Signed And Sealed...

But not delivered. Now the SALT II debate

"If the U.S. Senate fails to ratify the SALT treaty, history will judge it harshly," declared Massachusetts Senator Edward Kennedy. On the contrary, said Washington Senator Henry Jackson, "the U.S. would be better off with no agreement than this one."

Salvos like these were already ricocheting around Capitol Hill last week as Jimmy Carter wound up his summit in Vienna with Leonid Brezhnev and brought home the Soviet President's signature on a treaty to restrict both nations' long-range nuclear weapons. It was the signal for the great SALT II debate to begin in earnest. At stake is not just a treaty, but ten years of nuclear arms negotiations and the very nature of the relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Friend and foe of the treaty in the Senate feel they have embarked, in the words of Republican Treaty Opponent Jesse Helms of North Carolina, "on what may be the most significant national debate of our time."

The outcome is very much in doubt. Democratic Whip Alan Cranston of California, a leading SALT supporter, counts no more than 58 votes for the treaty and 30 against, leaving twelve Senators wholly undecided. The opponents have similar head counts. Thus, for the moment, the treaty is in what Alaska's Ted Stevens, a Republican opponent, calls a "never-never land," a standoff in which treaty backers have enough votes to block crippling amendments or a filibuster but lack the 67 votes that constitute the two-thirds majority needed to approve the pact.

Battle lines on SALT II were drawn months ago, but the all-out fight was delayed until Monday, when Carter and Brezhnev signed the treaty on a silk-topped table. Then the two men stood up and quite unexpectedly embraced. In contrast to the stiff formality of the summit talks, the moment was a warm and moving exchange between the failing Soviet leader, 72, and the vigorous American President, 54.

A few hours later, Carter was back in Washington, preparing to take on the Senate's SALT opponents and vowing: "We will win." Pausing only to change into a fresh blue suit and to hide the shadows of fatigue under his eyes with a dusting of powder, Carter strode down the aisle of the House with an air of self-confidence. For 35 minutes, he addressed a group of Congressmen, Senators and other dignitaries, speaking somberly and forcefully and glancing frequently in the direction of Scoop Jackson, the most outspoken of the SALT opponents. The President appealed to the Senate to back the agreement as "a matter of common sense." Without the pact, he said, the U.S. would be pushed into "an uncontrolled and pointless nuclear arms race." The President said "neither side obtained everything that it sought" in the negotiations, and argued that "the package that did emerge is a carefully balanced whole, and it will make the world a safer place for both sides."

Turning to the major objections of SALT opponents, Carter maintained that the treaty places "equal ceilings" on both countries' strategic arsenals, "slows down --it even reverses--the momentum of the Soviet arms buildup" and makes future competition on weapons "safer and more predictable." Furthermore, he insisted, "compliance will be assured by our own nation's means of verification, including extremely sophisticated satellites, powerful electronic systems and a vast intelligence network."

The Senators and Congressmen listened politely and almost silently. Claimed House Speaker Tip O'Neill: "It was the most attentive audience that I have seen in my years in Congress." This was a polite and partisan way of glossing over the fact that no applause greeted Carter's statements on the treaty itself. The audience did clap six times, but only when Carter condemned war and Soviet expansionism and exhorted Congress to keep U.S. defenses strong. In fact, there was no evidence that Carter's speech swayed any votes in the Senate.

The only surprise in Carter's speech was the statement that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would testify for the treaty. Actually, only the Chairman, Air Force General David Jones, and two other members, Air Force General Lew Allen Jr. and Admiral Thomas Hayward, support the treaty, and they have some reservations. The other two members, Army General Bernard Rogers and Marine General Louis Wilson, are even less enthusiastic and so far have held back from endorsing the pact.

Thus, said a senior White House official, the most that the Administration expects from the chiefs is that they will give "judicious and careful testimony" when hearings on the treaty begin July 9 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

There seems little chance that the Senate will approve the treaty without insisting that it be amended. Said Senate Republican Leader Howard Baker Jr.: "The Senate will give its advice before it gives its consent. The Senate is not going to accept a pig in a poke." Both Carter and Brezhnev have warned the Senate against insisting on changes. Said the Soviet leader in Vienna: "Any attempt to rock this elaborate structure, to substitute any of its elements, to pull it closer to one's self, would be an unprofitable exercise. The entire structure might then collapse." Scoffed the unconvinced Jackson: "They're already trying to do a little blackmailing."

The pact's most ardent opponents intend to block the treaty by attempting to pass "killer amendments." Utah Republican Jake Gam will offer a package that would amount to a substitute treaty. Said he of the one signed in Vienna: "Whatever else it is, it is not arms control." His feeling is shared by an unlikely ally, Liberal Democrat George McGovern of South Dakota, an advocate of disarmament who feels that SALT II does not go nearly far enough. "I don't think SALT II is worth fighting over," he said. "We ought to just scrap it."

The Administration maintains that significant cuts in armaments cannot be achieved until SALT III. A participant at the Vienna summit told TIME that at one session Carter said, "The U.S. is ready to agree to large reductions in launchers, warheads and throw-weight. We are willing to explore even a moratorium on construction [of nuclear weapons] as a prelude to SALT III." During those negotiations, he added, both sides should agree "to shift our technology toward increasing the invulnerability of our own forces rather than threatening the survivability of each other's." For instance, said Carter, SALT III could establish havens in which attacks on nuclear submarines would be prohibited, or it might ban the development of depressed-trajectory missiles, which can strike their targets with very little warning. Afterward Brezhnev asked Carter for a written version of his ideas.

The only real negotiating at Vienna concerned the Soviets' medium-range Backfire bomber, which is left out of the treaty. Following the script that was carefully worked out in advance by U.S. and Soviet officials, Brezhnev read Carter a statement promising that the bomber's range and rate of production would not be increased during the lifetime of the treaty, which expires in 1985. But when Carter asked Brezhnev to confirm that the production rate was 30 a year, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko interrupted to say: "No answer is required to that question." After some debate, the subject was temporarily dropped.

Next morning, Carter delivered an impassioned, ten-minute lecture, pounding the table and declaring that he had come to Vienna believing "in good faith" that the Backfire issue had been solved long ago. Gromyko and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance argued for several minutes over which side had departed from the summit script. Suddenly Brezhnev silenced them. "Tridtsat [thirty]," he said, spreading his arms wide. "It's 30 a year.

There! Another Soviet concession!" Still, it was an ambiguous and unwelcome addition to the SALT record, sure to be used against the treaty by Senate opponents.

Later, Carter brought up another touchy subject. To verify Soviet compliance with SALT II, the Administration hopes to fly U-2 observation planes over Turkey, but the Turks have insisted that the Kremlin must not object to the missions. Brezhnev's response to the proposal was not conclusive, but Carter felt it was encouraging.

Other military issues were discussed by Defense Secretary Harold Brown, Joint Chiefs Chairman General Jones and their Soviet counterparts, Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov and Chief of Staff Nikolai Ogarkov. The men talked over the long stalled negotiations on reducing troop levels in Central Europe. No progress was made, but the meeting was still significant: it was the first discussion between U.S. and Soviet defense chiefs since the end of World War II.

Nor was there any success in resolving basic foreign policy differences, but Carter and his advisers left Vienna pleased by the way the summit had gone. Said a U.S.

official: "What we went in to get and what we left with came out exactly the way we hoped." Which is to say that Carter had expected no more than a face-to-face exchange on the issues.

One man disappointed by the outcome was former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Said he: "Fundamentally, the Soviet Union did not act as if it needed to settle anything other than the immediate arms control issue, thereby leaving all the political causes of tension unimproved. In my view, restraint on arms cannot survive lack of restraint in political conduct."

The Administration contends that Brezhnev, although he tried valiantly, was simply too ill to do any actual negotiating with Carter. He seemed to doze off during the state dinners; he needed 20 seconds to sign his name to a copy of the treaty.

Still the White House believes the summit was worthwhile, if for no other reason than the impression Carter brought home of Brezhnev as a man who is trying to do something constructive about arms control. Whether Carter can persuade 67 U.S. Senators to share this view of the Soviet leader and Kremlin intentions remains to be seen.

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