An Interview with Teng Hsiao-p'ing

Peking's main thoroughfare, Ch'ang An Avenue, was decked out in holiday garb. Strings of red, pink, turquoise and yellow pennants fluttered gaily above the curb-to-curb crush of bicyclists and horn-tooting motorists, and bright red palace lanterns illuminated the Gate of Heavenly Peace. Not only in Peking but in every Chinese city, village and hamlet, the Lunar New Year celebration was under way last week.

In recent, harsher times, the Chinese were told to cut the holiday short and to avoid frivolity. This year, newspapers and radio stations urged them to have a good time, which was all the encouragement that they needed. Firecrackers began popping well in advance of the holiday. Shoppers thronged department stores and marketplaces. In the major cities they were able to choose from among 3,000 consumer items. Many had not been available before, ranging from enamelware to stretch socks.

Even as his countrymen prepared to usher in the Year of the Goat, China's Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing was getting ready to leave for his historic visit to the U.S. Just four days before his departure, he took time out for a wide-ranging interview with Time Inc. Editor in Chief Hedley Donovan, who was accompanied by TIME'S Hong Kong bureau chief, Marsh Clark. The interview, initially scheduled for half an hour, stretched to 80 minutes in the Sinkiang Room of the Great Hall of the People on Peking's T'ien An Men Square.

Teng was clad in his usual dark gray Mao suit with black shoes and light gray socks. Puffing incessantly on Chinese-made Panda filter cigarettes, he spoke animatedly, gesticulating with his right hand and at times banging his hands together sharply to stress a point.

The point he made most emphatically was a dramatic one--and one that Moscow expected, and feared, would be his main message to President Carter: that Sino-American rapprochement should be turned into an explicit anti-Soviet alliance. Stressing Sino-American ties, Teng argued that the two nations share a common destiny and should unite with other countries against the Soviet Union. He said that Soviet activities around the Mediterranean littoral, in Africa and in Asia should cause concern to all nations. He derided the value of the proposed SALT II treaty between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and demonstrated an acute historical grasp of East-West disarmament negotiations. Teng also rejected speculation about a "de-Maoification" campaign but, perhaps more notably, conceded that the Great Helmsman was not perfect.

Q. As the first senior official of your government to visit the U.S. since the founding of the People's Republic of China, how do you assess the significance of your trip and what do you hope to accomplish?

A. The significance is mainly reflected in the normalization of relations between China and the U.S. [Because I am] going there this time as one of China's leaders, the exchange of views with President Carter and other leaders will, of course, be of benefit. Particularly at the present time, the world is quite untranquil and we are faced with a lot of problems. Not only during this visit but in the future as well, it will be beneficial to have the leaders of the U.S. and China frequently contact each other and exchange views. As for the significance of normalization between China and the U.S., there has been much talk about it already, but you cannot [afford to] underestimate the significance of this event. One aspect of it is the development of relations between the two countries, but what is even more important is from the point of view of global strategy.

Q. Are you suggesting more or less regular summit meetings?

A. We cannot say regular, but we hope we will have more frequent contacts.

Q. More than once every 30 years?

A. Since 1972 there have been many contacts. And during my present visit I will, on behalf of the Chinese government, be extending an invitation to President Carter to visit China. And at an appropriate time in the future, a Chinese leader, regardless of who, will visit the U.S. again.

Q. Your visit is seen in America as an event of great significance. Your visit is anticipated to be not just ceremonial but one dealing with substantive issues.

A. That's right.

Q. "Hegemony" is a word that your government has frequently used with reference to the Soviet Union's policy. The Soviet Union has about 7% of the world's population and 10% of its production. How do you assess Soviet policies today, and what opportunities do you see in the new Sino-American relationship for countering those policies? What does hegemony actually mean?

A. I suppose that you have already read the letter of 170 retired American generals and admirals.* I have read it myself, and I very much approve of that letter. Those generals have already retired, but they are concerned and that means that the situation is indeed not tranquil. I have said this to a number of foreign friends: the nuclear arsenal of the Soviet Union and the constant development of their strategic weapons means that we can say that the Soviet Union is already on a par with the U.S. The Soviet military budget takes up around 20% of the gross national product.* What does one do with all these things? With no war going on, it has increased its standing army in three years from 3 million to 4 million men. What does one do that for? And as we have often noted, many people often overlook the continual development of the armed forces of the Soviet Union and its stockpiling of conventional weaponry, including ammunition, as well as the stockpiling of food grains. If one has so many things in one's hands, the day will come when one's fingers begin to itch. You can't eat those materials or wear them. You must use them somehow. We've already been through two world wars, and both started from small incidents. Such things often develop independent of one's will, perhaps even independent of the will of the present Soviet leaders.

Q. We did not think of Pearl Harbor as a small incident. I must note parenthetically, though, it was not the start of the war.

A. Yes, Pearl Harbor was toward the latter part of the war. We must face reality. Now every day one talks about detente, about striving for detente and disarmament. But was there detente in 1977, or in 1978, or will we see it in 1979? Let us look at the Mediterranean, at the Middle East, at northern Africa. Was not 1978 more tense than 1977? We see that last year South Yemen was taken over by the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union gained influence in Ethiopia. If we go farther east there is Afghanistan, and now there is Iran, where there seems to be no end to the troubles. And Pakistan. And farther to the east, Viet Nam controls Laos by military means, and the Vietnamese made a major invasion into Cambodia with more than ten divisions. And then if we go even farther east, do we see that the Soviet military force has been strengthened or weakened in the Asian and Pacific region? At least its navy and air force have been strengthened. The Soviet fleet in the Far East is now equal in strength to the Soviet fleet in the Atlantic. So all this gives serious concern to the countries of the world, and they should deal with it seriously.

Q. If I could come back to your definition of hegemony, do you mean by that a desire to be the dominant power in the world or to have actual control over other countries, such as East Germany and Czechoslovakia?

A. We look upon it as being big hegemonism, where one wants to exercise global hegemonism, and small hegemonism, where one seeks only local hegemonism. As for global hegemonism, only the Soviet Union and the U.S. are capable of it today, but it has been our view all along that since the early 1970s the U.S. has been on the strategic retreat. Global hegemonism means that you want to control the whole world [and] there is no scruple at using war as a step to achieving hegemonism. But it would first try to attain its aims by intervention, sowing discord or, as they say in Europe, by means of the process of Finlandization. But in the final analysis it would use military force and that would be World War III.

Q. Are you attributing greater virtue to the U.S., or saying that it is weaker than the Soviet Union?

A. We consider that the true hotbed of war is the Soviet Union, not the U.S.

Q. Is the Vice Premier saying that the U.S. is in strategic retreat or does he believe that U.S. intentions are more pacific?

A. At present, the U.S. has no reason and no need to want to launch a war. It is in the interest of the U.S. to maintain the status quo. The problem is that maintaining the status quo is difficult.

Q. In Washington, I think you'll hear that President Carter, Secretary of State Vance and various members of Congress do not entirely agree with the retired generals. They think it possible to have good relations with the Soviet Union and China at the same time. What is your reaction to that?

A. It is only possible for each individual to express his point of view. No country can impose its views on another. But we believe in what Chairman Mao Tse-tung and Premier Chou En-lai said repeatedly: that from the point of view of global strategy and international politics, even where there was no normalization between China and the U.S., what we are faced with is stark reality. Reality cannot be changed by any person's subjective views.

Q. President Carter hopes this year to sign SALT II.

A. Actually, this should be considered not SALT II but the fourth such agreement. The first such agreement was concluded in 1963, the second in 1972, the third in 1974. We have constantly said not that we are opposed to such agreements, but that they are of no use, that they are not of much use. In 1963 when the tripartite partial test-ban treaty was signed between the U.S., Great Britain and the Soviet Union, there was a great discrepancy in nuclear weapons between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. At that time all three countries had in mind to prevent China from acquiring nuclear weapons, but this aim was not attained. The U.S. and Great Britain also wanted to limit the Soviet Union in nuclear weapons. Did they attain this aim? In 1972, the Soviet Union had tried its best to catch up. We cannot say that by 1972 the Soviet Union was already on a par with the U.S., but the discrepancy had been narrowed. And then in the 2 1/2 years before the 1974 meeting at Vladivostok and the second agreement that was reached at that time, even the U.S. could not but admit that the strength of the two countries was more or less equal. What is more, both sides admitted at the Vladivostok meeting that the agreement did not put restraints on either side. And since 1974 it has been another four years or so and another agreement is to be concluded. Could we believe that the agreement could prevent the Soviet Union from further development?

Q. The language of the agreement is intended to impose some restraints.

A. I don't believe that will restrain them.

Q. You mean they won't comply with it?

A. Because the so-called supervision or surveillance will not work, no matter how you proceed about it. After the Vladivostok agreement, Dr. Kissinger came to China and told us about it, and I said to Dr. Kissinger, "Well, you two will continue your race." After the conclusion of this fourth agreement the race will continue. But the difference will be that the U.S. will be forced to continue the race while the Soviet Union will just further step up its development.

Q. This should provide you with a lively hour of discussion with President Carter.

A. I'm not opposing your signing this agreement or three or four more agreements. We're just being sober. One should not rely on such a thing. In seeking world peace and world stability, such agreements are neither as significant nor as useful as the normalization of relations between China and the U.S. and the peace and cooperation treaty signed between China and Japan. And if you look at the question in broader perspective, such an agreement is not as important as the strengthening of relations between the U.S. and Europe and between the U.S. and Japan. The first characteristic of the Soviet Union is that it always adopts the attitude of bullying the soft and fearing the strong. The second characteristic of the Soviet Union is that it will go in and grab at every opportunity.

Q. Viewing the triangular situation between you and the Soviet Union and the U.S., it must be reassuring to you that both China and the U.S. have a very close relationship with a very important fourth power, Japan. There is no equivalent for the Soviet Union on their side of the balance.

A. The question is: After setting up this relationship between China, Japan and the U.S., we must further develop the relationship in a deepening way. If we really want to be able to place curbs on the polar bear, the only realistic thing for us is to unite. If we only depend on the strength of the U.S., it is not enough. If we only depend on the strength of Europe, it is not enough. We are an insignificant, poor country, but if we unite, well, it will then carry weight.

Q. To go back to Japan, does that not tip the triangular balance?

A. It is not only of interest to China but also of great significance to world peace, world security, world stability, that there be friendly relations between China and the U.S., Europe and Japan.

Q. Our readers will be surprised to hear you describe China as insignificant.

A. Well, when I said insignificant, I was going to extremes. But China is quite poor, and you have made a poor friend.

Q. You don't mean a bad friend?

A. No, not a bad friend, but economically poor. In Chinese, the word poor has no bad connotations to it. Of course, that does not mean that China is of no use. We do not look upon ourselves as inconsequential.

Q. How will the new relationship between China and the U.S. help with your Four Modernizations campaign?

A. We believe the normalization of relations will enable us to obtain much scientific and technological know-how. From the point of view of the U.S., we also think it will be beneficial. From the broader perspective of global politics, it will have even greater benefits.

Q. You set the year 2000 for attaining modernization. Is that a date of symbolic convenience, or does it have a rationale? Does China know how to plan that far ahead?

A. It is not symbolic. We do indeed have such an ambitious goal. For any country, if it wants to develop itself, it must mainly rely on itself and its own potentialities. But it is also necessary to obtain capital from the developed countries [and] to learn from the experiences of the developed countries, especially in the field of management.

Q. There has been much written in the Western press in recent months about the de-Maoification of China. To what extent is the legacy of Mao still relevant, and to what extent have you departed from his legacy?

A. You may have noted that we already declared on many occasions that we will continue to take Mao Tse-tung's thought as our guiding thought. What is more, many of our basic principles are still based on the tenets put forward by Chairman Mao and Premier Chou. For instance, the development of relations between our two countries was promulgated some time ago by Chairman Mao himself, and the issuance of the Shanghai communique during the visit of President Nixon in 1972 was something personally looked after by Chairman Mao and Premier Chou. This was on the basis of our global strategy of dividing the world into three worlds. According to our view of the three worlds, the first world consists of the U.S. and the Soviet Union, but in this concept of our thinking of three worlds, we proceed from the establishment of a united front against hegemonism and for the defense of world peace, security and stability, and this united front includes the U.S.

The Four Modernizations [program] was put forward by Chair man Mao and then was made pub lic through Premier Chou in his speech at the Fourth National People's Congress in 1974. At the same time, we have always considered that Chairman Mao was not beyond fault. We cannot demand of any great personage that he be faultless. To demand that is not in keeping with the thoughts of Marx or of Mao Tse-tung himself. Then there are many things that Chairman Mao could not foresee during his lifetime because of the limitations of the condi tions then existing. Now there are new conditions, and so we raise new questions. This is entirely logical and cannot be called de-Maoification. For instance, the question of absorbing foreign capital and foreign technology to help our development -- during the Chairman's lifetime the conditions for doing so did not exist.

Q. It would not be wrong, would it, to say that the present leadership has helped create the new conditions?

A. These conditions were created by Chairman Mao himself. For instance, the improvement in relations between China and Japan, and China and Europe, were policies promulgated during the lifetime of Chairman Mao, as well as the normalization of relations with the U.S.

Q. It is the impression in the U.S. that there have been important changes in China in the last two years. Is that a mistaken view?

A. There have been changes. But, as I said, many are made according to the fundamental principles laid down by Chairman Mao. I must also say that in carrying out these policies, there were obstructions in those days. And in the latter years of his life, because of his poor health, Chairman Mao was not able to remove some of these obstacles, so in this respect we cannot say that the Chairman was devoid of responsibility. But we are still building up our country according to the blueprint laid down by Chairman Mao and Premier Chou.

Q. Have the obstacles been totally removed?

A. Yes. But even when you remove the obstacles, lingering influences will remain, and we will need quite some time for them to be totally eradicated. You know that for more than ten years there was obstruction by the Gang of Four.* Undisciplined behavior became rampant. Now, in this field we are recuperating rather rapidly. But the field of education is a major problem. For many years the Gang looked upon people who didn't study as heroes, people who didn't work as heroes. Now people must work. But we lost a whole generation as regards education, including science and technology. We need quite some time and much effort to catch up.

Q. You have referred from time to time to your age. Will the new policy directions now being undertaken in China continue past your own service?

A. That is a matter of certainty. I am confident that I can live at least another ten years. And our chairman of the party and Premier Hua Kuo-feng is now less than 60 years old. He will certainly go on even longer. As to our present policies and principles, we consider them to be supported by the entire party and people, at least by the overwhelming majority. When people worry about whether the policies will continue, they overlook the most important question: Are the new policies correct or not? If the policies and measures are not correct, what's the use of continuing them? If the policies bear fruit, living standards will get better and the economy will improve. If these policies bear fruit, living standards will get better. Then who can oppose their continuation? So the decisive factor is not any particular individual but rather the success of these policies. We are confident they will be effective.

Q. Do you expect Taiwan to be reunified with the P.R.C. within ten years?

A. I said to American friends not long ago that ten years is too long a time. I hope it will be realized this year, but that is probably being too impatient.

Q. How do you see reunification happening?

A. Our policy and principles for reunification are very fair and reasonable. We will respect the realities on Taiwan, and the Taiwanese authorities as a local government will retain their rights and powers, but it must be within the context of one China. That means they can maintain a certain amount of their own armed forces. As for trade with foreign countries, they can continue. They may also maintain their present system and continue leading their own way of life.

Q. Their capitalism?

A. Of course. The solution may take a long time. In fact, the main part of China, what you call the mainland, will also change, and it will become more developed. We demand of them only that there will be no two Chinas, and that patriots all belong to the same family.

Q. Taiwan says the same thing.

A. We agree with them there.

Q. But they say China is it [Taiwan].

A. At present the Taiwan authorities are refusing to negotiate with us. That is bad, but their insistence that there is only one China is good. Another thing, they do not say that the Chinese capital should be Taipei. That, too, is a good thing.

Q. While establishing full diplomatic relations with the P.R.C., the U.S. stated its intention to continue to sell defensive weapons to Taiwan. President Carter acknowledged that your government does 'not agree" with this policy, but he said your government "understands" it. Would you amplify your attitude toward this policy?

A. We clearly expressed our disagreement with this. But we said that disagreement on this issue should not prevent immediate normalization. Why do we not approve? Because the continued sale of arms is of no benefit to negotiations between us and the Taiwan authorities for peaceful reunification, because then Chiang Ching-kuo will think he has nothing to fear, and he will thrust his tail up 10,000 meters high in the sky. And so we do hope that following normalization the U.S., while maintaining a people-to-people relationship with Taiwan, will take care not to hinder negotiations between China and Taiwan for peaceful reunification. This particular question may be discussed many times.

Q. Your arrival in the U.S. coincides with the start of the lunar new year. It is the Year of the Goat, said to be auspicious for peace. How do you view the omens for peace in 1979?

A. We believe the biggest common point between China and the U.S. is that we both hope to prolong as long as possible peace, security and stability.

Q. I don't know whether you are aware of our interview in TIME magazine in which Soviet Party Chief Brezhnev said that he is tired of talking about the Chinese. I wonder if there could be a limited agreement that Brezhnev will not talk about China, and you will not talk about the Soviet Union.

A. I am not tired of talking about them. You know that Brezhnev told the Japanese that I, myself, am the worst Chinese. So when you made me Man of the Year, you may have made an error.

Q.We don't think so.

*The open letter, warning that the Soviets were "heading for superiority, not parity, in the military arena," ran a full page in the New York Times last week and was signed by 178 retired generals and admirals. Among them: Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr., former Chief of Naval Operations; General Albert C. Wedemeyer, China theater commander in World War II; Major General George J. Keegan Jr., former Air Force chief of intelligence. *The CIA estimates it at more like 11% to 15% of G.N.P. *A reference to Mao's widow, Chiang Ch'ing, and three other high officials who sought to seize power after Mao died in September 1976.

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