Once More, with Feeling

Vance and Gromyko wrestle over their most complex problem

On almost the eve of what had been regarded as a promising arms-control conference between Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, Moscow last week suddenly issued a chilling announcement. It said that Anatoli Shcharansky, 30, a computer expert and Jewish human rights activist who has been accused of spying for the CIA, would stand trial in Moscow early this week on a charge of high treason. If found guilty, he could be executed. On the same day that Shcharansky's trial starts, court proceedings also begin against another Jewish dissident, Alexander Ginzburg, 41, a leading member of a Russian group founded to monitor the U.S.S.R.'s compliance with the human rights provisions of the 1975 Helsinki accord.

Within an hour of the Moscow announcement, a State Department spokesman read a carefully crafted statement that had been personally approved by Jimmy Carter: "These trials will be watched closely in the United States. The fate of Mr. Shcharansky and Mr. Ginzburg will be an important indicator of the attitude of the Soviet government [regarding] ... the constructive development of U.S.-Soviet relations."

Ever since Shcharansky's arrest 16 months ago on what Western experts regard as baseless spy charges, the U.S. has made it clear that his continued imprisonment constituted a blatant violation of the human rights that the Carter foreign policy seeks to protect. Not only has Vance urged Moscow not to press the charges, but Carter took the unusual step of publicly denying that Shcharansky had ever been a CIA employee. He thus committed his personal prestige to a declaration that the Soviets now propose to challenge in a Moscow court.

The timing of the Soviet announcement baffled U.S. officials. Some speculated Moscow might have been hoping that with attention focused on this week's Vance-Gromyko meeting in Geneva on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), the dissident trials would be spared the glare of international publicity. Others wondered whether the Kremlin was deliberately testing the Carter Administration's policy of not linking the Strategic Arms Talks with other events. It seemed certain, in either case, that the trials could not have been scheduled without top-level approval from the Kremlin. Said one State Department aide: "If the Russians wanted to make this difficult, they sure have found a way."

The fate of the Soviet dissidents will undoubtedly be added to Vance's agenda for his sixth meeting with Gromyko in 16 months. Other matters that are sure to be discussed will be the latest developments in the Middle East, the continued Soviet intervention in Africa and the mounting harassment of American citizens in Moscow. Vance will give Gromyko a personal message from Carter addressed to Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev, warning that the Shcharansky and Ginzburg trials could injure U.S.Soviet relations. Carter has already ordered a review of all U.S.-Soviet cooperative agreements to find ways to dramatize U.S. concern about the case, and Vance formally announced that Presidential Science Adviser Frank Press would not, as previously planned, attend the sixth annual meeting of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission on Scientific and Technical Cooperation in Moscow. A three-member environmental delegation also canceled an imminent trip to Russia. Vance said he "deplored" the coming Soviet trials as a violation of "fundamental principles of justice."

Although U.S.-Soviet ties have been cooling for some months, the Administration has tried to insulate the SALT process from other controversies. Thus there is a chance that Vance and Gromyko will still be able to devote most of their time in Geneva to arms limitation, which Vance insisted last week was "in our national interest." Since SALT first convened in Helsinki nine years ago, progress toward curbing atomic arsenals has been frustratingly slow, and there has been no ban at all on offensive weapons since the SALT I ceilings expired last October.

A number of small moves in the past few months, however, have indicated that a SALT II accord may finally be in sight. As Carter said at his last press conference, "Negotiations are going along very well," and "we are making progress." Yet even before Moscow's unexpected scheduling of the trials, U.S. officials had carefully muted their optimism about SALT. Noted one Administration aide before he left for the talks: "We don't see Geneva as make or break. We're not talking about breakthroughs. It's part of a process."

Administration officials have good reason to be publicly cautious in their prognoses. For one thing, breakthroughs in the past have faded embarrassingly quickly in the face of continued negotiating deadlocks. For another, Washington does not want to appear too eager for an agreement lest that weaken its bargaining position with Moscow and later make it more difficult to win ratification in the Senate. As it is, Senate approval is far from assured.

Both sides so far have agreed that SALT II would have three parts. The first, detailed in 40 pages of a 50-page summary that Vance is taking to Geneva, would be a treaty running until 1985. It would prohibit both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. from deploying more than 2,250 strategic systems. Counted toward this total would be long-range bombers, such as the U.S. B-52 and the Soviet Bison and Bear; intercontinental ballistic missiles (iCBMs); and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. This ceiling, a far cry from the "deep cuts" that Carter requested a year ago, is only slightly below the 2,400 limit to which Gerald Ford and Brezhnev agreed at their 1974 Vladivostok summit. The proposed treaty would actually require no cuts in the U.S. arsenal of 2,150 strategic systems, but would call on the Soviets to dismantle about 250 aging, obsolete rockets; they have, in fact, already begun to do so.

Under this overall limit, there will be several subceilings. The total number of land-based ICBMs carrying the multi-warheads called MIRVS (multiple, independently targetable re-entry vehicles) cannot exceed 820. Such ICBMs plus MIRVed submarine-launched missiles cannot exceed 1,200. These land and sea missiles plus bombers adapted to carry the highly accurate cruise missile cannot exceed 1,320 (the U.S. long opposed the inclusion of its cruise-carrying bombers at all, but gave way on this point last autumn). The rest of the total quota can be filled by unMIRVed missiles or bombers lacking facilities for the cruise.

The second part of the proposed SALT II accord will be a three-year protocol, providing a temporary solution for the difficult matter of weapon modernization and improvement. Some new missiles will be banned, the testing of new systems will be limited and the upgrading of existing weapons will be controlled. While this will slap a few restrictions on the improvement of the Soviet arsenal, U.S. technology is the main target of the protocol. It is a device by which Washington will be able to accommodate some of Moscow's professed fears about the U.S.'s newest systems without having to restrict them for the relatively long period covered by the treaty. The U.S. will probably bow to Moscow's insistence and agree not to test or deploy a mobile ICBM, such as the MX, for the duration of the protocol. Yet the U.S. will be allowed to test rockets from a fixed base in preparation for eventual use in a mobile launcher. Similarly, Washington has agreed that it would not deploy land-and-sea-launched cruise missiles with ranges exceeding 360 miles and air-launched cruises with ranges beyond 1,500 miles; cruises with greater capabilities, however, could be tested.

Since the Pentagon has had no plans anyway to deploy long-range cruise missiles or the M-X over the next three years, it is questionable how much the protocol's restrictions would slow U.S. arms development. But if the limits run longer, the U.S. could begin losing the technological edge that so far has offset U.S.S.R. rocket-power superiority.

The third part of the agreement will be a statement of general guidelines for SALT III. It is here that the Administration intends to push for substantial cuts (as much as 18%) in nuclear arsenals and for tight controls on qualitative advances in weaponry.

Despite the considerable agreement on the shape of SALT II, a number of issues must still be resolved. According to one American negotiator: "Gromyko will open, as he does every time, by reiterating our errors and his country's munificence." Then the bargaining will begin.

At the top of Vance's agenda is the problem of the Soviet Backfire bomber. According to Moscow, this new airplane cannot strike the U.S. and return to its base without refueling and thus is not a strategic weapon and should not be counted against the overall ceiling of 2,250. If, as expected, the Administration accepts this reasoning, it will be sharply criticized by a number of analysts who argue that Backfire could eventually be upgraded to hit targets in the U.S. Washington is seeking some kind of written assurances that the aircraft will not be adapted for longer range or based within striking distance of the U.S.

Vance will also try to resolve problems with the timing of the accord. While both sides agree that the Soviets will have to reduce their strategic arsenal somewhat, it has not been decided how long Moscow can take to do so. The U.S. wants the Soviets to pare down to 2,250 strategic systems within six months after the SALT II pact is signed; Moscow would like three years to reach that number.

The timing of the protocol to limit technological development also poses problems. The U.S. argues that it should take effect retroactively, about when the SALT I ceilings expired, and should run until December 1980. But Moscow, which would like to keep the lid on U.S. technological developments as long as possible, wants the clock to start when the new accord is actually signed.

Still another difficulty involves the wording with which both sides pledge that they will not try to circumvent the terms of the accord. Although such a vow may seem superfluous, the Soviets could try to interpret it in a manner that would impede the transfer of weapon technology by the U.S. to other NATO members.

If Vance and Gromyko resolve a couple of the key problems that have been blocking SALT II, the remaining issues could be left until September, when Gromyko will be in the U.S. for the opening of the U.N. General Assembly. Should those talks succeed, Carter might meet with Brezhnev in October to work out the final details and initial a draft treaty.

But that would only conclude the Administration's negotiations with the Russians. Carter would then have to open negotiations with the deeply suspicious U.S. Senate. According to California's Alan Cranston, the upper chamber's Democratic whip: "It's going to be a tough battle, tougher than the Panama Canal treaties. If we had to take up SALT today, it probably wouldn't make it." Cranston notes that even advocates of arms control are reserving judgment on SALT II until they see the final shape of the accord. He estimates that roughly 40 Senators favor the prospective arms limitation pact and an equal number are undecided, while a hard core of 20 are opposed. It takes only 34 votes to block approval. Cranston feels, however, that with a good treaty, "the battle for SALT is winnable given the time to prepare for it."

Surveys of the public's attitude toward SALT are far from conclusive, depending partly on how the questions have been phrased. A recent Louis Harris poll revealed widespread backing (75% to 12%) for a new treaty. But another nationwide sampling, by the Foreign Policy Association, found that 21% of the respondents opposed SALT, with 32% approving it and 34% going along with the treaty unenthusiastically.

A number of factors explain the Senate's current coolness toward the Strategic Arms Limitation treaty. For one thing, any proposed accord with the Russians is bound to meet some resistance because of the widespread dismay at Moscow's recent behavior. Another problem is that the arms limitation process is paying a price for having failed to fulfill those expectations that it once raised. For all the years of negotiations, there is little evidence that the SALT talks have reduced either nuclear or conventional arsenals.

Much of the lack of enthusiasm for SALT, however, probably results from arguments, some of them persuasive, that the U.S. has consistently been getting the short end when bargaining with the Kremlin. Reviewing the partial draft for SALT II, Richard Perle, a strategic analyst for Senator Henry Jackson and perhaps the leading arms control expert (and critic) on Capitol Hill, complains that SALT II would be an unequal treaty. Says he: "The Soviets get more throw weight, more heavy missiles, more heavy bombers." Perle's indictment reflects the basic concern that SALT has strayed far from its original purpose of freezing the strategic balance so that neither Washington nor Moscow would be tempted or able to launch a surprise attack. By merely limiting the number of strategic delivery systems, with scant regard for their vastly differing capabilities, SALT has failed to stem a potentially ominous shift in the superpower balance.

The continued Soviet advantage in throw weight (the measure of a rocket's power to deliver warheads to a target) plus continued gains in accuracy could theoretically give the Kremlin the ability to destroy most of the U.S.'s land-based ICBMs while they were still inside their underground silos. Defense Secretary Harold Brown estimates that there could be a "substantial threat" to U.S. ICBMs by "the early 1980s." The U.S. has no missiles comparable in power to the 300 mammoth Soviet rockets, like the SS-18s, and both the Ford and Carter Administrations have failed in their attempts to negotiate a reduction in the number of them.

While the U.S. still enjoys a lead of 8,000 to 4,000 in the number of nuclear warheads it can deliver, one well-informed SALT critic points out: "Our superior number of warheads is only good if they survive an attack. It's pointless to say that our missiles are better than theirs. If theirs can destroy ours--and they can--they're better."

With SALT II slicing strategic arsenals only slightly, a significant cutback will have to await SALT III. In the meantime, even more exotic weapons are on their way. In the annual "Arms Control Impact Statements," released last week, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency hinted alarmingly at future "space wars" between the U.S. and the Soviet Union that would be waged with lasers and particle beam weapons. Whether the SALT process will ever be able to limit these devices is debatable.

There is even an argument that it is not worth the effort to continue trying to control strategic arms because SALT so far has accomplished little. Weapons output and costs, for example, do not seem to have decreased under SALT I. And certainly no treaty is better than a bad treaty. Still, it ought to be possible to negotiate an accord, in SALT III or IV, that would stabilize the nuclear balance and provide a high enough level of confidence so that both superpowers could finally brake their strategic arms efforts.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.