Taking Aim at the MX Missile

Two Governors fear the $34 billion system will hurt their states

This is one for the man-bites-dog department. Last week the Governors of two states trooped to Capitol Hill, not to ask for federal money but to urge Congress to reject a mammoth development that would bring millions of dollars into their regions.

Appearing before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Military Construction, Utah's Democratic Governor Scott Matheson and Nevada's Republican Governor Robert List attacked the Administration's plans to install in their states the new mobile MX missile that is billed as the nation's most important ICBM of the future. Both men feared that the $34 billion missile system would do irreparable harm to their states.

Each of the 200 missiles would have its own oval "racetrack," ten to 15 miles long. Along every track would be 23 underground shelters. Playing a kind of shell game, a monstrous, 180-ft.-long TEL (transporter-erector-launcher) would laboriously haul the MX from one shelter to another. Or the TEL might leave the missile in place for a while and carry a dummy MX to another shelter or around the course. Watching from the sky, Soviet spy satellites could never be sure exactly where the missile was and hence would have to target all 23 shelters on each of the 200 tracks for a pre-emptive attack.

The MX tracks would be scattered over 45,000 sq. mi. of federally owned land in the Great Basin desert of Utah and Nevada. Matheson and List urged Congress to reconsider the sites because of the damage the project would cause the fragile ecosystem of the area. They were particularly concerned that the construction would increase an already severe water shortage. In addition, Matheson claimed, the invasion of the construction crews would change forever what he called "the chosen way of life" of people in the region's tiny rural communities. Beyond their plea to Congress, the Governors plan to wage a trench-by-trench defense against the MX by showing that the project would violate provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act.

After the Governors appeared in Washington, the Pentagon lost no time launching a counterattack. Testifying before the same House subcommittee, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown claimed that the MX would not increase irrigation problems, stating that once the system was built it would annually require no more water than the amount "consumed at twelve golf courses in the Greater Las Vegas area." During seven years of construction, the Air-Force would try to avoid disrupting the region by forbidding the estimated 25,000 to 50,000 workers to bring their families with them. This would obviate the need to build new communities with schools and other facilities.

In the long run, however, the strongest threat to the MX is likely to be caused not by the Governors of Utah and Nevada but, oddly enough, by the shelving and probable demise of the SALT II treaty in the wake of Afghanistan. The whole rationale for the MX depends on its ability to survive a surprise onslaught; if the Soviets were not sure that they could destroy the entire system, according to this line of thinking, they would be deterred from attacking in the first place. Under the provisions of SALT II, the Soviets would be allowed to deploy missiles carrying a total of 8,000 warheads, a formidable arsenal but not large enough to guarantee the success of a surprise attack. The Kremlin could not be sure of knocking out all of the 4,600 MX shelters, plus the 1,054 sites for the Minuteman and Titan ICBMs already in place, and still having enough left over to attack American cities. Unlimited by any treaty, the Soviets theoretically could build enough warheads to do all that and more. Says James Foster, senior researcher at the Rand Corp., a private think tank that deals with military affairs: "I'm not sure the MX makes any sense with SALT, but it surely makes no sense without it."

In rebuttal, the Air Force claims that the MX is necessary, SALT or no SALT, if only to make it more difficult for the Soviets to mount a successful surprise attack. For one thing, without an MX system, the Soviets could easily knock out the Minuteman and Titan missiles, leaving the U.S. with no land-based ICBM and dependent for its deterrent on bombers and ICBM-carrying submarines. Without having to worry about land-based U.S. missiles, the Soviets would be in a much stronger position to neutralize the remaining American systems.

If SALT II were abandoned and the Soviets started building up a force big enough to wipe out MX, the Pentagon would simply urge the Government to create more of the dummy shelters. Although some critics of the MX are skeptical, the Air Force argues that it would be cheaper for the U.S. to build shelters than it would be for the Soviets to build warheads. If the Soviets persisted, the U.S. could take the extreme step of building an antiballistic missile system (ABM) to defend the MX and still, by Air Force calculations, end up spending less than Moscow. But that would mean the U.S. would have to abrogate or refuse to renew the 1972 AMB treaty, which expires in 1982.*

Despite growing concern about the MX, Carter and the Pentagon are confident they can get it financed again in Congress in an election year, especially in light of Afghanistan. Brigadier General Guy Hecker, project boss of the MX for the Air Force, notes that there are no easy ways of countering Soviet power. Says he: "All of the solutions are ugly. None of them is pretty. But of all the uglies, the MX is the most attractive."

*Under the ABM treaty, the U.S. and the Soviet Union are allowed to defend two sites each. The Soviets have only one network, protecting Moscow, while the U.S. has no system in place.

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