Profiling the Gulf States

By Marguerite Johnson

Vast riches and growing pains for the Arab sheikdoms

For 550 miles, from the Shatt-al-Arab in Iraq to the Musandam peninsula in Oman, a shallow, aquamarine trough of water glistens under the brutal sun--the Persian, or Arabian Gulf, depending on the side of the water on which one stands. On either shore, the Arabian and Iranian plateaus form some of the most uninviting landscape anywhere: endless vistas of desert and rock, so desolate that in one stretch in Saudi Arabia it is known as Rub'al Khali--the Empty Quarter.

Along the gulfs shores and in its waters, nature has left vast underground pools of oil controlled today by Iran and seven Arab states. With a total estimated population of 24 million and a daily oil production of 17 million bbl., the gulf states alone have the power to hold the industrial world for ransom.

There is no indication that any one of them has the desire or feels the need to do so. Compared with the convulsions plaguing Iran, the atmosphere on the Arab side of the gulf is relatively calm. Business is good. Oil money has brought riches beyond imagination. Black ribbons of tarmac connect capitals of concrete and glass that have mushroomed where small fishing and pearling villages stood little more than a decade ago.

Yet the tranquil facade cannot conceal the fact that the gulf has become a focal point of geopolitical tension. The demise of Iran as a regional superpower has left the area in a vacuum; the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has stirred fear. If the vision of a clash between Moscow and Washington over oil is the ultimate nightmare of gulf leaders, Iran's revolution has raised immediate concerns over regional rivalry and internal stability.

The upheaval in Iran has also taught gulf rulers that building on the wealth brought by oil is not enough. Modernization must be coupled with social and political reform. Most of the states have created far-reaching social welfare programs and give education high priority. But a higher standard of living and better education could lead to demands for greater political participation; though the leadership remains accessible through the majlis, the traditional consultation process between ruler and ruled, such consensus politics may not suffice for much longer. The rise of fundamentalist Islam as a political movement in Iran is not lost on the sheiks and emirs. At least two states--Kuwait and Bahrain--plan to revive consultative assemblies soon, while Saudi Arabia is in the process of forming a new assembly that will hold its first elections in the next year or two.

Moreover, hundreds of thousands of foreign workers have descended on the gulf states to perform tasks too technical or too demeaning for gulf Arabs to do themselves. Yemenis, Pakistanis, Taiwanese, Thais and Filipinos clean the streets, serve in restaurants and manage hotels--a large and disquieting foreign presence. Educated Egyptians and Palestinians occupy key professional posts, even serving as top advisers to heads of state. The Palestinian diaspora, estimated to be 400,000 through the gulf, has been the major factor in the gulf states' refusal--Oman is the exception--to support the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Brief Baedekers on the Arab gulf nations:

SAUDI ARABIA. For centuries, the Red Sea port of Jidda has been the gateway to Islam's holy places in Mecca. Jidda's transformation during the past decade from a ramshackle port to one of the busiest commercial centers in the Arab world is the most visible sign of the world's largest oil exporter's extraordinary new wealth. Billions of dollars have been spent to create basic transportation, communications, electricity and water systems in Saudi Arabia; the new five-year plan will earmark another $221 billion for development. One Saudi dilemma: of an estimated population of between 5 million and 8 million, as many as 1 million--75% of the labor force--are foreign workers.

The House of Saud retains its hold on power. Yet in an age of revolution, an absolute monarchy seems excruciatingly vulnerable, particularly since the kingdom's security forces are small and untested. The power structure frustrates young Saudis as they return from studies abroad. Western experts and Saudi officials alike nervously recall that Iranian students, educated on government scholarships abroad, were the shock troops of the revolution against the Shah.

In a state governed by the shari'a (religious law), the chasm between the ideal of Muslim piety and the lush life-style of many Saudi princes, moreover, was a factor that led to the seizure of the Sacred Mosque in Mecca by orthodox Muslim dissidents. Since that traumatic event, Saudi leaders have begun to crack down on corruption and dissolution in their own ranks. One close observer of the Saudi scene compares the Sacred Mosque incident to a heart attack: not fatal, but leaving the royal family with a frightening intimation of mortality and the resolution to lead a cleaner, more disciplined life.

IRAQ. One of the most startling developments in the Middle East during the past two years has been the evolution of Iraq, one of the superrich oil states (expected 1980 revenue: $30 billion), from a position of uncompromising radicalism to one that involves cooperation with its conservative gulf neighbors, mainly Saudi Arabia. The change is in part due to the personal ambition of President Saddam Hussein to become a regional leader.

As the commander of the gulfs largest (220,000 men) and best-equipped military force, Hussein is giving every indication that he intends to play the Shah's old role as policeman of the gulf--an ambition the smaller gulf states view with some apprehension. Drawing away from the Soviet Union, Iraq (pop. 12.2 million) has turned to Japan, France and West Germany for industrial technology and weaponry. France, Iraq's biggest oil customer, has been instrumental in bringing Iraq to the threshold of nuclear power; last June it closed a $1.5 billion deal to supply Baghdad with a variety of sophisticated weapons.

KUWAIT. "You know what I'd like?" the professor remarked as he floated in a pool at Kuwait University. "I'd like to be in California right now. What is there to do here? Nothing." Among the young and educated in the gulf, the complaint is common. Many have studied in the U.S., and, despite their sense of hurt and betrayal over American Middle East policy, there remains enormous nostalgia and good will for the U.S.

Kuwait is politically and economically the most advanced of the gulf states. It became a constitutional monarchy after it gained its independence from Britain in 1961. In 1976, the 50-member National Assembly was suspended, but last month the Crown Prince and Prime Minister, Sheik Saad al Salah, announced that the assembly would be restored in February, after general elections. The move to bring back parliamentary life is a clear bid to contain rising discontent.

In fact, much power will probably remain within the Chamber of Commerce, where Kuwait's so-called 14 families, the country's business elite, congregate to debate policy. It is this oligarchy that many young Kuwaitis find unacceptable. Although per capita income for Kuwait's 1.5 million people is $15,000 a year, there have been complaints, largely from academics, that 95% of the wealth goes to only 5% of the population.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES. For centuries the tribes along the southern gulf coast embodied the essence of Araby. Bedouins roamed the desert in the vast inland stretches of Abu Dhabi. Savvy merchants turned Dubai into a notorious smuggling port. A great seafaring tribe, the Qawasim, ruled Sharjah and dominated the gulfs coastal routes until feudal intrigue and British colonial meddling fractured their holdings into independent emirates.

Today the same people incarnate modern Arab lore emerging from the magic elixir of oil. The oil price boom in 1973 began barely two years after seven gulf emirates--Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al Qaiwain, Ras al Khaimah and Fujairah--set aside tribal quarrels to form a loose federation. The cornucopia of oil money has yielded perhaps the highest per capita income in the world for Emirates citizens (in excess of $100,000 a year) and created a cradle-to-grave welfare state. But the Emirates face the most serious population imbalance in the region: of a population of 900,000, fully 80% are foreigners.

BAHRAIN. The first oil producer in the Arabian peninsula, this island nation has come to grips with the fact that its wells, now pumping only 50,000 bbl. a day, will soon run dry. It is rapidly transforming itself into the service and financial center of the gulf. More than 120 banks have opened offices in Bahrain with an eye on the ballooning revenues of the oil producers. But some 70% of the population (250,000) is under 20 years of age, and there have been rumblings against the absolute rule of Sheik Isa bin Sulman al Khalifa, who has decided to reopen the National Assembly.

QATAR. Throughout the 4,400-sq.-mi. desert peninsula in eastern Arabia, the land does not rise higher than 360 ft. above sea level; the average annual rainfall is a scant 4 in., falling mostly in short cloudbursts in winter. Slowly, with great care, a modern state is being built. Qatar is one of the lesser oil producers in the gulf (411,000 bbl. a day), but the population is also small (250,000, of whom only 60,000 are native Qataris). The country has been found to have vast natural gas reserves, though at current prices development is considered uneconomical. Still, the sheikdom has taken steps to diversify by developing petrochemical, shipping and steel industries. "We do not want to be a short-range country," says Saeed Mis'hal, a Palestinian who heads the Industrial Development Training Center.

OMAN. Ten years ago, Oman (pop. 800,000) was one of the most underdeveloped nations in the Arab world. It had only three elementary schools, a handful of doctors and nurses, and was ruled by tyrannical Sultan Said bin Taimur, who hoarded state revenues (all in gold) in the basement of his palace. Finally, his Sandhurst-educated son, Qaboos, then 29, staged a palace coup and set about bringing the country into the 20th century. Today Oman boasts 375 schools and 14 modern hospitals. A rebellion in the Dhofar region, fanned by Marxist South Yemen, has been snuffed out as Oman, gatekeeper of the Strait of Hormuz, has built up its military forces. Oman has no large Palestinian presence; Qaboos' top advisers and military commanders are British--two factors that may help explain Oman's special relationship with the U.S.

--:By Marguerite Johnson.

Reported by William Stewart and William Drozdiak/The Gulf States

With reporting by William Stewart, William Drozdiak/The Gulf States

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