"The Final, Extra Mile"

WELCOME KARTER read one of the hand-painted signs that were held above the cheering crowd lining the streets of Cairo. Some of the others called him Kartir, Caytar, and Cahtah. Many of them said PEACE, and some said, in honor of his own faith, WE BELIEVE IN GOD. And in Jerusalem it was much the same: WELCOME, SHALOM, and PEACE.

Jimmy Carter's bold flight to the Middle East last week was one of the most startling and swiftly executed diplomatic initiatives in years. Just 72 hours after he telephoned Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to invite himself to Cairo, Carter was on the banks of the Nile. It was a daring attempt to use the prestige of the U.S. presidency to end the months-long stalemate blocking an Egyptian-Israeli peace settlement. Even though the search for a Middle East ac cord has claimed more of the President's time than any other issue, last week's jour ney, in the words of Presidential Assistant Hamilton Jordan, demonstrated Carter's willingness to go "the final, extra mile." The goal, of course, was momentous: an end to more than 30 years of warfare that repeatedly threatened to draw the American and Soviet super powers into a clash.

But as Carter flew off from Andrews Air Force Base, after a surprisingly successful White House meeting with Israeli Premier Menachem Begin, he had no advance assurance that his trip would not lead to an embarrassing failure. It thus entailed major political risks, both for the nations involved and for Carter personally. If he had to return home without having brought Cairo and Jerusalem substantially closer to agreement, he could be criticized for unwisely raising expectations, for wasting U.S. influence, and for improvising showy moves without any serious plan behind them. Said a Washington-based European diplomat: "It is extremely risky; to Europeans it seems even a little bit crazy. There is no fallback position if this fails." While White House Press Secretary Jody Powell agreed that there was "no guarantee of success," he stressed that "without a major effort such as this, the prospects for failure are almost overwhelming." If the U.S. permitted such a failure, added a formal White House statement, "the judgment of history and of our children will rightly condemn us."

By Sunday night, after 6 1/2 hours of talks in Jerusalem with Begin and senior members of his cabinet, the payoff on Carter's gamble was still in doubt. "A treaty is within our grasp," the President had told Egypt's parliament Saturday. Sadat agreed, saying that "we have had a very fruitful talk." But both leaders cautioned that some issues remained unresolved as Carter headed for Israel. Arriving there just as the Jewish Sabbath was ending, he was greeted at Ben-Gurion Airport by President Itzhak Navon and Premier Begin, who gave him a warm embrace. Said Carter: "I have good reason to hope that the goal can now be reached. I look forward to completing the urgent business at hand on this brief visit." The carefully chosen words were more optimistic, however, than the actual situation. Carter let it be known that he was willing to delay his return home for a day or two, and that Secretary of State Cyrus Vance planned to remain in the Middle East still longer.

If an agreement could possibly emerge, that clearly would be a great triumph that richly justified the risks, but there could still be several weeks' more work in arranging every last detail before a formal signing. And there would still be widespread opposition among Arab nations to any agreement that left the Palestinian problem fundamentally unresolved.

Dramatic as it was, Carter's search for a limited Israeli-Egyptian settlement was only one move in a broader search for stability in the increasingly turbulent Middle East. The upheaval in Iran has turned that nation sharply against both the U.S. and Israel. Saudi Arabia, the world's largest oil exporter, feels increasingly vulnerable and threatened. North

Yemen is under attack by the Soviet-supported regime in South Yemen. So disconcerting were events that Carter ordered the 80,800-ton carrier Constellation to head from Subic Bay in the Philippines across the Indian Ocean to the Arabian Sea. This action was in marked contrast to the Administration's inactivity during the collapse of Iran.

What made Carter's sudden trip possible was a trio of U.S. proposals designed to bridge key differences in the Egyptian and Israeli interpretations of the accords signed by Sadat and Begin last September at Camp David. The main questions:

1) Would the signing of an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty commit Israel to granting autonomy to the Palestinians living in the areas it seized in the 1967 war?

2) What is the timetable, if any, for negotiations leading to that autonomy?

3) Does the treaty take precedence over defense agreements Cairo previously signed with other Arab states?

On the first two questions, Carter last week offered a carefully crafted formula that merely implied linkage between the Egyptian-Israeli treaty and Palestinian autonomy by stating that the treaty is part of the agreement for "a framework for a comprehensive peace treaty signed at Camp David." As for the timetable, the U.S. compromise said that negotiations on autonomy will begin one month after Israel and Egypt sign their treaty and "will be concluded within twelve months." Elections for the Palestinian councils, the first step toward self-rule, would be held speedily. This proposal, however, left ambiguous the questions of what happens if there is no agreement at the end of a year's talks and exactly how quickly the elections are to be held. With these ambiguities to protect him, Begin accepted for the first time at least a vaguely implicit linkage and an implicit timetable.

On the issue of treaty precedence, Carter offered a Solomonic solution: that the Israeli-Egyptian treaty would not have precedence over Egypt's other treaties, but neither would Cairo's other treaties have precedence over the one with Israel. This mind-numbing legal nicety leaves unresolved, of course, the crux of the issue: a definition of the circumstances under which Egypt can join another Arab state in fighting Israel. Begin agreed to accept that too; hence Carter's mission.

At the beginning of last week, there was absolutely no hint of the startling diplomatic moves that Carter would soon make. On the contrary, the President's talks with Begin in Washington were not going well, and the euphoria kindled by the Camp David summit had all but faded completely. At his Sunday school Bible class at the First Baptist Church, the President wearily shook his head and confessed, "I stayed up real late last night with Premier Begin. We did not make any progress." The Israeli leader agreed with that view, stating on an ABC television interview program that "we didn't solve the main issues" and that the talks were still in a "deep crisis."

During most of their eight hours at the White House, Carter listened quietly to Begin's arguments that Egypt had "deviated" from the original Camp David accords and that the deadlock was partly the result of Carter's backing Sadat on some key points. Carter challenged both points, but let Begin talk on.

From his remarks it was clear that Begin had just about ruled out any new concessions. Begin argued, for instance, that the precisely worded phrases that almost completely barred any linkage between the Egyptian-Israeli agreement and the Palestinian problem were the "soul" of the Camp David agreement. Sadat has demanded linkage in order to combat the accusation that he has abandoned his fellow Arabs on the West Bank and Gaza. To Begin such linkage means that fulfillment of the peace treaty could be delayed if the Palestinians make trouble in the negotiations on autonomy. In the meantime, Israel might have withdrawn from most of the Sinai, thus losing a considerable military advantage.

"We cannot sacrifice our security for the sake of Sadat's prestige," Begin told Carter. "We leaders of Israel cannot betray our children."

The one matter on which Begin and Carter seemed to concur was that Middle East instability was reaching a crisis point in the light of the revolution in Iran, the military weakness of Saudi Arabia, and the confluence of the pan-Islamic movement and Muslim radicalism. Begin declared that Israel is not only a stable democracy but also a potential strategic asset to the U.S., and Carter agreed. Carter himself offered no new ideas. He asked Begin what he thought a breakdown in talks would lead to, and Begin coolly answered that it would not necessarily be a tragedy. Said he: "The next step should be very serious reflection, and we need some time for all the parties involved."

Although his talks with Begin were getting nowhere, Carter decided on one last attempt to find a compromise. Secretary Vance and a handful of aides began combing the minutes of the Camp David summit and the subsequent negotiations. Working nearly around the clock (Vance skipped a Sabbath dinner given by Begin), they sought some kind of formulation that would satisfy the Arabs on the questions of linkage and treaty precedence without requiring Israel to compromise on the essential issue of security. What Vance and his team eventually came up with was nothing very startling--three rather enigmatic paragraphs on a single sheet of paper.

The Americans were not optimistic about Vance's document. "We thought maybe Begin would accept one of the three," said an aide. Their assessment was so gloomy that Carter did not even mention Vance's new proposal at his next session with Begin on Saturday evening. It was only after church on Sunday morning that Carter telephoned Begin and asked him to come to one last meeting that afternoon. As Vance read aloud what he called a "formula for compromise," Carter calmly awaited Begin's reaction. To everyone's surprise, the Israeli seemed much impressed. He studied the single-page draft for several minutes and then said he would "consider these proposals seriously." The Americans looked at each other in astonishment. Said one later: "It was the best news we had heard in a long time." Said another: "We had absolutely no rational reason to presume that Begin would be receptive."

Begin said he would immediately submit the proposals to his Cabinet, and made it clear that he would urge approval. Though it was past midnight in Cairo, Carter telephoned Sadat to report the encouraging developments. Despite Begin's endorsement, the Israeli Cabinet approved the U.S. proposals by only a thin majority: nine in favor, three opposing and four abstaining. When he got word of the vote, Carter again called Sadat, this time to tell him of his idea of flying to the Middle East. Said Carter: "I'd like to come over with these suggestions. They're not going to be exactly what you want, but I believe they take into consideration your concerns." Sadat offered to come to Washington, but Carter stuck to his plan. Sadat replied that the American would be warmly welcomed in Egypt.

Shortly afterward, Carter invited Begin back to the White House. In an eight-minute meeting, Carter told him of his plan to fly to the Middle East to obtain Egypt's acceptance of the compromise. Leaving the President's office, Begin flashed a "thumbs up" sign to an aide and exclaimed, "Good news! World news!" Cutting short his trip to the U.S. by one day, he flew home and declared, "This has been a good week for Israel."

The White House clearly enjoyed revealing the presidential trip. Even the regulars in the briefing room gasped when Jody Powell announced it. At Powell's elbow sat two rare visitors to the press room, Presidential Aides Hamilton Jordan and Zbigniew Brzezinski. Barely able to contain their pleasure, they had dropped by to relish the reporters' surprise.

With the dramatic announcement, the White House mood brightened enormously. Aides who had been depressed and subdued by a long series of dismal domestic developments and international setbacks began joking and bantering as they became caught up in the hectic preparations for Carter's departure. The President himself looked more jovial.

To change Washington's mood was one reason for Carter's sudden decision to head for the Middle East. Having been stung by his decline in the opinion polls, Carter was reaching for a dramatic foreign venture. By going to Cairo and Jerusalem on short notice, he might satisfy those critics who have been clamoring for him to "do something somewhere."

But there were more important reasons for Carter's decision. Despite the risk that the mission's failure could further erode the President's image as an effective global leader, there was a pressing need to take some bold international action to reassure America's friends and allies of Washington's determination to protect its interests. An editorial in a Beirut paper speculated that the U.S. was fast becoming a "super nonpower" in the Middle East. Much more worrisome to the Administration was the degree to which Saudi Arabia seemed to be reassessing its close ties with the U.S.

With the Saudis clearly in mind, Washington moved to demonstrate that it was not prepared to allow North Yemen to fall victim to South Yemen's aggression. The U.S. offered to fly in F-15 jets to defend Saudi Arabia if the Saudis use their own air power in Yemen (the Saudis declined the offer for the time being). North Yemen, meanwhile, was authorized to receive some $300 million in U.S. weaponry, including a dozen F-5E fighter jets, 64 M-60 tanks and 50 armored personnel carriers. These arms could be airlifted to North Yemen almost immediately.

Surveying the deteriorating U.S. fortunes in the Middle East, a top U.S. official remarked last week, "It's not a question of the U.S. running out of patience. It's a question of time running out over there." Said another presidential aide: "We're going to be in the soup anyway if we fail to get an Egyptian-Israeli settlement. We might as well go all the way."

Once Carter had obtained Israel's approval of the new compromise proposals, he concluded he had to move quickly. Said a White House official: "He knew that he had to pre-empt the Palestine Liberation Organization, Begin's Cabinet, Sadat's lawyers--everyone--from tearing the compromise apart again." Having learned something about Middle East temperament during his months of involvement in the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations, Carter has concluded that to show patience and allow extra time for bargaining often only encourages destructive quibbling over legalisms and phraseology.

Carter also figured that Sadat would be more flexible on his home ground. He reasoned that the mere presence of the American President in Egypt would exert an indirect kind of pressure on the Egyptian leader to reach an agreement. For one thing, a President's transatlantic voyage is itself a gesture of courtesy and respect, implicitly requiring a positive response. For another, if Sadat came to Washington and did not like the terms proposed to him, he could angrily return home, and even gain popularity with his own public and the Arab world in the process. Such a tactic would be lost to Sadat if he had to play host.

What Sadat, on the other hand, gained from a Carter visit was the spectacle of Egyptian throngs cheering him and his visitor. Carter understood this and thus agreed to a slow-moving, triumphal train ride from Cairo to Alexandria, even though U.S. Secret Service men voiced serious concerns about protecting him from terrorists. A White House official explained that such hoopla would "demonstrate to the doubters in the Arab world the Egyptian people's support for Sadat and the peace initiative."

Carter's two-day stay in Egypt was a mixture of exotic ceremony and difficult diplomatic bargaining.

The burden of his mission seemed to weigh heavily on him as he arrived. His face was ashen, and he looked unusually tired when he stepped onto the red carpet at Cairo's International Airport after a twelve-hour flight from the U.S. He perked up, however, during the 50-minute, open-limousine ride with Sadat to the Kubbeh Palace, where he and Rosalynn stayed overnight. Carter grinned broadly and waved to the crowds, who were chanting, as they did throughout the trip, "Carter, Carter. Man of peace." Banners fluttered their welcome in the gritty, sandy wind that blows through Cairo at the start of the duststorm season. Roadside musicians banged their drums and played their flutes.

The capital's crowds were noticeably sparser than those that had greeted Richard Nixon in 1974. This may have been partly because Carter's presidential motorcade appeared on such short notice, partly because it rolled through the tranquil upper-middle-class suburb of Heliopolis rather than Cairo's crowded working-class quarter. Yet the smaller turnout may also have reflected the Cairenes' growing skepticism at the possibility of peace being near. Said one: "We have been waiting now for peace for more than a year. If Carter has brought peace, we can give him a better farewell."

In what Cairo residents described as a "miracle," the city managed to get ready for the President very quickly. Travel routes were cleaned, electricity service was improved (in the hope that street lights would not all suddenly go out, as often happens), and communication equipment was installed to serve the official American party and the estimated 2,500 journalists covering the trip. To house the visitors, the government took over the entire 400-room Nile Hilton Hotel, forcing its infuriated guests to find other accommodations in the middle of the tourist season. Concerned about terrorists, authorities confined Cairo residents with radical backgrounds to their homes until Carter's departure.

The ceremonial highlight of the second day of the visit was the 137-mile, four-hour train ride from the capital to Alexandria, through Sadat's home district in the heart of the verdant Nile delta. "This is my Georgia," exclaimed the Egyptian leader, pointing to the landscape of thatched-roof mud houses and farmers tilling with ox-drawn wooden plows. The antique diesel locomotive, decorated with flowers and palms, was greeted along the way by the shrill sound of reed instruments and the rhythmic clapping of hands. Dangling from trees and lampposts, clustered on roofs and balconies, and crowding close to the rails, tens of thousands of robed farmers, workers and students shouted their greetings. Among them: "We love you, Carter," and "We sacrifice souls and blood for you, Sadat."

In Alexandria, Carter was met by the largest, most enthusiastic crowd of the Egyptian visit. An estimated 1 million people lined the 3 1/2-mile drive along the Mediterranean Sea wall from the railway station to Ras el Tin Palace, where the Carters stayed. That night Sadat was host at a gala state dinner.

The following morning the President and his party returned to Cairo in U.S. Air Force helicopters, which had been ferried to Egypt just for the presidential visit. At Egypt's parliament, he received a standing welcome, and his moving, well-delivered remarks were interrupted by applause 14 times. Addressing the deputies as "my friends, my brothers," he ended the televised speech by citing passages from the Old and New Testaments praising peace as the highest of man's virtues. And he quoted the Koran: "If thine adversary incline toward peace, do thou also incline toward peace, and trust in God." After the speech, Carter had one more working session with Sadat, then quickly toured the Great Pyramid at Giza. When told by a guide that the structure took only 20 years to build, Carter retorted: "I'm surprised that a government organization could do it that quickly." After the sightseeing, the presidential party took off for Israel.

Behind the pageantry and the politicking, the Americans and Egyptians were working on the issues still stalling the peace settlement. Involved in various aspects of the bargaining was the platoon of advisers accompanying Carter. In addition to Vance, they included Brzezinski, Defense Secretary Harold Brown and U.S. Envoy Roy Atherton. White House officials had been careful not to encourage hopes of success. On the flight to Cairo, a senior presidential aide stressed that Carter was "not particularly" optimistic and was "well aware of the fact that it is much easier for things to go wrong than to go right." This caution seemed warranted, for even before the Americans had landed, Egyptian Premier Moustafa Khalil had announced that his Cabinet had not accepted all the U.S. compromise proposals. Said Khalil: "There will be a few changes."

In Sadat's remarks welcoming Carter, the Egyptian leader pointedly referred to the linkage question. Said Sadat: "We are determined to enable our Palestinian brothers to realize their national rights and regain their freedom." This prompted Carter to depart from his prepared response in order to include "the Palestinians" among those who would benefit from "the state of peace for this region." Carter also assured Sadat that an Israeli-Egyptian agreement would only be part of "a comprehensive peace, a peace that would reflect the legitimate needs of all those who have suffered so deeply during the last 30 years of conflict, enmity and war." This is a point that Carter has been stressing with increasing frequency. Later, in his address to Egypt's parliament, he again endorsed linkage by saying that "there can be little doubt that the two agreements reached at Camp David&$151;negotiated together and signed together--are related."

For a total of 2 1/2 hours on Thursday, the two leaders discussed the U.S. proposals and Egypt's response to them. Even more extensive negotiating went on between Vance and Khalil. Few clues emerged, however, about the course of the talks. When a reporter asked Sadat what he had discussed with Carter, the Egyptian replied, "No comment. This is another Camp David." He was referring to the complete secrecy that cloaked the September summit.

On one occasion, Sadat allowed that only "some words here or there" separated his position from the Israelis'. But this was not the candid revelation of progress that it seemed at first, because Carter then added, "We still have some problems, obviously." His grim mood upon leaving Egypt indeed seemed to signal that success was proving elusive.

On arriving in Israel, the President had to attend to the pomp and ceremonies that take up so much of a state visit before he could begin his serious talks. He was welcomed by Begin and President Navon in a glare of floodlights at Ben-Gurion Airport as a 21-gun salute boomed through the night. Then the presidential motorcade rolled into Jerusalem where Mayor Teddy Kollek offered him bread and wine, an honor once reserved for Jewish kings returning from battle. According to Kollek this was "the most important visit to Jerusalem since the Queen of Sheba."

Saturday night, Jimmy and Rosalynn dined privately with Begin and his wife Aliza at the Premier's residence. This was the President's first chance to brief the Israeli on Sadat's response to the U.S. compromise proposals. When the two leaders parted after midnight, both looked glum. On Sunday, Carter attended St. Andrew's Church and later paid tribute at the Yad Vashem memorial to the 6 million Jewish victims of Nazism. Wearing a yarmulka, he placed a wreath at the memorial and observed that it was impossible to understand Israel without recognizing what was symbolized there.

The Israeli government took elaborate precautions to guarantee the President's safety. Some 10,000 security personnel were on duty, the armed forces went on alert against terrorist attacks and all public demonstrations were banned. The vigilance paid off. On the eve of the President's arrival, four Palestinian terrorists, armed with Soviet-made Kalashnikov automatic rifles, were intercepted as they slipped across the Jordan River about 30 miles northeast of Jerusalem. Their purpose apparently was to mar Carter's visit by seizing some Israelis and holding them hostage to exchange for the release of imprisoned Palestinians. The Israeli military patrol that discovered them at about midnight killed all four infiltrators in a brief gun battle.

The critical event of Carter's first full day in Israel was his Sunday meeting with Begin and senior members of the Premier's Cabinet. There Carter formally presented Sadat's objections to the U.S compromise. And once again Carter, assisted by Vance, sought to bridge the not yet publicly disclosed Egyptian-Israeli differences. Certainly Carter pressed strongly the note he had sounded so firmly the night before: "It would be a tragedy to turn away from the path of peace after having come so far."

The meeting lasted far beyond the two hours allotted, and a kosher lunch had to be brought to the Cabinet room. When he emerged from the session, Carter admitted: "Important issues remain to be resolved." Said Begin of the talks: "very serious, very friendly." Earlier the Israelis had been saying that they were ready to accept cosmetic modifications by Sadat to the original U.S. proposals. A senior Cabinet member remarked: "Here a change, there a word--as long as these changes are not substantial--it will be okay with us." But there were also warnings that Begin would not yield on substance. Said Cabinet Secretary Aryeh Naor: "We will not go beyond our 'red line.' Begin simply thinks that any further compromise will endanger Israel's capability to survive. It depends now on strong nerves and an ability to withstand psychological pressure."

Sunday evening, Begin convened his full Cabinet to take what an Israeli official called "very important decisions." Carter was scheduled to meet with the full Cabinet the next morning, and afterward address the Knesset.

Even if a settlement on the U.S. compromise proposals can finally be worked out, several other problems will still remain. Among them: guarantees to Israel that its loss of the Sinai oilfields would not deprive it of an adequate oil supply, and a timetable for the exchange of ambassadors between Cairo and Jerusalem. Also to be determined is the amount of economic aid the U.S. will give Israel in compensation for its abandonment of its military installations in the Sinai. (Israel has asked more than $3 billion.)

These are relatively simple points. In the Middle East, however, experience has taught that any unresolved issue is a potential stumbling block and even the most minor matter can swell into a symbol of gigantic proportions. Yet if all the outstanding issues could somehow be resolved, and a treaty signed, then Carter's mission surely would have led to the elimination of a major cause of Middle East instability.

Or would it? While a peace agreement would cause near-jubilation in Israel and Egypt, the future relationship between the longtime enemies remains a potential minefield. The legacy of distrust will not quickly fade, and that could easily cause new conflicts over genuine misunderstandings on how the terms of the peace treaty are supposed to be fulfilled. Even though an Israeli-Egyptian treaty would greatly reduce the dangers of another Middle East war, the potential for trouble in the region remains disturbingly high so long as other Arab states refuse to join the peace process. So far, Sadat stands dangerously isolated. Almost no Arab leader has endorsed his dealings with Israel.

In blasting Carter's trip last week, Syria's state-run radio railed against "Sadat the traitor and Begin the terrorist." Syrian President Hafez Assad told a Damascus rally that Carter, Sadat and Begin "may have what they call a peace treaty ... but the outcome will not be worth the paper it is written on. Time will prove that the Middle East will still be in a state of war." In a thinly veiled threat against Sadat, Palestine Liberation Organization Leader Yasser Arafat declared: "The Egyptian people will eventually triumph over President Sadat. Carter's visit to Egypt this week reminds us of his visit to Iran to celebrate the new year of 1978 with the Shah. Like the Iranian people in 1978, the time will soon come when the Egyptian people will prove that they too are a time bomb." Supporting all such outcries is the Soviet Union. Its news agency Tass excoriated Sadat for having "taken the road of surrender to Tel Aviv's political and territorial claims."

Other Arab leaders have threatened to take harsh punitive actions against Sadat. At last November's summit in Baghdad, called to oppose the Camp David accords, some Arab leaders called for sanctions against Egypt if it made a separate peace with Israel. Among such sanctions, presumably, could be a pan-Arab economic boycott and an end to the generous financial aid (more than $3 billion) that Cairo receives annually from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and other oil-rich states. Al Thawra, the official paper of Iraq's ruling party, last week demanded "the beginning of the punishment" of Sadat because "he is continuing his cooperation in imperialist-Zionist plans."

One thing that is almost certain to follow any Egyptian-Israeli peace is an increased U.S. role in the Middle East. Washington's economic and military aid to both nations would soar from last year's totals, which provided Egypt with $1 billion and Israel with $2 billion. Although Carter told the Egyptian parliament that the U.S. "does not seek a special [military] position for itself," the chances are good that America's military commitment to the Middle East would be increased. During his Washington visit Begin suggested, for example, that the U.S. might consider making use of the Sinai airbase at Etzion, which Israel, under the peace terms, would have to turn over to the Egyptians. U.S. officials quickly distanced themselves from any such idea, but that may have been chiefly a diplomatic courtesy, since a deal on the base would have to be discussed with Egypt rather than Israel. While Sadat so far opposes any foreign bases in the Sinai, he might conclude that some form of American presence would contribute substantially to regional stability.

It was also suggested during last week's round of talks that the U.S. Navy might use the bases at Alexandria or Haifa or both. U.S. officials believe that Egypt and Israel would welcome the move. Another military option would be for Washington to sign separate mutual defense treaties with Egypt and Israel. Carter informally raised the idea in his talks with Begin, who approved, but neither side pressed the point.

Such military planning, however, would become far less urgent if the peace process on which Carter has risked so much of his personal prestige eventually led to a comprehensive Middle East settlement. That may be a dream requiring years to fulfill, but a reconciliation between Israel and Egypt is almost certainly the first big step. In those terms, Carter's "extra mile" does not seem an unworthy gamble.

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