Troubled Summit at Aswan

A unity in global outlook, but no progress on autonomy

The view was soothing and so was the 80DEG weather: the two men chatting together by the sun-drenched pool of Aswan's Oberoi Hotel on the Nile might have been old friends planning their next family vacation together. But the impression was deceptive. For Israel's Premier Menachem Begin and Egypt's President Anwar Sadat, the relaxed atmosphere at last week's summit could not conceal troublesome problems ahead in giving "momentum to the peace process," as Sadat put it. The two leaders agreed to establish formal relations between Egypt and Israel on Jan. 26, in accordance with the timetable laid down at Camp David. But Begin and Sadat remained far apart on the nature of an autonomy plan for the Palestinian Arabs of the West Bank and Gaza.

The summit was the fifth that the two have held since the signing of the peace treaty last March. Sadat and Begin, who were accompanied to Egypt's best-known winter resort by their wives, resumed the warm, almost joshing relationship of previous meetings. When Begin gallantly made a dinner toast to Sadat's wife Jehan ("To our dear lady, or perhaps I should say our beautiful lady") his Egyptian host, amid roars of laughter, responded with mock jealousy: "Begin, be careful."

For all the banter, there was an underlying sense of urgency about the talks. The seizing of American hostages in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had transformed the summit, said a Begin aide, "from just a discussion on Palestinian autonomy to a broad consideration of regional matters." At their second session, beside the hotel swimming pool, the two men pored intently over a large map of the Middle East and Southwest Asia, with Sadat using his pipestem as a pointer. The leaders found that their views of the Iranian and Afghan crises coincided. Responding to a dinner toast, with Sadat nodding his approval, Begin denounced Khomeini's rule as "an outburst of dark fanaticism, of black hatred." Later he termed the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan "one of the most brutal acts of our time." "Thank God," he noted somewhat smugly at one point, "Egypt and Israel, unlike these two negative phenomena, are on the side of right, not wrong, of justice, not its opposite, of freedom, and not slavery."

Even before the summit began, Sadat had reacted strongly to the Kremlin-decreed coup in Kabul. He ordered a cutback in Soviet diplomatic personnel in Cairo, severed all ties with the pro-Moscow regimes in Syria and South Yemen, and announced that Egypt would provide training camps and military assistance for the Afghan rebels. Sadat's Defense Minister, Kamal Hassan Ali, disclosed that the Egyptian and U.S. air forces had conducted joint exercises in recent weeks, to prepare for a contingency that might require the Americans to use Egypt's facilities. Among the U.S. aircraft deployed for the exercises were two E-3A Sentry AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System), which carry highly sophisticated electronic surveillance equipment.

Begin and Sadat may see eye to eye about the problems of the region, but there was no detailed discussion at Aswan about Israeli-Egyptian military or strategic cooperation--which would make Sadat even more of a pariah to his Arab colleagues than he already is. Besides, noted a senior Egyptian official, "we must concentrate on solving the Palestinian problem before thinking about military strategy." The Israelis insist that autonomy means only a limited measure of self-rule for the Palestinians; the Egyptians argue that there must be steps of substance toward the ultimate goal of independence for the West Bank and Gaza.

During the talks, Egypt's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Butros Ghali, complained bitterly in several interviews that time was running out on the autonomy problems. When Begin expressed irritation at these heavyhanded warnings, Sadat was quick to assure him that he was not orchestrating a "good cop, bad cop" approach to the summit. In an effort to end the stalemate, Sadat offered a new two-part proposal: an overall agreement on autonomy for the occupied territories, which would be first put into effect in Gaza. The 146-sq.-mi. strip along the Mediterranean was under Egyptian administration from 1948 until 1967, and does not carry the emotional and religious overtones for Israeli nationalists that the West Bank does. Begin promised that he would discuss the proposal with his Cabinet. "Autonomy is a novelty," he said before he left Aswan, "and we must be patient."

The Israeli leader came away from the summit with further tokens of Sadat's determination to make peace a reality. The leaders agreed that there would be an exchange of ambassadors on Feb. 26, one month after the formal establishment of relations. The Egyptians also expressed willingness to establish direct air service between Tel Aviv and Cairo, to set up postal and telecommunications links, and open the land borders between the two countries to civilian traffic. In agreeing to go ahead with these arrangements, declared a beaming Begin, Sadat had shown himself to be "a man of his word."

Good will may not be enough to unlock the autonomy issue. Though Sadat graciously conceded that there were still "four months to agree on autonomy," his next scheduled meeting with Begin is not until April, in Israel. That puts the two leaders working on their own, perilously close to deadline. Despite firm denials by U.S. officials in Washington, both Israeli and Egyptian observers were speculating that Jimmy Carter may yet have to convene Camp David II to produce an autonomy plan--one that will somehow satisfy both parties to the peace treaty.

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