital American interests in the Persian Gulf, while enhancing the power and prestige of the Soviet Union--yet the U.S. seemed to have little ability to sway the course of events. Once again, as during the fall of the Shah and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S. was standing on the sidelines as an anxious spectator.

The war is the first in the Middle East in which Washington has no influence with either side--and, indeed, is being blamed by both parties for fomenting the conflict. Iran, of course, is still holding 52 American hostages, and it regards the U.S., in the words of Ayatullah Ruhollah Khomeini, as "the great Satan." Iraq is a Soviet client whose military forces were trained and equipped by the U.S.S.R.; though Iraq has hinted that it would like to establish ties with the U.S. too, the State Department has no contacts with Iraqis of Cabinet rank. It was to Moscow, not Washington, that officials of both combatants scurried, unsuccessfully, at the start of the fighting to seek aid and support.

Thus as the shooting intensified, the U.S. could do little but proclaim neutrality, work behind the scenes to encourage mediation efforts and hope for the best. The best, however, in this case appeared to be none too good.

If the war ended quickly, the economic consequences for the U.S. and its allies would be small. The flow of oil from Iran and Iraq has already been cut off, causing some price increases. Still, the present high inventories around the world should prevent any immediate shortages.

But the Carter Administration had to worry about the political effects of even a short war. Iraq would gain prestige and power from just a modest victory. Not only does Iraq have its Soviet connections, but it is trying to head a vehemently anti-Israel Arab front. A defeated Iran is likely to turn more anti-American than ever.

As for the hostages, Carter at one point last week seemed to be suggesting that perhaps the Iranians would exchange them for some spare parts for their American-made military equipment, but that notion was soon disavowed by the Administration. However, Carter did say there was a "possibility" that the war would convince the Iranians that "they need to be part of the international community" and thus "induce them to release the hostages." Iranian President Abolhassan Banisadr greeted those words with sarcasm, and the Majlis (parliament) froze all deliberations on the hostages' fate until the war ends. The Iranians claimed that the hostages were safe, although they had been moved to prevent the U.S. from having any hopes of rescuing them during the confusion of the fighting.

Despite the Administration's concern about the hostages, worries about their welfare will not shape or restrict Carter's actions. Says one analyst: "The hostages matter, but the geopolitical strategy and the interest of the West and the U.S. are more significant."

Prolonged fighting would open truly frightening possibilities. Iran has threatened that it might block the Strait of Hormuz, through which passes 40% of the oil purchased by the non-Communist world and one-fourth of U.S. oil imports. That would cause economic chaos in the West, and Carter said last week that the U.S. was determined to keep the strait open, implying that it might organize an international fleet to do so. The Soviet news agency TASS thundered that "the U.S.A. is speeding up preparations for armed interference in the Persian Gulf area" and Secretary of State Edmund Muskie warned that the situation "could even escalate to the point where the unthinkable hostilities may take place"--meaning, presumably, a U.S.-Soviet nuclear confrontation.

That is extremely unlikely; Muskie also reported that the Soviets seem to want to stay neutral, and all the evidence so far was that they were. But the U.S.S.R. could profit handsomely from a long war by gaining new influence over Iran as well as Iraq. A badly beaten Iran might dissolve into chaos, allowing a left-wing faction to gain control in Tehran. The Soviets could offer to guarantee Iran's security. Or they might pose as mediators and win a major role at a peace conference called to end the war Says one well-informed analyst: "If the Soviet Union can worm its way in as guarantor of a steady oil flow, it has taken a gigantic strategic leap forward. It's a worst-case scenario that is by no means inconceivable."

Even if none of these things occur, the all too accurate impression that it cannot shape events is certain to hurt the U.S., both with the conservative oil-producing monarchies of the Persian Gulf region and with its European allies. America's dilemma will also surely have some effect on the presidential campaign. Normally, a crisis abroad helps an incumbent, but Ronald Reagan lost no time in charging that "what is happening in Iraq and Iran is the consequence of policies [Carter's] Administration has followed during the last 3 1/2 years--a vacillating foreign policy and a weakened defense capability are largely to blame."

The crisis preoccupied Carter last week almost from the moment he took off on Air Force One for his campaign swing. At his first stop, at Lincoln Land Community College in Springfield, Ill., a speaker announced Carter's entrance to a roomful of loyal Democrats, only to be told that the President would be delayed; he was on the phone talking to National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski.

Tuesday morning, Carter rose before dawn in the Century Plaza Hotel in Los Angeles to confer on the phone with Brzezinski, Muskie and Defense Secretary Harold Brown. He then showed up for a local television interview at 7 a.m. and announced: "Our own position is one of strict neutrality, and we're doing all we can through the U.N. and through other means to bring a peaceful conclusion to the combat."

The President was candid about the threat to oil supplies: "The prospect of an extended interruption would be very serious to us. I would have to call on the American people to restrict their consumption of oil even more severely on a voluntary basis." The U.S., he said, had military forces in the Persian Gulf region (29 warships), but he would not use them so long as the Soviets stayed out: "The worst thing I could do as President would be to escalate this disruption between Iran and Iraq to an even greater international crisis because of ill-considered decisions by myself. What we want to do is calm the situation and not aggravate it."

Carter went through the motions of campaigning the rest of the day but was clearly distracted. He returned to the White House at 2:40 a.m. Wednesday, then rose in a few hours for the National Security Council meeting. Wednesday afternoon, he appeared before reporters to describe the war as "a very dangerous situation" and to stress the importance of keeping the Persian Gulf oil-shipping lanes free. Said Carter: "It is imperative that there be no infringement of that freedom of passage ... We're consulting with other nations about what ought to be done to keep the Strait of Hormuz open."

All week the U.S. talked to friends and adversaries. Carter himself communicated by phone or personal cable with several heads of government of friendly nations--his aides would not identify them--and subordinates pressed the effort at lower levels.

The major diplomatic meeting of the week occurred Thursday morning when Muskie strode into the heavily guarded Soviet mission to the U.N. in Manhattan to talk with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. Afterward, Gromyko declined to speak to reporters, but Muskie indicated that the talks were testy. "We each questioned the other's intention," he admitted, "yet we are able to express the questions and doubts face to face." Muskie came away with the impression that "we seem to be taking the same view ... we are apparently in a neutral position." But, he said, Gromyko "didn't respond to or reject" the idea of simultaneous U.S.-Soviet efforts to procure a ceasefire. Concluded Muskie: "Whether ... we will pursue parallel tracks only time will tell."

For the moment, the U.S. was not doing much visible pursuing of any kind. Though Muskie said the nation "would welcome" a U.N. Security Council call for cease-fire negotiations, the U.S. did not request a Security Council meeting, nor did it publicly push mediation efforts. Said Muskie: "We are not in a position to take the lead in this situation." His aides were candid about the reason: if the U.S. appeared to be leading a mediation effort, both Iran and Iraq would reject it on that basis alone. On Friday the Security Council did meet, at the request of Norway and Mexico, but the session ended in complete confusion as members quarreled over the proper roles of the council itself.

Adding to U.S. difficulties was the hard fact that it has little military power to bring to bear in the region, at least on the ground. The Carter Administration has organized a so-called Rapid Deployment Force to be dispatched to troubled areas of the world, especially the Middle East. But former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, paraphrasing a celebrated crack by Voltaire about the Holy Roman Empire, argued last week that the RDF is not rapid, readily deployable, or much of a force. That overstated the case, but sending the RDF to the Persian Gulf would weaken the U.S. ability to respond to a threat in Europe. Further, the U.S. at present has no bases nearer to the Middle East than Diego Garcia island in the Indian Ocean. The force, if sent to the Persian Gulf, would have to rely primarily on a 10,000-mile-long supply line from the U.S., which would limit its combat effectiveness.

As for the international fleet to guard the Strait of Hormuz, the only substantial new idea to come out of the crisis, American officials last week admitted that they had not talked to U.S. allies about it until a few days ago. Says one senior State Department planner: "We have just begun to explore the options, and no one is committed to one or another at this point." West Germany cited a provision in its constitution that would limit participation in such an operation, and Japan had constitutional problems of its own. The U.S. also consulted some Arab nations about the possibility of joining in; their response was not made public.

The possibility of a blockage of the strait has been worrying diplomats ever since the Iranian revolution overthrew the Shah in early 1979. In his State of the Union address last January, the President proclaimed the so-called Carter Doctrine, which declared that the U.S. would take any necessary steps to protect U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf region, by military force if necessary. Last week the State Department was busily explaining that the doctrine was designed principally to respond to a Soviet move in the area, not a regional conflict such as the war between Iraq and Iran. Even so, it seemed inconceivable that the Administration had not consulted months ago with its allies--even more dependent upon Middle Eastern oil than the U.S.--to set up combined naval operations if any military out break threatened the vital supply line.

Though Iraq-Iran border conflicts have been flaring for many months, the U.S. seems to have been caught napping, and now finds itself able to do little more than hope that the war over which it has so little control will be mercifully short--and short on destabilizing consequences.

--By George J. Church. Reported by Christopher Ogden and Roberto Suro/Washinton

With reporting by Christopher Ogden, Roberto Suro

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