Hussein's 14 Questions

One of the several reasons for the peace talks stalemate is another temporary chill in relations between Jerusalem and Washington. The Israelis are worried about what they feel is a pro-Arab, or at least a pro-Egyptian, tilt on the part of the U.S. As a prime example, they cite an October visit to Amman by Assistant Secretary of State Harold Saunders, who gave Jordan's King Hussein the official U.S. answers to 14 questions that the King had raised about the Camp David accords. Saunders, at various times a CIA, National Security Council and State Department specialist in Middle East affairs, is a respected Arabist. Selective leaks of his purported answers to Hussein tended to fuel Jerusalem's suspicions that the State Department, if not the White House, had an anti-Israel bias.

TIME has obtained the complete text of the U.S. answers to Hussein's questions. In many cases, both are perfunctory and nonprovocative. The King's first question, for example, was whether the U.S. intended to be a full partner in future negotiations on the West Bank, Gaza "and the Palestinian question in general." Answer: "Yes, the U.S. will be a full partner in all the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations [and] will use its full influence to see that the negotiations are brought to a successful conclusion."

Why, the King wanted to know, had five years been selected as the transition period leading to self-government for the occupied territories? Answer: The five-year term was an American proposal, first presented to Egypt and Israel in 1977. "The key point is the concept of transition, not the precise duration which has been agreed [to]. We see the transition period as essential to build confidence, gain momentum and bring about the changes in attitudes that can assure a final settlement."

Several tougher questions by the King involved the nature of sovereignty for the West Bank and Gaza, the future status of Israeli settlements and security forces in these areas, and the fate of predominantly Arab East Jerusalem. Washington's answers reiterate familiar positions, but it is easy to see why the U.S. phrasing irritated the Israelis.

On East Jerusalem, for example, Washington informed Hussein: "We believe a distinction must be made between Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank because of the city's special status and circumstances. We envisage a negotiated solution for the final status of Jerusalem that could be different in character in some respects from that of the West Bank. The final status of Jerusalem should not be prejudged by the unilateral actions undertaken in Jerusalem since the 1967 war." In answer to another question, the U.S. said that any solution "should preserve Jerusalem as a physically undivided city" and provide for "free access to the Jewish, Muslim and Christian holy places." The Israelis also believe that the Holy City should be indivisible--but under their sovereignty. They were shocked by this reminder that the U.S. still regards the occupation of East Jerusalem, and its integration with the western half of the city, as illegal.

Hussein asked about the future status of Israeli troops and of Israeli settlements on the West Bank. Concerning the troops, "the U.S. Would not oppose, if agreed to by the parties, the stationing in the West Bank and Gaza of limited numbers of Israeli security personnel in specifically defined areas and with a defined role as one element in providing for the security of Israel."

The status of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories was "a matter for discussion in negotiations on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza." Hussein was also informed that "it is the position of the U.S. that Israel should refrain from creating new settlements on the West Bank while negotiations are under way on establishing the self-governing authority." The U.S. position is based on the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, which forbids the establishment of civilian communities in territory that is militarily occupied. Washington and Jerusalem have hotly argued the interpretation of the convention in the past, and the Israelis were irritated to find the issue revived again.

If anything, the Israelis were even more agitated by Washington's answers to Hussein's questions about which Palestinians could participate in future talks about the West Bank and what the U.S. meant by inviting "representatives" of the Palestinian people. The answers diplomatically avoided "comprehensive definition," but Washington did indicate that these "representatives" could come from outside the West Bank, Gaza and Jordan, and that they "need not be citizens of Egypt or Jordan." Moreover, the U.S. believes that a political solution for the occupied territories must also recognize the "legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements." In the complicated code-word diplomacy of the Middle East, these seemingly innocent phrases meant to Jerusalem that the U.S. favored the participation of Israel's implacable enemy, the Palestine Liberation Organization.

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