Monday, Jan. 14, 1980
"A Hell of a Lot of Vodka"
President Carter's retaliatory measures will pinch but they are unlikely to punish the Soviet Union seriously.His principal move--the cutoff of grain sales--is a good show of short-term strength, yet its long-term value is arguable. Says Richard Kjeldsen, senior international economist for the Security Pacific National Bank: "I cannot think of a single unilateral embargo that has been effective. Nor can I think of an instance in the past when wheat-producing countries have actually got together to function in some concerted, cartel-like operation. An embargo on grain shipments is simply a very leaky boat."
The Carter Administration has been trying to persuade other wheat-exporting nations to cooperate with the embargo and not sell the Soviets the 17 million metric tons of grain eliminated by the U.S. So far, Canada and Australia have given "pretty firm" commitments to go along with the embargo, while Argentina is a question mark. Even if these nations do cooperate, the Soviets may still find other ways to get their grain. Says Verel Bailey, an Iowa corn grower: "The Russians are very effective in manipulating international pipeline supplies. It would not surprise me if a lot of grain starts heading for Polish ports and never arrives there but goes to a 'destination unknown,' namely the Soviet Union."
Even if the embargo were to prove largely successful, it is unlikely that anybody in the U.S.S.R. would go hungry. The bulk of the grain from the U.S. is corn, which is fed to livestock. The Kremlin has been striving to build up its herds after a distress slaughter prompted by bad harvests in the mid-1970s. At the moment, Soviet ports and storage areas are crammed with grain, so any embargo would not be felt for a few months. When the grain runs out, the herds would again be slaughtered to feed people. Toward the end of 1980, a meat shortage would finally develop. But that would simply mean belt-tightening for Soviet citizens --a familiar enough deprivation under Communist rule. If the embargo were sustained for a long period, more severe suffering could occur. But Carter has always been reluctant to use food as that direct a weapon. In his speech he even went out of his way, rather lamely, to say that the grain he is cutting off is used to feed livestock, not people. The livestock would, of course, feed people.
Carter's speech quickly drew rebukes from political opponents. Senator Edward Kennedy complained that the "Soviets won't leave Afghanistan, and the American farmer will pay the price for an ineffective foreign policy. A weak policy can't be redeemed by getting tough on farmers." George Bush declared that the embargo "cuts off our own nose more than it hurts the Russians. Talking about cutting off fishing rights is like hitting the Soviets with a marshmallow."
American farmers, who are enjoying bumper crops and record exports, are unhappy with the embargo but seem to grudgingly accept it on patriotic grounds. Says Texas Congressman E de la Garza, a Democrat: "With all the grain around, we may end up with a hell of a lot of vodka, but I think the agricultural states will go along with the President as long as the integrity of the nation is involved."
Farmers are at least partly mollified by Carter's proposal that the Federal Government buy much of the $2 billion in embargoed grain and put it in storage. But Clark Biggs, spokesman for the California Farm Bureau, warns that stockpiles tend to depress prices. "The wheat has to be sold some time, and buyers have that in the back of their minds when they bid on the grain." Government purchase of grain will also add to the $33 billion budget deficit projected for fiscal 1980 and thus increase inflation. The slim $10 billion U.S. balance of payments surplus anticipated this year will be reduced, further adding to the pressure on the alarmingly weakened dollar.
The cutoff of technology sales to the Soviets may discomfit them, but again only modestly. The Soviets badly need certain kinds of U.S. technology, especially oil-drilling equipment. But in most cases they can buy somewhat less advanced equipment from Western European nations. The Carter Administration is engaged in talks with the Germans, British and French to stop these sales, but no commitments have been announced.
The basic question is whether economic pressure, no matter how successful, will cause any change in the Soviets' political behavior. Cautions a top European Community official: "For the Russians, American technology is only the icing on the cake. They would like your IBM computers, your rubber plants, your petrochemical processes, but not at the expense of their expansionist foreign policy. The one thing that has remained completely consistent for 50 years is Russian expansionism."
This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.