Monday, Jul. 23, 1979

From Russia with Hope

Byrd seeks a way to satisfy the Kremlin and the Senate

As the SALT hearings got under way last week, Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd was briefing his colleagues on the results of his visit to the U.S.S.R. and his surprisingly candid talk with Leonid Brezhnev. The West Virginia Democrat returned with some new ideas about how the Soviets might respond to the questions the Senate has been raising about the arms accord.

Byrd was more than graciously received by Brezhnev at his vacation retreat at Yalta. The Soviet leader had sent his limousine to pick up his guest at the airport, 80 miles away. When Byrd drove up, Brezhnev was seated on the lawn and was wearing a batch of medals on his chest. He rose to shake Byrd's hand.

Byrd presented him with a record album of his own bluegrass fiddling. Brezhnev then took Byrd by the arm--"he was a little unsteady," Byrd said--and they walked together into the vacation lodge and sat down at a long table in the splendidly paneled conference room.

Brezhnev read a prepared statement, describing the process of negotiating SALT II. He said that Soviet and American negotiators had achieved an "equal and balanced" agreement in which the Soviets had made concessions. He emphasized that the Soviets and Americans had negotiated the treaty thoroughly--"every word, every phrase, hundreds of times."

It was then Byrd's turn. He told the Soviet leader that he himself was still undecided on the treaty. He added: "I want to give you today a candid appraisal of the prospects for the SALT II treaty in the Senate. It is my opinion that if there were a vote today, the Senate probably would not approve the SALT II treaty. But much can happen between now and the final vote." Byrd then made his first suggestion: "It would be a significant help in the area of verification if we could have an indication that you could agree to notification--on a voluntary basis--in advance of all ICBM test launches. Such a step would undoubtedly have a favorable impact on the Senate debate."

Byrd told Brezhnev that some Senators were also afraid that the SALT protocol might be regarded as a precedent for future negotiations and that the agreement on non-circumvention might be used to alter existing relations with U.S.

allies. As for the Soviet Backfire bomber, the Senate might want to write into the ratification documents the promise Brezhnev had made in a letter to Carter that no more than 30 sonic planes would be Brezhnev repeatedly interrupted Byrd's presentation with comments. Observed Byrd:

"Brezhnev was very attentive. He was listening and alert." Byrd cautioned Brezhnev | against inflammatory rhetoric. "The Senate will not be intimidated," he said. "It will not act out of fear. It will not act in haste."

Brezhnev interrupted: "The Soviet Union is not attempting to scare the Senate."

After the meeting, Byrd took the opportunity to ask for "compassionate consideration" for Anatoli Shcharansky and some other Soviet dissidents. Said Byrd:

"My aide has a list." Replied Brezhnev:

"I will read the list." Brezhnev then took Byrd's arm and gave him a tour of the grounds, taking him up the hill some 200 yards to a small cabin. This was a retreat that Stalin had built but had never used, said Brezhnev.

Just before he left, Byrd asked Brezhnev if he might have a bar of candy for his wife, who was waiting in Moscow. He had noticed some candy bars in the lodge.

Brezhnev sent an aide for them and handed Byrd four. "Ladies like candy," Brezhnev said, "when it's presented by a man."

The next day, in Moscow, Byrd talked for 2 1/2 hours with Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, who made it plain that if the Senate amended the text proper, the whole treaty would be reopened. Byrd paraphrased Gromyko's explanation:

"O.K., you want to reopen that; we want to reopen this. If it is reopened on one side, it is reopened on the other side."

In short, Byrd found the Soviets adamant against altering the text of the treaty, but attentive to his words about the Senate's adding reservations or understandings to the resolution of ratification.

Byrd felt that if the Senate did in fact reopen the negotiations by voting a substantive amendment to the text, those negotiations might lead to a less favorable treaty than SALT II as now submitted.

Byrd found the Soviets responsive to the idea of quieting their inflammatory rhetoric. Gromyko asked Byrd to apply the same rule of caution to his Senate colleagues. Byrd said he was advising them just that way, but he could not control them. He told Gromyko that a Senator could make a fiery speech about the treaty and the Soviets and still end up voting for the treaty. Gromyko then responded with rare whimsy: "If I should ever get the urge after reading some hotheaded statement made in the United States to reach for a pencil and paper, I will use my other hand to restrain the first one. If I should ever be tempted to dictate a sharp response into a tape recorder, I will instruct my staff to make sure the tape recorder breaks down. If I should ever feel the urge to call in a stenographer to dictate a sharp response, I will arrange to have the lady not feel too well that day."

Byrd feels that he returned with at least a scenario by which Senate approval of the treaty is quite possible. And he came home plainly pleased with his journey.

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