Change in a Feudal Land

The Mecca siege inspires reforms--and fears

Of all the countries in the troubled Middle East, none is more important strategically to U.S. interests than Saudi Arabia, which now provides 16% of U.S. oil imports. To see how the ruling House of Baud is coping with the country's external and internal crises, TIME Correspondent William Drozdiak visited the desert kingdom last week. His report: s is our democracy," explained Saudi Arabia's royal chief of protocol, Ahmed Abdul Wahab, as he led his guests through the opulent marble palace in Riyadh to a thickly carpeted reception hall. Inside, about a hundred supplicants from various Bedouin tribes clustered beneath a huge crystal chandelier, awaiting their turn to approach Crown Prince Fahd. One by one they knelt before him, asking a special favor or voicing a complaint; the portly Prince nodded in sympathy, then told a member of his entourage what must be done. This ancient ritual, known as the majlis, enables even the lowliest Saudi citizen to express his desires or worries to the royal family. Supposedly it also keeps the royal family attuned to the faintest rumblings of discontent.

Three months ago, however, a well-armed band of zealous dissidents attacked the Sacred Mosque in Mecca, holiest of all Muslim shrines, and proclaimed one of their leaders the new Mahdi, or messiah. It took Saudi forces nearly two weeks to dislodge the invaders, and the audacious assault has jolted the royal family to its gilded foundations. "They were shocked and embarrassed, to say the least," says a Saudi with close ties to the ruling elite, "but it drew their attention to things they had neglected in the past."

The most influential princes of the royal family appear to have closed ranks, as they have done in previous crises. Ailing King Khalid, 67, has embarked on a series of pilgrimages throughout the country to solidify support for the royal family. Crown Prince Fahd, Deputy Prime Minister and heir presumptive to the throne, continues to handle day-to-day chores; most--although not all--observers in Riyadh believe his authority has increased as he seeks to carry out reforms to quell potential unrest. The next princes in line, National Guard Commander Abdullah and Defense Minister Sultan, seem to have buried their long-running feud in the interests of family unity.

Since the Sacred Mosque siege, the Saudis have reshuffled security and intelligence officials, replaced several top military officers and appointed a new governor for the Mecca district. Crown Prince Fahd has sought to emphasize the royal family's concern for the people by opening roads and schools with great fanfare. In response to growing popular resentment over corruption, he has taken steps to channel government money into showcase welfare projects, including a manpower training program to reduce the country's alarming dependence on foreign labor. To appease fundamentalist religious leaders, Fahd has tightened strictures that forbid women to work. To set an example to potential troublemakers, the regime beheaded 63 of the surviving terrorists of the Mecca siege.

At the heart of Saudi Arabia's problem is the unfinished task of creating a modern state out of a cluster of Bedouin tribes that were unified by Abdul Aziz (Ibn Saud) under the present kingdom in 1932. The royal leadership is worried by the growing polarization of Saudi society; thousands of young Saudis return from the West every year with university degrees, only to chafe under a puritanical, semifeudal system designed to appease the disparate desert tribes. "When the graduates come back, they are given nice jobs with plenty of money," remarks one educated Saudi. "But how long they will remain happy driving fancy cars and drinking whisky at home, God only knows."

For several years, Fahd has contemplated setting up a consultative assembly that would be a quasi parliament composed of both elective and appointive officials. According to the prince's plan, three-quarters of the assembly's members would be modern, educated Saudis, and the remainder would be unschooled but respected tribal leaders.

Saudi Arabia's domestic problems and its oil policy are inextricably linked. Progressive members of the royal family, including Fahd, have argued that current high production levels (9.5 million bbl. per day) are necessary to stabilize the world oil market and assist important allies like the U.S. At the current price of $26 per bbl., Saudi Arabia's oil revenues could surpass $90 billion this year.

But more conservative groups, including religious and tribal elements, have challenged the wisdom of the government's high-production policy at a time when 1) the country needs to produce only 6 million bbl. per day to maintain current budgets and 2) the U.S. has been unable to secure autonomy for the Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip and return the Muslim shrines in the Old City of Jerusalem to

Arab control. These Saudi conservatives argue that high production will not solve the problem of internal discontent, as evidenced not only by the Mecca siege but by sporadic unrest among Shi'ite Muslim workers in the oilfields of the country's eastern province.

The conservative groups also worry about the disruptive influence of some 2 million foreign workers in a country one-fourth the size of the U.S. that has a native population of only 4 million to 5 million. The foreigners include Egyptians, Palestinians, Pakistanis, Thais, Filipinos and Koreans--and about 1 million North Yemenis. The Saudis need the North Yemenis, both as guest workers and as allies, and often talk about the need to defend their country from the pro-Moscow, Marxist regime in South Yemen. Nonetheless, the Saudis know that the Yemenis resent Riyadh's oil wealth, and that a number of South Yemenis were involved in the Mecca siege. They also know that unstable, poverty-stricken North Yemen could link up with South Yemen to form a menacing new radical state on the Arabian peninsula.

During the Islamabad conference of Foreign Ministers from Islamic states, the Saudis led the fight to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Saudis' specific fear is that Moscow has embarked on a pincer-like squeeze of the Persian Gulf states by moving into Afghanistan and later, conceivably, Iran, even as the Soviets are buttressing their military outposts in South Yemen and Ethiopia.

The Saudis acknowledge that their security depends ultimately on U.S. power. To guard their independence, they abhor the thought of having U.S. bases on their own soil, but they would not be opposed to American outposts in Oman, Somalia or Kenya. The Saudis' first priority, however, is to build up their own forces. They are now confident that given the current cold war climate, the U.S. Congress will approve their purchase of 60 advanced F-15 fighter jets, though Riyadh is sensitive to any suggestion that the planes would be gifts. When told by a visiting Congressman that it looked as if "we got you the F-15," Defense Minister Sultan bluntly interrupted: "Excuse me, but we are paying more than our share for them."

What seriously stands in the way of better relations between Washington and Riyadh is the Palestinian problem. Fahd and other Saudi leaders remain convinced that the current autonomy talks between Egypt and Israel will fail to produce a plan that the Palestinians can or will accept. As traditional custodians of Islam's lory places, the Saudis are adamant about regaining Arab control of East Jerusalem. As pragmatists and as the world's largest oil producers, they are worried about the threat of sabotage--and subversion--if he Palestinian problem remains unresolved much longer.

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