Carter Stuns the World

It was the most momentous foreign policy announcement of Jimmy Carter's two-year-old presidency, and one of the most important in recent U.S. history. At precisely 9:01 Friday evening, the President, seated at his gleaming wooden desk in the Oval Office, looked gravely into the TV cameras and in a calm, steady voice revealed that the U.S. and Communist China had secretly and suddenly decided to end nearly 30 years of bellicose estrangement. The two countries would establish normal diplomatic relations on Jan. 1.

Under the agreement, the U.S. would terminate formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan, cancel the 1954 mutual defense treaty that committed the U.S. to guarantee Taiwan's military security and withdraw the 700 U.S. troops now on the island. On March 1, the U.S. and Peking would exchange ambassadors. Moreover, said Carter, Chinese Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing, 74, the shrewd and pragmatic chief architect of Peking's remarkable Great Leap Outward to the West, would visit Washington at the end of January for an unprecedented series of summit talks.

With that stunning announcement, Jimmy Carter capped a period of extraordinary diplomatic activity. Not for years has an Administration engaged itself on so many fronts of such complexity all at the same time. At the beginning of the week came word that Vance would meet with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in Geneva Dec. 21 to put the finishing touches on the long-stalled SALT II treaty to limit nuclear weapons. If all goes well-and White House officials maintained that the changed relations with Peking would not affect the SALT talks--Carter is expected to hold his first summit next month with Soviet Party Chairman Leonid Brezhnev to sign the pact.

Next, Carter dispatched Vance to the Middle East in an effort to spur Egypt and Israel into reaching final agreement on a peace treaty by the Dec. 17 goal set at the Camp David summit. That deadline was not to be met. Together, Egypt and the U.S. arrived at compromises on the few remaining points that were not settled at Camp David. But the Israelis rejected the proposals with an intemperate rebuke that threw into doubt both the immediate future of peace negotiations and of U.S.-Israeli relations.

Meanwhile, the U.S. was trying to find a way to help calm the continuing upheaval in Iran. Even as the White House was assertively supporting Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, George Ball, an Under Secretary of State in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, now acting as a special consultant to Carter, was reportedly recommending that the U.S. encourage civilian rule. Finally, Carter was getting ready for a Western summit Jan. 5 and 6 on the Caribbean island of Guadeloupe with British Prime Minister James Callaghan, French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing and West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt.

Overseas reactions to Carter's speech were swift and mostly favorable. Though the Taiwanese were dumbfounded, accusing the Administration of treachery, other Asian governments gave support. Japanese Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira told Carter by phone that the move "will contribute to the peace and stability of Asia." Seoul hoped that the development might lead to a resumption of talks with Pyongyang on the unification of Korea. Pro-Western Thailand suddenly felt less isolated. Said Theh Chongkhadikij, editor of the Bangkok Post and a confidant of Prime Minister Kriangsak Chomanan: "It's a good move. It returns the U.S. to the arena in this region."

British Prime Minister Callaghan phoned Carter to express his government's strong support. The West German government, usually critical of Carter, issued a statement of praise. Said a senior Bonn official: "It had to come sooner or later, and the longer it was postponed the more difficult it was bound to be."

In the U.S., most liberal members of Congress supported normalization, while many conservatives harshly accused the Administration of abandoning Taiwan. One certain consequence: a rousing battle over termination of the Taiwan treaty. The divisions on Capitol Hill paralleled the contradictory views of the American public. A Harris poll last fall showed that, by 66% to 25%, Americans favored full diplomatic relations with Peking; but by almost the same ratio, they opposed withdrawal of U.S. recognition from the government of Taiwan and cancellation of the defense treaty.

The surprise over the secret negotiations was not lessened by the fact that the U.S. has been seeking improved relations with mainland China for almost seven years, ever since President Richard Nixon's breakthrough visit to Peking in 1972. Nixon and Chinese leaders pledged in their Shanghai communique to work toward normalization. But because of Watergate, Viet Nam, Mao Tse-tung's death, and other problems, the two countries made little headway until Jimmy Carter took of fice. The chronology of events, as put together in part from interviews conducted Saturday morning by TIME Correspondent Christopher Ogden with Vance and National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski: arly this year, Brzezinski. who is well regarded by the Communist Chinese regime because of his strong anti-Soviet opinions, was dispatched to Peking by Carter. The President authorized him to tell his hosts that, as Carter put it, "the U.S. has made up its mind" to achieve full normalization of relations.

The Chinese were interested. At an elaborate dinner party, Vice Premier Teng told Brzezinski that he wanted to visit the U.S., adding that he had only three years in which to do it. The statement baffled Brzezinski, who thought at the time that Teng was referring merely to his advancing years. In retrospect, however, the Chinese leader may have been mysteriously hinting at something more significant.

Soon after Brzezinski returned to Washington, the Administration gave Leonard Woodcock, the former United Automobile Workers president who heads the U.S. Liaison Office in Peking, full authorization to negotiate with the Chinese. During the summer and fall, Woodcock met with Foreign Ministry officials seven times. In Washington, meanwhile, Brzezinski met a dozen times with China's envoy, first Han Tsu and later his successor, Ch'ai Tse-min. Their talks took place in Brzezinski's office, the Chinese Liaison Office on Connecticut Avenue, and Brzezinski's home in Virginia. The negotiations were conducted in absolute secrecy, despite Carter's past assertions that secret diplomacy is objectionable.

The White House set up a high-level group to monitor the talks with the Chinese. Its members consisted of Brzezinski, Vance, Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and Michel Oksenberg, a staff member of the National Security Council. The chief advocate of the China move continued to be Brzezinski, who has long urged normalization, in part to counter Soviet expansionism, but he worked closely on the project with Vance.

On Sept. 19, Carter prodded the Chinese at his first formal meeting with Ambassador Ch'ai at the White House by again laying out his terms for normalization: Peking must allow the U.S. to keep its economic and cultural ties with the Nationalist Chinese and agree, at least tacitly, not to reunite Taiwan with the mainland by force. The Chinese began dropping strong hints that they were getting ready to accept the U.S. terms. In late November, for instance, Teng told a visiting Japanese delegation that diplomatic relations with Tokyo had been restored "in one second" and that relations with Washington could be restored in "two seconds."

In diplomacy, a second can be the equivalent of a week, and, in fact, the final stage of the bargaining took only two weeks. In early December, the Chinese Foreign Ministry told Woodcock that Teng wanted to see him. Woodcock flashed the word to Brzezinski and Carter, who summoned Ch'ai and told him that if the negotiations were concluded satisfactorily, the President wanted to invite "one of your top officials" to the U.S.

On Tuesday. Dec. 12, Woodcock was summoned by Teng. "I understand your Government has invited Chinese leaders to the U.S.." Teng said briskly. "I will go." After the meeting, Woodcock cabled Carter: "My God, they've accepted. I think we've got something."

Both sides immediately began working on the language of a joint communique. That evening, Brzezinski and three other officials gathered in Brzezinski's office. Carter soon sauntered in, wearing blue jeans and a western-style sport shirt. The group worked past midnight, with dispatches rocketing back and forth across the international date line. The cables to Washington totaled about 120 pages and were kept in a bright red cardboard folder on Brzezinski's desk. They were heavily annotated. Carter's comments ("Good," or "What is meant by this?") were neatly written in green ink; Brzezinski's replies were scrawled in pencil or black ink.

On Wednesday, when Vance phoned to report that the Middle East peace talks had hit serious snags, Carter told him in cryptic language--even though he was using a scrambler phone--that the agreement with Peking was almost set. The President referred to it as "the matter that only five of us are involved in." After several more exchanges of cables with Peking, Brzezinski informed Carter at about 1 p.m. Thursday that work on the communique was finished. The President smiled and said, "Good deal."

By now a dozen U.S. officials knew about the agreement, and Carter ordered them to maintain absolute secrecy. The President, during an interview Thursday with ABC's Barbara Walters, gave a deft and disarming response to a question about China. There was no hint that a historic development was imminent.

Although Vance had told no one traveling with him, not even his closest aides, what was going on, he had let on that the new matter involved foreign policy and was not connected with the Middle East. When reporters in Washington asked Press Secretary Jody Powell for clarification, he silently closed his door.

By Friday, it became obvious to everyone in Washington that something important was about to happen. At 3 p.m. Soviet Ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin showed up at Brzezinski's office. When the envoy departed a few minutes later, reporters pressed around him to ask what had been discussed.

"Christmas," said Dobrynin.

The reporters asked for a better answer.

"Chess," he answered.

Carter, after jogging calmly around the South Lawn, called in congressional leaders for a 6:15 p.m. briefing and then swore them to secrecy.

That evening the suspense ended, on both sides of the world. While Carter was reading the joint communique on TV in the U.S., Hua Kuo-feng, China's Premier and Communist Party Chairman, was reading the statement to about 100 Western and Communist reporters in Peking. It was the first press conference ever held by a Chinese Communist Party Chairman, and Hua was in good form. He even answered a few questions, ritualistically describing Taiwan as "a sacred territory of our country" and its people as "compatriots of our own flesh and blood."

The people of mainland China seemed to react with pleasure to Hua's announcement. Reported TIME Correspondent Richard Bernstein, who heard the news while traveling through Nanning, a Chinese city about 100 miles northeast of the Vietnamese border: "The bearer of the good tidings was the director of the art institute, Ho Wei-ch'ing. He shouted toward us, 'Are there any Americans in that group?' 'Yes,' I answered, 'I am an American.' Ho reached out and touched me with his hand. 'I have some joyful news,' he said, and related Hua's announcement. There were handshakes all around. The feelings of the man on the street may not have been as enthusiastic as Ho's, but most Chinese felt some satisfaction over the change. A Communist border guard near Hong Kong spotted a tourist's American passport, broke into a broad grin and exclaimed: 'We're friends now!' "

During his TV announcement, Carter took particular pains to assure the Nationalist Chinese and their U.S. supporters that the new ties to Peking "will not jeopardize the well-being of the people of Taiwan." The U.S.-Peking statement acknowledged that "there is but one China, and Taiwan is part of China" (a view shared by the Nationalists on Taiwan). It also specified that the U.S. recognizes Peking as the "sole legal government of China." But the statement went on to declare: "Within this context, the people of the U.S. will maintain cultural, commercial and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan."

In a further effort to mollify Taiwan, the Administration implied strongly that they had received tacit assurances that Peking would not invade Taiwan. In the Shanghai communique, Peking insisted that it had the right to liberate Taiwan. Mainland China, Teng now told the Ad ministration, will seek reunification, but slowly, peacefully, and in a manner that will not disrupt Taiwan's capitalistic economic system. The U.S. will continue to sell Taiwan "selective defensive weapon ry"--which might include interceptor air craft, artillery, and antitank weapons. Said Carter, during an unusual visit to the White House press room after his speech: "The interests of Taiwan have been ad equately protected."

Another of Carter's major concerns was to assure Moscow that the agreement with mainland China was not meant to challenge or provoke the Soviet Union, even though the U.S.-Peking communique condemned "hegemony," which is a Chinese code word for Soviet expansionism. To counterbalance that possibility, the communique pointedly said that the new step was not taken for "transient, tactical or expedient reasons," diplomatic language implying that Carter's China action was not in any way directed against Moscow. Vance told TIME: "We will treat the Soviet Union and China equally and not play one off against the other."

The Kremlin's reactions are hard to measure, but Western diplomats in Moscow agreed with Carter's assessment that the Soviets had long expected the U.S. move, and that, as the President said, this week's SALT talks "will not suffer any adverse effect." If all goes well, the Carter-Brezhnev summit is tentatively set for sometime during the week of Jan. 14.

In the U.S., Taiwan's longtime friends in the Senate were furious over the rapprochement with Peking. Utah Republican Orrin Hatch contemptuously called Carter's foreign affairs advisers "loose-jointed and weak-kneed diplomats" and declared that the President should have held out for a better deal on Taiwan. Said Hatch: "All he had to do was stand fast. Mainland China needs this relationship more than the U.S. does." Arizona Republican Barry Goldwater accused Carter of having committed "one of the most cowardly" presidential acts in history and threatened to sue him in court on the questionable ground that a President cannot cancel a treaty without the Senate's approval. Liberal Republican Jacob Javits of New York complained that Carter had not sought the advice of Congress before making his decision--especially since the House and Senate passed a resolution this year demanding just such advance consultation on the issue.

Carter actually had a solid basis for acting on his own in deciding to end relations with Taiwan and terminate the mutual defense treaty. The Constitution requires that treaties be ratified by the Senate but does not require a Senate vote on cancellation. Moreover, a clause in the Taiwan defense treaty permits either side to cancel it on one year's notice, which is precisely what Carter is doing. But conservatives can sponsor resolutions condemning what Carter has done. Or, as seems likely, they can try to block the nomination of Carter's choice for first U.S. Ambassador to Peking, who must be confirmed by the Senate. That nominee is expected to be Woodcock.

Whether Carter will prevail in the end is uncertain, but he can count on a number of strong allies, including Frank Church, the next chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Praising Carter for having "cut the Gordian knot," Church declared: "His decision to recognize China finally brings American policy into line with Asian realities." Many Senators brushed aside as unimportant Carter's failure to consult them. Said Maine Democrat Edmund Muskie: "We have been committed to normalization for six years, and everyone in Congress must have been aware that this dialogue was going on." Among other supporters of Carter's action were two prominent Republicans: Gerald Ford and Henry Kissinger. Kissinger's only reservation was that the U.S. should fulfill its "moral obligation to the people of Taiwan."

Carter sought to blunt some of the conservative reaction by indicating that normalization would lead eventually to a bonanza for the American economy. He spoke to reporters glowingly of "the new vista for prosperous trade relationships with almost a billion people." U.S. trade with the mainland now totals only about $1 billion a year. Says Ping-ti Ho, an expert on China at the University of Chicago: "The reason the Chinese have not bought from the U.S. is largely related to the absence of full diplomatic relations. Normalization will remove this barrier."

Most experts think that the change was inevitable and probably long overdue. Even they, however, were startled by the tuning. Carter insisted that the final steps in the negotiating process had been taken at Peking's initiative and that the Chinese had done most of the giving. Said he: "We have maintained our own U.S. position firmly, and only since the last few weeks has there been an increasing demonstration to us that Premier Hua and Vice Premier Teng have been ready to normalize relations."

As is so often the case with China, there was no indication from Peking of why Hua and Teng had decided to bring the long negotiations to a successful conclusion. Whatever the reason--perhaps a desire to score a diplomatic triumph with the U.S. in advance of the expected SALT II agreement with the Russians--normalization was the latest step in what some Chinese term the New Long March, an all-out effort to modernize and industrialize their nation. It began soon after Mao's death two years ago and rapidly accelerated after Teng returned as Vice Premier in July 1977 to take effective control of China's foreign and domestic policies. Since then there have been many lower-level conflicts within the Chinese leadership, and ample evidence that Teng and his supporters have been winning most of them. To develop their economy as quickly as possible, the Chinese have negotiated new trade pacts with France and Japan, agreed to exchange students with the U.S., and begun bargaining for American technology, including communications satellites. Teng has been helped further in his negotiations with the U.S. by the fact that under his realistic leadership Taiwan is no longer at the top of Peking's list of priorities, as it was when Mao ruled the mainland.

But there still remained the question of why the Administration chose to announce the agreement with Peking so suddenly last week. Was it to divert attention from the failure of Vance's shuttle diplomacy? Was it part of an aborted attempt to score a diplomatic hat trick: successes on the Middle East, SALT and China all in two weeks? According to Administration officials, the answer is far simpler: the inability of the President's staff to keep a secret for very long. The plan originally was for Carter and Hua to make their announcements on Jan. 1, the date that normalization will take effect. But the agreement came almost too quickly. On Wednesday, Carter told his aides: "If we wait until Jan. 1, it will leak. Let's do it right now." Carter then cabled Teng: "Since we're ready, let's announce it." Teng agreed.

Whatever criticisms might come, Carter felt certain that he had scored a diplomatic success of the first magnitude and produced a stimulating climax to his second year in office. During his ten-minute announcement from the Oval Office, the President appeared totally impassive. Then, unaware that a radio tape was still running, he did a most unpresidential, but certainly human thing. Into his presumably dead mike he announced: "Massive applause throughout the nation!"

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