"We Gave Them What They Wanted"

During his visit to Washington, Prime Minister Ian Smith was interviewed by Bureau Chief Robert Ajemian and TIME correspondents. Excerpts:

On Majority Rule. I have always believed in qualifications for the vote -- a kind of meritocracy, as opposed to democracy. I think it leads to better government. I am critical of the system Jin which] a man who is an absolute rotter, a crook, has the same say as the best man in your land, the most brilliant man. I wonder whether democracy will survive under those circumstances.

But Dr. Kissinger convinced me that unless we accepted majority rule, we had no hope of surviving as members of the free world because even those few Mends of ours would no longer be able to help us. We made this traumatic decision and gave them what they wanted. We were told if we accepted "one man, one vote," we would be readmitted to the free-world community, sanctions would be removed and terrorism would end. That was the barrgain that was struck. But in 1966 [the U.S. and British governments] broke the contract.

On the Talks with Vance. We were sparring, we didn't make any ground. We're not opposed in principle to an all-parties conference, but we are opposed to going with preconceived conditions. For example, the Anglo-American plan would liquidate the Rhodesian security forces. This would lead to absolute chaos. Then they want to establish an appointee of the British government as virtual dictator. We wonder why this is necessary. The Americans and British say [Joshua] Nkomo is the man, that you can forget [Robert] Mugabe. Now, I don't say that [British Foreign Secretary David] Owen and Vance specifically say they love Nkomo and they want him appointed. They are going along with the wishes of the Organization of African Unity and the front-line states, which support Nkomo. The U.S. and Britain don't want to cross the O. A.U.

On the Patriotic Front. We offered a place to Nkomo on the Executive Council but he turned it down. He wants to come back as the appointed leader of the transitional government. But that is the crux of the matter: he must be elected. If he had any sense, he would have come in at the beginning. But the longer he stays out, the more he loses his internal support.

On the Front-Line States. [Samora] Machel [of Mozambique] and [Kenneth] Kaunda [of Zambia] want to end the Rhodesian problem even more than I do. U.S. and British recognition of the internal settlement would give them the out they are looking for. Kaunda said to me once, "If only the British government would have the guts to face up to its responsibility in settling the issue, while I would make a few unpleasant noises in public for a few days, that evening I would fall down on my knees and thank the good Lord." He wants it resolved desperately, as does Machel. Kaunda is looking for this opportunity because he is getting to a stage where Nkomo has more men under arms in Zambia than Kaunda does. The same applies to Machel, who is becoming disillusioned with Mugabe.

On a General Election. I must be honest and say that I don't think we are going to be able to comply by the end of the year. I hope I am wrong. [But] the less terrorism, the easier it will be to hold the election, because otherwise, intimidation is rampant and it is difficult for people to exercise a free vote.

On Governing Rhodesia with Black Colleagues. It turned out far better than I expected. All of my white associates are surprised at the agreement we have received and the logic and common sense we have gotten from [our] black colleagues. We have found that when they are working constructively within the confines of government, they are far more reasonable and responsible than when they are outside appealing to the electorate.

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