Meeting At Camp David

Considering the critical importance of the meeting confronting them, the three leaders seemed remarkably nonchalant. Jimmy Carter spent pleasant hours fishing in Wyoming, and Anwar Sadat went swimming in the Suez Canal. Though Menachem Begin stayed behind his desk in Jerusalem, he was working no more than his normal rigorous schedule. All this seemed a strange way for the leaders of the U.S., Egypt and Israel to prepare for the momentous summit conference that convenes this week at Camp David, the secluded presidential retreat in the Maryland hills. Observed one astonished diplomat involved in planning the meeting: "I expected frantic activity these weeks. But so far nothing's happening."

Despite the outward calm, the staffs of the three leaders have been busily working over the issues and options in the Middle East and preparing position papers for their bosses. By week's end Carter had received two black loose-leaf notebooks from his team of experts. They outlined, among other things, what would be "acceptable minimum" and "practical maximum" results on a wide range of problems. Begin's staff, meanwhile, had given him a pale blue folder titled "Possibilities and Recommendations," containing 70 pages of charts, documents and official statements on the Arab-Israeli conflict. And Sadat had been handed a sheaf of working papers drafted by his own special task force. The participants, moreover, are hardly strangers. Sadat and Begin have conferred twice; Carter has met Begin four times and Sadat thrice.

Still, there is an unsettling feeling that the Camp David summit has been somewhat ill prepared for. It is usually a firm rule of summitry that the participants arrive with a fairly clear idea of the outcome. Mostly, they ratify agreements that have already been worked out in intense negotiations by lower-level officials. Often even the concluding communiques are drafted before the parties formally take their seats. This tradition is designed to avoid the dangers of high-level misunderstandings and wounded national pride. But Camp David is unique; a high U.S. official calls it a "virginal experience." It is convening with very little joint preparation and no preliminary agreement. It lacks even a detailed agenda. Instead, as one of the participants remarked, "we're banking a great deal on chemistry leading to an evolution in the discussion."

This is risky, but perhaps inescapable--in view of the alternatives. Jimmy Carter last month called the conference only when he became convinced that the Middle East peace initiative, dramatized last November by Sadat's "sacred mission" to Jerusalem, was grinding to a dangerous halt, and that conventional diplomacy had found no way to renew it. And in the Middle East, stalemate generally contains the danger of increased terrorism or, ultimately, another war. Sadat has even hinted at October as a deadline when he would cancel the Sinai Disengagement Agreement unless there is some sign of progress toward peace. By promising to make the U.S. a "full partner" in the talks rather than simply a disinterested mediator, Carter determined to try to rescue the peace process by substituting his own initiative for Sadat's. The President has admitted that this "is a very high-risk thing for me politically." Indeed, no previous American President has assumed such a direct personal responsibility for resolving the Arab-Israeli dispute, which has erupted in four wars and taken 39,000 lives in the past three decades.

U.S. officials have tried, as usual, to prevent any exaggerated expectations of the outcome at Camp David. Said one: "There is no magic formula. On the basic questions, nothing has changed. There'll be no deus ex machina coming up with a great plan." In fact, even a modest success is far from assured. It will depend in large part on the stern and cantankerous figure of Menachem Begin--and on whether any mixture of pressure and persuasion can induce the onetime guerrilla fighter to lessen his intransigency and make at least some concessions for the sake of a settlement. The temperamental Sadat will have to make compromises too, of course, but the Egyptians are pinning their hopes on the perhaps illusory belief that Carter can influence Begin to change his course. Warned one of them: "If the U.S. is ever going to use its power to get a Middle East peace, there is no better time."

It would be hard to imagine a conference site more remote from the tensions of the Middle East than Camp David, a 143-acre aerie perched atop a 1,880-ft. hill in Maryland's Catoctin Mountain, 75 miles northwest of the capital. Franklin Roosevelt was so fond of sneaking off to his hideaway that he called it Shangri-La. There he and Winston Churchill planned Dday. Dwight Eisenhower changed the name of the retreat to that of his grandson David, and the new name later became synonymous with a thawing of the cold war. "The spirit of Camp David" derived from the 1959 summit conference between Eisenhower and the Soviets' Nikita Khrushchev. In all, 20 leaders of foreign countries have stayed there.

The retreat provides the privacy and intimacy that Carter seeks for the summit, especially if the "chemistry" is going to work. The camp is sealed off from the rest of the world by a fence topped with a double strand of barbed wire, and guarded this week not only by the usual contingent of Marines, but also by a squadron of U.S., Israeli and Egyptian special agents armed with submachine guns, shotguns and pistols.

The press is barred, except for a small pool that records the arrivals of the participants and some minor activities. The leaders are thus spared any barrage of questions. By general agreement, White House Press Secretary Jody Powell will handle the daily briefings, either at the White House or at the makeshift press center inside an American Legion hall in Thurmont, Md., the town closest to Camp David. But on some issues he may be joined by his Egyptian and Israeli counterparts.

Administration aides hope that the camp's facilities will encourage informal mixing. The presidential retreat offers tennis courts, a one-hole golf course, a bowling alley and a heated swimming pool. It is difficult to imagine Begin or Sadat working off tensions on the trampoline, but they may take to the nature trail that winds through the thick woods. For evening entertainment, Carter enjoys showing movies to his guests in Hickory Lodge, and both the Egyptians and the Israelis have expressed interest in westerns. (White House aides were joking last week that both would like to see How the West Bank Was Won.)

Begin and Sadat arrive separately at Camp David this Tuesday. The Egyptian President is arriving from Paris, where he was to meet with French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing to discuss the summit's prospects. At Andrews Air Force Base outside Washington, he will probably begreeted by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, who will escort him to the presidential helicopter for a 35-min. flight to Camp David's helipad. Vance is expected to remain at Andrews to meet Begin, who is due 90 min. later from New York City, where he was scheduled to spend two days resting and meeting with American Jewish leaders.

Carter himself will occupy the plush Aspen Lodge, which was extravagantly refurbished by Richard Nixon. Begin will stay in Birch house and Sadat in Dogwood, both located about 50 yds. from Aspen Lodge. The guests' "cabins" are similar, each with two large bedrooms, two bathrooms and a large sitting room with a fireplace. Cooks at Aspen Lodge are on 24-hr, call to prepare any dish the guests order, and they have a list of the two visitors' gastronomic favorites. Sadat, nonetheless, is bringing his own chef; the Egyptian leader is a health buff who carefully watches his diet. Kosher meals are available for Begin.

Some of the negotiating will take place in armchairs around the huge central fireplace in Aspen Lodge, where Nixon spent agonizing hours trying to construct a Watergate defense. Other sessions will be held less than a quarter mile up the road in Laurel Lodge, where the rectangular conference table has been replaced by a circular one. For these enlarged conferences, Vance, Vice President Walter Mondale, National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and other key officials will be available, as will the top aides of the two other leaders.

Carter is expected to chat with Begin and Sadat separately Tuesday evening and again Wednesday morning. The first time the three leaders sit down together is likely to be Wednesday afternoon. U.S. officials originally figured that the summit, though open-ended, would last only two or three days and conclude by this weekend. Now they think it may run at least through the weekend and possibly a full week.

The talks will not be slowed by the need for translation; Begin and Sadat speak excellent English. But one problem, in this gathering of a Muslim, Jew and Christian, is that their Sabbaths occur on different days--Friday, Saturday and Sunday respectively. This cuts considerably into negotiating time. While Carter will be ready to resume his diplomatic labors after Sunday-morning church services. Begin will not participate in talks from sundown Friday through sundown Saturday. It is uncertain how Sadat will observe his Sabbath, but White House officials hope he does not want to go into Washington to pray at the Islamic Center Mosque near the Egyptian embassy. Admitted an Administration official: "We want everybody to stay up there in the hills. We don't want any circus."

Carter invited Sadat and Begin up to the hills to revive the peace process. What, then, had gone wrong with Sadat's sacred mission? Many observers answer in one word: Begin. Warns a senior British diplomat: "Frankly, there's no chance of a Middle East peace as long as Begin remains Premier of Israel."

This may be something of an exaggeration, for Sadat has also dug in his heels and twice refused to continue talks. But Begin does seem to bear by far the greatest responsibility for the current impasse. Many U.S. officials feel that the Israeli leader does not really want peace on anything but his own terms. Perhaps it would be more fair to say that Begin considers his terms essential to Israel's survival and Israel's future--even more essential, indeed, than a peace treaty.

Sadat made an important concession to the Israelis by journeying to Jerusalem, saluting the Israeli flag and battle banners, standing before the assembled Knesset and declaring on behalf of his fellow Egyptians: "We welcome you among us with full security and safety . . . We accept to live with you in a permanent peace." That was tantamount to Egyptian recognition of Israel, which Israel has long demanded as a condition for reaching a settlement.

Begin's responses, however, have often seemed inadequate and at times rude. Speaking in January at a Jerusalem banquet for Egyptian Foreign Minister Mohammed Ibrahim Kamel, for example, Begin patronizingly referred to his guest as a "young man" who failed to understand the supposed parallel between the Palestinian desire for a homeland on the West Bank and the Nazis' claim to the Sudetenland. Later he brusquely dismissed the significance of Sadat's visit to Jerusalem by asserting: "We have existed, my dear Egyptian friends, without your recognition for 3,700 years. We never asked your President or government to recognize our right to exist."

The Israeli government, moreover, has pushed ahead with the establishment or expansion of its controversial settlements in the occupied territories, even though previous Israeli governments had acknowledged that most of these territories would have to be returned to Arab rule. Carter sent Begin three messages expressing his personal concern about the Israeli moves, and Secretary of State Vance stated that the Israeli settlements "are contrary to international law."

But Begin denied all suggestions that he was being belligerent. On the contrary, last December he submitted to the U.S. and Egypt a 26-point peace plan for the West Bank and Gaza, together with a promise at least to return the Sinai to Egyptian sovereignty. Washington judged the plan "a fair basis for negotiation," but did not fully endorse it. Instead, Carter asked the Israelis to explain what status they envisioned for the West Bank and Gaza at the end of the plan's five-year transition period. Jerusalem's vaguely worded reply merely promised that Israel would be willing to negotiate "the nature of the future relations between the parties" after the transition.

Israel's refusal to commit itself to eventual Arab sovereignty over the territories angered the Carter Administration and convinced a number of key U.S. officials that Begin was repudiating the professed willingness of past Israeli leaders to withdraw from at least major portions of the West Bank in accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, adopted in 1967.

By this spring, the old bitterness again inflamed relations between Egypt and Israel. Sadat did not help matters when he tried, unsuccessfully, to erode Begin's support inside Israel by meeting in Austria with Israeli Defense Minister Ezer Weizman, a Begin rival, and Opposition Labor Party Leader Shimon Peres. The Egyptian President also began sniping at his Israeli counterpart, asserting: "It is possible to establish peace in hours. The only obstacle is Mr. Begin."

In July there seemed to be some progress in Vance's talks with Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan and Egypt's Kamel at Leeds Castle in England. Then Sadat shook Washington by expelling the Israeli military mission from Egypt and stating that there could be no further talks with the Israelis until they agreed to evacuate all Arab territory.

The U.S. publicly criticized Sadat, saying that it was "very disappointed" by his action. The Israelis gloated that Sadat's moves showed that it was he and not Begin who was blocking a peace. The Administration disagreed. But it also worried lest the deadlock make Sadat and other Arab moderates vulnerable to radical demands for action; it is even possible that the Egyptian might be toppled or killed. And so Carter decided to gamble on a summit. Explains a top State Department aide: "We had to keep the momentum going to keep the moderates in."

The main issues still dividing Israel and Egypt are substantial. That is apparent in the differing proposals that each country has made in the past year (see box). Both Begin and Sadat declared on the eve of Camp David that they would stick by these proposals. Although the U.S. does not anticipate much flexibility in either side's opening position, it certainly hopes they will modify their views on some key points.

One of the easiest such points, perhaps, is the Sinai. Israel is prepared to let nearly all the area revert to Egypt, though it claims the right to maintain two military bases and several civilian settlements there. But even on this relatively simple matter, Sadat insists that he cannot sign a bilateral agreement with Jerusalem. He wants to link a Sinai accord with at least some progress (from the Arab viewpoint) on other fronts. By this he hopes to avoid charges that he is betraying the interests of other Arabs for the sake of a deal with Israel. Sadat thus has been trying to get Begin to accept a declaration of principles that at least sketches the framework of an ultimate peace settlement in Gaza and the West Bank. Their inability to agree on such a declaration was the main reason for the failure of last December's Sadat-Begin summit at Ismailia.

Sadat sees the declaration of principles as an essential step toward an eventual Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, because the declaration would, in effect, affirm Arab sovereignty over the lands. He said to the Knesset, "Our land does not yield itself to bargaining . . . We insist on complete withdrawal from these territories."

Begin, who repeatedly professes his willingness to negotiate about anything, has proved very elusive about any acknowledgement of Arab sovereignty over the West Bank. The only "concession" Israel has granted came at the Leeds Castle meeting. Instead of merely being willing to negotiate "the nature of the future relations" after a five-year transition period, Dayan said there, Israel would be prepared to discuss "the question of sovereignty." This minute change of nuance satisfied neither the U.S. nor Egypt. Sadat had by then concluded that Begin had no intention of signing a peace agreement and was determined to keep the Arab lands as part of "a greater Israel."

Israel understandably does not want to give up territory that it feels it needs for security. But the U.S. has long argued that it should be possible to satisfy Israel's security requirements without a full-scale Israeli occupation of Arab territories. And Sadat, for one, told the Knesset: "We agree to any guarantees you accept." Egyptian officials have indicated that they would even be willing to permit some kind of Israeli military presence on the West Bank for a limited time (perhaps up to ten years), if it did not undermine the principle of Arab sovereignty. Last week, moreover, U.S. officials let it be known that Washington might be willing to consider establishing bases and stationing U.S. troops as a safeguard in the area. Begin rejected the idea. Said he: "We do not want any United States troops or United Nations troops, because we ourselves will protect our own people."

There are suspicions, however, that security is no longer Israel's sole reason for trying to hold on to the lands it conquered eleven years ago. The fiercely devout Begin has introduced a troubling religious factor into the argument by maintaining that events related in the Old Testament give Israel a historic claim to the West Bank. He even insists on calling the region by its Biblical names of Samaria and Judea. He declared to the Knesset: "We did not take strange land; we returned to our homeland. The tie between our nation and this land is eternal."

Linked closely with West Bank sovereignty is the issue of the Palestinians' right to self-rule. Israel is adamantly opposed to an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, and so it objects to unrestricted self-determination for residents of these areas. Israelis fear that a Palestinian state would be controlled by the Palestine Liberation Organization, a group that not only commits acts of terror but also is on record as calling for the destruction of Israel. Says Dayan: "Self-determination for the Palestinians means for us the destruction of the state of Israel in stages."

Egypt and the U.S. may not be very far from the basic Israeli position. Washington and Cairo insist that the Palestinians have "legitimate rights" --something Jerusalem has yet to accept--but neither Sadat nor Carter is enthusiastic about creating an independent state that would be politically, militarily and economically unstable. When the two leaders met last January in Aswan, Carter merely stated that the Palestinians should "participate in the determination of their own future." Sadat later approved this notion, which falls far short of self-rule. An Israeli-Egyptian compromise on this issue is therefore possible.

This summit meeting may be the most trying test Carter has had of his ability as a negotiator and reconciler. Sitting on the porch of Aspen Lodge, overlooking the pool, he will try to dispel the suspicions and antagonisms that have built up between Sadat and Begin. Said one top Administration official: "It's not so mechanical as in a strategic negotiating session. A lot stems from human qualities and reactions. The introduction of ideas depends on intuitive insight."

Carter will need all the intuition he can muster to smooth over the sharp and often irritating personal differences of his two visitors. Sadat is an emotional and visionary leader who at times sounds so mystical that Israelis snidely refer to him as sitting upon "his pharaonic throne." Preferring to deal in broad strokes and principles, Sadat quickly tires of the legalistic details that are often essential to translate a belief into a program. The Israeli Premier is no less visionary, but he is also a product of the Talmudic tradition. He almost seems to revel in analytical disputations about minutiae.

Not surprisingly, Begin and Sadat did not really hit it off well during their meetings in Jerusalem and Ismailia. They certainly tried to be as friendly as possible; in Ismailia, for example, Sadat even got behind the wheel of a car and personally drove Begin around the city, pointing out sights. But despite the efforts, the two have had great difficulty communicating. Their misunderstanding of each other's statements on such issues as the status of Israeli troops and settlements in the Sinai has led to bitter recriminations.

Because of this, Carter plans to be present for all sessions between the two, although he certainly will not object if they want to meet privately. Said one U.S. diplomat: "They can be awfully antagonistic when they're alone together. They've talked without note takers and there's been tremendous confusion and misunderstanding later about what was said and who meant what. We hope we can avoid a repeat of this by channeling all direct contact through Carter." One problem is that while Carter is fond of Sadat, he does not much like Begin, whom, he feels, has been less than candid.

Carter, of course, will not only have to moderate the personality differences between Begin and Sadat but he will also have to bring the two closer together on the major substantive questions. To pick the moment and choose the issue for his interventions in the discussion, he will need a masterly sense of timing and nuance, a quality that he has not yet definitively demonstrated. He may be helped by the powerful mystique of his office. Explained one Administration aide involved in the summit: "There is something unique about the position of the presidency, and both the other guys know it."

The President is not planning to put any overall American proposal on the bargaining table because that would probably lead to cries of an "imposed peace." But if other efforts fail, he may issue a declaration describing U.S. "ideas" for a comprehensive peace. He much prefers, however, simply to make suggestions on crucial points and try to steer the talks toward a balanced outcome.

In the key issue of Arab sovereignty vs. Israeli security, for example, he will try to nudge his visitors into trading Israeli concessions on the West Bank and Gaza for Egyptian compromises on Sinai and security for Israel. This could prompt creative talk about such concepts as Israeli phased withdrawals in return for confidence-building good will gestures by the Arabs. Further discussion could attempt to define which Palestinians would participate in the West Bank's administrative agencies and what Egyptian measures might strengthen Israel's security. The Administration has become increasingly sympathetic to Israeli security needs and recognizes that some long-term residual Israeli presence in the occupied territories may be required. Carter will also press Begin for a much clearer idea of the status he envisions for the West Bank after the five-year transition period that both sides agree on.

The result of this bargaining, Carter hopes, will be a formula calling for the transfer from Israel to moderate Palestinians of authority over the West Bank and Gaza. While these Palestinians will enjoy some self-determination, they will not be able to turn their area into an independent state, at least not for a predetermined and rather lengthy period.

Carter will also be watching for openings that can lead to a separate Egyptian-Israeli peace. Begin would welcome this--he calls it a "permanent partial peace"--but Sadat has always balked, fearing a backlash from the other Arab states. While U.S. officials doubt that the Egyptian can be coaxed from his position, one Administration staffer advised: "We'll have to see if Sadat's resolve slips."

At times Carter may find that the two other leaders are willing to consider his suggestions even though they have previously rejected very similar ideas. Or so, at least, run the hopes of some Washington experts. Explains Joseph Sisco, President of American University and former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs: "Each side likes to camouflage a concession, and it's easier to say yes to Carter than to a proposal from the other side. The concession then bears U.S. markings and not those of the enemy." If, in fact, Carter asks the Israelis to relent and accept the declaration of principles that Sadat has been demanding, there is a good chance that they will do so if the statement is given some new name like "framework for negotiations" or "set of guidelines." That way it will not seem as if Begin is giving in to a Sadat demand.

On the other hand, there may come a moment at Camp David when Carter finds that his suggestions and proddings are not having any effect. At this point, the President may offer to involve the U.S. more directly in the Middle East if that will ease some of the anxieties afflicting Begin and Sadat. The U.S. could, for example, sign a defense treaty guaranteeing the existence of Israel. Or the U.S. could contribute troops, if Begin changes his mind, to a U.N. force that might be stationed in Sinai, Gaza and West Bank buffer zones. Another possibility would be to send U.S. civilians to man strategic monitoring stations in the West Bank, just as some 200 Americans now do in the Sinai. Finally, the U.S. might be willing to establish an air or naval base in Egypt or Israel. Not only would this dramatically symbolize the American commitment to the area's stability but it would also provide the U.S. with an enhanced strategic reach at a time when the U.S.S.R. has been increasing its activity on the rim of the Middle East.

Carter will offer direct U.S. guarantees only reluctantly--and, preferably at the end of the bargaining process, in order to conclude a deal. He is in no rush to dispatch G.I.s to patrol a truce, a step that has no certainty of congressional backing. Potential opposition on Capitol Hill, moreover, is not the only limitation on what Carter can propose at the summit. If he presses Begin too hard, he runs the political risk of alienating influential American Jews. Last October, for example, when the U.S. and U.S.S.R. issued a statement on the Middle East that displeased Israel, the White House was inundated with 7,268 angry telegrams and 827 phone calls in just four days. On the other hand, Carter also cannot ignore Sadat's primary protector, Saudi Arabia. Washington has carefully cultivated a close relationship with the Saudis, and they have supported U.S. interests by blocking sharp increases in the price of oil and supporting the international role of the dollar.

Sadat and Begin, of course, also negotiate under constraints. While the Israeli leader currently enjoys widespread popularity at home, his ability to make concessions seems limited by his narrow ideological outlook and his three decades of uncompromising rhetoric. As for Sadat, he can scarcely afford to dismiss Saudi Arabia's opposition to a separate Egyptian-Israeli peace. The Saudis, who fear that such an accord would isolate Egypt and weaken the force of moderation in the Arab world, provide Cairo with lavish handouts (roughly $1 billion per year).

But Sadat is also under pressure to show progress toward a settlement. Otherwise he will disappoint his people, who are weary of recurring wars and have enthusiastically supported his peace initiative. This is an especially bad time for him to risk a drop in popularity; after his country's students return to their campuses next month, leftist radicals and Islamic fanatics are expected to try to launch a campaign of public disorder.

With the negotiators under such constraints and the problems confronting them so difficult, is there much chance of Camp David succeeding? The answer to a large extent depends on the definition of success.

A great success, in the opinion of U.S. officials, would be for Begin and Sadat to agree on a set of principles outlining: 1) a settlement of the territorial issues of Sinai, Gaza and the West Bank and 2) satisfactory security arrangements for Israel. Serious problems, of course, would still remain to be resolved. But having the set of principles agreed on would greatly aid Sadat in persuading Jordan's King Hussein and eventually Syria's President Assad to join the negotiating process. As much as U.S. experts would like to see Camp David achieve this kind of success, they feel that there is little chance of it.

Similarly, there is only a slight chance, in the opinion of U.S. officials, of a catastrophic failure--a personal blowup, for example, with Sadat and Begin yelling at each other. Nearly as bad would be adamant Egyptian and Israeli refusals to consider any compromises; that could well lead to a rapid collapse of the talks and adjournment after only a day or two.

The most likely outcome, in the view of these U.S. experts, would be substantial clarification of several key issues: 1) the degree of autonomy the residents of the West Bank and Gaza will have during the five-year transition period; 2) the rights of the West Bank Palestinians after the transition; 3) provisions for Israeli security forces inside the West Bank and Gaza; and 4) the next steps in the negotiations. This would be considered a satisfactory success. If the participants, however, accomplish no more than agreeing to continue peace talks at a later date, high-level Administration officials believe the summit will have been a disappointment. The Egyptians agree.

A summit failure, of course, could create infinitely more serious problems. For one thing, a deadlock at Camp David would probably have a profound effect on Sadat. Most observers in Egypt think he would cancel the 1975 Sinai Disengagement Agreement. This could start a potentially disastrous chain of events. It might mean, for example, that the U.N. peace-keeping force and the U.S. observation mission would have to pack up and leave. Israel would probably respond by moving its forces into the vacated areas and reoccupying the Sinai's strategic Mitla and Giddi passes. The Israelis might even push as far as the Suez Canal. Hostilities, in some form, would be almost certain. If that led to another Arab oil embargo, the result would be economic catastrophe in the West.

Even if there is no new war and no new embargo, however, a major failure at Camp David would discredit moderation and encourage radicalism to spread in the Middle East. Moscow would have a new opportunity to increase its influence in this vital region.

Such grim predictions, according to some experts, are unwarranted. Counsels Sisco: "I've seen too many last chances over the years. Failure at Camp David would bring bad fallout, but I don't think that it would necessarily mean war. Both sides already have too high a stake in avoiding it."

Correct as this may be, it is undeniable that the situation in the Middle East will be much worse after a failed summit than before it. This is the great risk in convening the conclave without preparing for it in the meticulous manner of traditional diplomacy. The potential benefit, by contrast, is that Camp David could turn into a laboratory in which the Begin-Carter-Sadat chemistry really works, and the long-delayed movement toward a Middle East peace is restored.

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