F-15 Fight: Who Won What

And now Carter must try to bring the antagonists together again

"What do we want to do with the Israelis?" cried Republican Jacob Javits of New York. "Sap their vitality? Sap their morale? Cut the legs out from under them?" Replied Democrat Thomas Eagleton of Missouri: "Better that we provide a means for the Saudis to defend [their oil] themselves than face the possibility of some day being forced to commit our own military forces."

So went an emotional and often acrimonious ten-hour debate in the Senate last week, the culmination of a month-long battle over Jimmy Carter's plans to sell 60 F-15 fighters, which are among the world's most advanced interceptors, to Saudi Arabia and 50 less sophisticated F-5Es to Egypt, as well as 35 F-15s and 75 F-16s to Israel. Then, after a subdued roll call that took only 15 minutes, the outcome was official: by 54 to 44, the Senate sided with the President.

The vote was a milestone. It was the worst defeat suffered in Congress by Israel and its U.S. supporters. It was an indication that the Senate now agreed with three successive Presidents that the U.S. should pursue a more evenhanded Middle East policy, one that protects Israel's security and supports its moderate Arab neighbors as well. It was also a hard-won and welcome victory for Jimmy Carter.

But some of the Administration's joy was offset by a growing concern that such battles between the President and Congress had to be fought at all. Carter, like his modern predecessors, resents congressional interference in U.S. foreign policy, particularly the post-Viet Nam laws that limit U.S. intervention abroad or the shipment of military aid to friendly governments resisting Communist insurgency. These restrictions in turn inhibit the U.S. in negotiations; by not being able to threaten the use of force, the U.S. loses its edge at the bargaining table.

Even as the President felt hampered in his authority to conduct foreign policy, he confronted a series of new challenges last week. In Ethiopia, government forces, backed by Cuban troops, opened an offensive against secessionists in Eritrea. In pro-U.S. Zaire, leftist rebels based in Angola stormed into the copper-rich province of Shaba. At breakfast with congressional leaders, Carter fumed specifically about his "frustration at having his hands tied" by the 1975 law restricting U.S. intervention in Angola.

Carter's frustrations can only increase in the days to come. This week Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko meet in New York City and Washington to try and narrow their differences in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, a prospective agreement that faces formidable opposition in the Senate. Next month Carter will begin an uphill fight in Congress to lift the arms embargo against NATO ally Turkey, which was imposed in 1974 following Turkey's invasion of Cyprus. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted 8 to 4 to retain the embargo, but Administration supporters will raise the issue again on the Senate floor.

While savoring their hard-fought plane-sale victory, Administration officials tried to play down its significance to both the winners and the losers. In capitals around the world, the Senate vote raised a significant question: How far had the U.S. modified its Middle East policy?

The official answer seemed to be: Not very much. Said Vance: "Our commitment to Israel is fundamental. It is unchanging. Israel can count on us for support as far as security is concerned." Reported TIME State Department Correspondent Christopher Ogden: "Providing the planes might not seem to be a desirable way of promoting peace, but the alternative, shutting off the Egyptians and Saudis, was worse. Administration officials felt there was an excellent chance of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's being overthrown if Washington did not back his portion of the plane agreement. They were also sure that rejection of the Saudi F-15s would have lost the U.S. considerable Saudi support."

There was certainly a sense in Middle East capitals that more than mere military hardware was at stake in the Senate. Declared Sadat: "The true value of the deal does not lie in the "number or types of planes approved but in overcoming a situation created by the special relationship between the U.S. and Israel."

Israeli reaction was predictably bitter, and much of the anger was directed at Premier Menachem Begin. Wrongly counting on Congress's traditional support for Israel, he opposed the sale of fighters to Saudi Arabia. Then, two days before the vote, he realized that he had miscalculated Israel's strength. Switching tactics, he directed his embassy to fight the entire package. But it was too late. Begin called the Senate's decision "a negative turn for the security of Israel." He added: "An attempt is being made to impose peace terms on us." Former Premier Yitzhak Rabin called the plane deal "the greatest setback for Israel in the U.S. since the Six-Day War," when the U.S. refused to put pressure on Egypt to end its blockade of Israel's water route to the Red Sea.

Some U.S. supporters of Israel reacted in similarly apocalyptic terms. "The bond of trust has been broken," said Democratic Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York. Jewish leaders reported a wave of bitterness among Jews across the country. "I'm mad as hell," said Rabbi Alexander M. Schindler, chairman of the 33-member Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations. More than 1,000 Jewish students from New York demonstrated outside the White House, some carrying coffins symbolizing "the death of American morality." To such charges, and to equally groundless accusations of anti-Semitism on the part of the Administration, White House Press Secretary Jody Powell retorted, with good cause, "If honest debate cannot be conducted among honest people without allegations of the basest motives, then our society is in sad shape."

Hardly had the Senate war ended before the peacemaking began. Top White House officials ordered that there be no gloating over the victory. Said Chief Aide Hamilton Jordan: "We take pleasure in winning but not in beating the group of friends that we had to beat." Immediately after the vote, Carter, Vance, Vice President Fritz Mondale and a squad of advisers began phoning scores of Jewish leaders to reassure them of U.S. support for Israel's security. Pledged Mondale later, at a dinner in New York of the American Jewish Committee: "Military assistance to Israel will continue regardless of any negotiating differences. It will never be used as a form of pressure against Israel."

Some Jewish leaders acknowledged privately that the plane deal will scarcely change the military balance of power in the Middle East, a view also expressed by Egyptian officials. Said one Egyptian political leader: "By the time we get the F-5E and have our pilots trained to use it, the craft will be obsolete. Meanwhile, Israel is getting F-15s and F-16s that it can use immediately. Who really won?" The Saudis will also receive F-15s, but a former top Egyptian official noted, "It will be another decade before Saudi pilots will be flying their F-15s effectively."

With the plane question settled, the Administration is now faced with the increasingly difficult task of getting the Middle East peace talks going again. Even before the Senate vote, Israeli Chief of Staff Lieut. General Rafael Eitan insisted that the country's defense required permanent occupation of the West Bank and Golan Heights. Said he: "The basic intention of the Arabs has not changed. They want to obliterate us." After the vote, Begin's ever firm attitude hardened still more.

To offset the effects of their defeat on the planes, Israeli officials were calling for action by Carter to get Sadat to reopen the peace talks, which were broken off in January. Insisted a senior Israeli diplomat: "Before the end of May, we have to have some dramatic gesture to help us. The Administration has to put the onus of peacemaking on the Egyptians and Saudis." Carter is not likely to go that far, but he is expected to take some action soon, perhaps this week. As a first step, he sent messages to Begin, Sadat and King Khalid of Saudi Arabia saying that now is the time to start bargaining again.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.