"Watching a Campaign the Way You Watch a Movie"

He is the guru of the modern political campaign, the ex pert who pinpoints which voters a candidate has the best chance to woo and what image and issues might win them. Yet the art and emi nence of the candidate's pollster have flowered so recently that there are only four or five pros at the top of the trade.

Among them: Reagan Strategist Richard Wirthlin and Carter Adviser Pat Caddell.

Their differences go well beyond the fact that Wirthlin, 49, is old enough to be the 30-year-old Caddell 's father, and is known in the business, to his pleasure, as the "grandfather "of the modern pollsters. Wirthlin is a sedate family man and former professor of economics at Brigham Young University who speaks cautiously, befitting his responsibilities as Reagan 's chief strategy planner. Caddell, on the other hand, is a voluble, black-bearded bachelor who turned pro in 1970, working for Governor John J. Gilligan of Ohio while still a Harvard undergraduate, and can be startlingly candid about his chiefs political problems. But Wirthlin and Caddell agree in sizing up the election: close.

Using Wirthlin's computer bank, an assistant can call up information on the political behavior and preferences of some 110 categories and subcategories of potential voters, ranging from the numerous and obvious (conservative Republicans) to the small and obscure (Roman Catholics who consider themselves "born again"). One sample: people over 65 who have incomes of $25,000 a year or more favor Reagan over Carter better than two to one, and their turnout at the polls is extraordinarily high--87% in a typical election.

Wirthlin began building up his mass of data--currently called PINS (Political Information System)--in 1968 when he conducted his first polls for Reagan, who was preparing to run for re-election as Governor of California. In the years since, Wirthlin has been expanding the bank steadily, adding dollops of census data and studies of voting history to the results of his own polling. In the latest survey, finished just before Labor Day, Wirthlin's agents interviewed 7,000 people, five times the size of the typical Gallup or Harris sample, investigating not only overall preferences but trends in key states and voter reaction to major events.

An equally important element in Wirthlin's system is a technique called tracking: constantly repelling small groups of key voters to catch developing shifts in opinion. Says he: "Tracking allows you to watch a campaign almost the same way you watch a movie."

Following George Bush's win in the Iowa caucuses, Wirthlin's surveys immediately picked up a deterioration of Reagan's early lead in New Hampshire. But thorough polling showed that Reagan had very strong support among more conservative Republicans and independents. To rouse them, the Reagan camp toughened its attack on Bush, using such sensitive issues as abortion and gun control, while painting Bush as a mushy Eastern establishmentarian. Reagan won by 26 points. Later Wirthlin's surveys showed that Reagan scored better against Carter by himself than with any running mate he was considering (except for Jerry Ford, who actually would have added a few points) but that Bush detracted less from the ticket than any other vice-presidential possibility. Although Reagan felt little rapport with Bush, Wirthlin's data, added to the pleas of other staffers, helped persuade him.

Currently, Wirthlin's surveys lead him to counsel calm to the Reagan camp despite the candidate's celebrated gaffes. He can find no evidence that they have hurt Reagan substantially. In addition, Wirthlin insists, contrary to the indications of the national polls, that "soft Democrats," i.e., those disenchanted with their President, are leaning toward Reagan again, after momentarily reverting to party allegiance as they watched the Democratic Convention. "The references to Hubert Humphrey and the speech by Ted Kennedy made some of them proud to be Democrats again," says Wirthlin. "A week later they woke up after that short walk in the sun and realized that Jimmy Carter was still the candidate."

More positively, a main reason that Reagan will be making a major effort in the industrial states of the Midwest and Northeast is that Wirthlin has targeted blue-collar workers, especially those who earn $15,000 to $25,000 a year, as a block that the Republican has a strong chance to win. They are predominantly white, heavily Catholic and usually vote Democratic, but now they feel squeezed hard by rising prices and taxes. With a recession on, they are worried about their jobs as well. Many are highly conservative on social issues such as abortion and welfare --an ideal combination to open their ears to Reagan's message.

Wirthlin finds the electorate to be exceptionally mercurial.

The voters, he says, "are still not committed strongly to anyone," and he discerns a tendency for people to make up their minds very late. In 1976, he notes, one survey indicated that 10% of the nation's voters made their final choice virtually on the eve of Election Day.

He suspects the proportion this year may be larger still.

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