The Military Balance

The two forces engaged on the rugged, inhospitable terrain of northern Viet Nam were the object of intense scrutiny by military analysts last week. In Washington, a task force raised from the U.S. intelligence community began meeting within hours of the Chinese invasion, evaluating what data could be obtained from military communiques and by satellite observation of the battle scene. In Moscow, strategists were equally attentive to the broader implications of the war. How well the People's Liberation Army does in its first real combat test since the Korean War nearly 30 years ago could provide clues to its capability against Soviet armies on China's northern border. Arrayed against the PLA was a formidable military instrument forged by Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap, the conqueror of Dien Bien Phu, whose forces had defeated French and U.S. armies in more than three decades of fighting. The strengths and weaknesses of both forces, as evaluated by the analysts last week, appeared to be in delicate balance.

With 3.5 million men, the world's largest standing army, Peking has an overwhelming numerical advantage over Hanoi's 615,000 troops. In a limited punitive strike, the Chinese would probably not deploy more than 200,000 men, though the PLA's available reserves in southern China are immense if the conflict should widen. China currently has about 1.6 million men along the Soviet border--a force that Peking may decide to augment if Moscow raises the combat readiness of its own 1 million troops on the frontier in response to the crisis. One tactical plus for the PLA is that many of Hanoi's forces are tied down in Cambodia or Laos and cannot be readily transferred to the war in the north.

Although the Chinese are not "blooded" by battle experience, Pentagon specialists believe that they are good fighters. The untried PLA soldier, like his commander, may be eager for combat--and a rare chance for promotion. The experience that their operations chief, General Yang Teh-chin, 68, gained in the Korean War may have served to boost the troops' confidence. Being on the attack also confers an intangible morale advantage. The PLA, however, is troubled by years of excessive involvement in China's internal politics. For a long time its most arduous duty has been curbing the excesses of the Cultural Revolution.

As for the Vietnamese, they benefit from the fact that they are defending their own country against a historically hated enemy. They are proven fighters with undeniable staying power. "It's too early to tell who is better," says a U.S. Defense Department expert. "Man for man, the weight of experience would be on the Vietnamese side."

Hanoi has a clear superiority over Peking in sophisticated weaponry. Although both forces are fighting with arms made in the U.S.S.R. or with copies of Soviet models, many of the PLA's weapons were acquired before the Sino-Soviet split in the late 1950s. The Vietnamese also have some captured American equipment, notably the 177-mm howitzer, which outguns any artillery piece in the Chinese inventory. One of Hanoi's favorite and most effective weapons, as Americans learned at Khe Sanh, is the 130-mm howitzer. Says one military analyst in Hong Kong: "The Vietnamese love the 130 and really know how to use it. They must love to have the Chinese outranged."

The Chinese have about 10,000 tanks, compared to Viet Nam's 900. But the mountainous terrain of last week's fighting precludes the use of tanks except in very narrow corridors, and China's aged T-34 tanks are vulnerable to the extremely accurate Sagger antitank missiles supplied to the Vietnamese by the Soviet Union in the past three years. The Chinese have nothing comparable to the Sagger. "This is one of their major combat deficiencies, which they are trying to correct by buying HOT (antitank) missiles from the French," notes one U.S. expert.

The Vietnamese air force is vastly inferior to the Chinese in quantity, but the quality is vastly superior. Hanoi has 300 combat aircraft in all; about 700 Chinese planes are within striking range of Viet Nam. Most of those ready for combat, however, are outdated MiG-17s and MiG-19s, whereas the Vietnamese have not only the slightly more advanced MiG-21s but also the versatile F-5 "freedom fighters" captured from the Americans.

The Vietnamese also have an advantage in supply and transport. Because of shortages of trucks and freight cars, the Chinese are reported to have brought some supplies to the combat area by horse-drawn vehicles. While the Chinese army moves primarily on foot, the Vietnamese forces have plenty of modern transport, much of it seized from the U.S.

Army. The Chinese, moreover, have primitive battlefield communications; they still sometimes use runners and bicyclists. The Vietnamese are equipped with modern radio and field telephones, many of them American-made.

Despite Hanoi's superiority in experience, weaponry and logistics, low morale in the Vietnamese forces could blunt their advantages. Heavy casualties in Cambodia have severely impaired some Vietnamese soldiers' will to fight. Recruits have bribed their officers to let them return home. The AWOL rate is so high that the army command has announced a two-year reorganization plan that will better integrate the demoralized southern troops into a more aggressive fighting force. Mao Tse-tung may have been right when he said, "Weapons are an important factor in war but not the decisive factor; it is people not things that are decisive."

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