"People Want to See Coonskins"

The Secretary talks candidly about some of his biggest problems, his strongest hopes

Before leaving Washington for Africa and the Soviet Union, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance sat down over breakfast with TIME Correspondents Strobe Talbott and Christopher Ogden to talk about himself and the Carter Administration's foreign policy. The two-hour interview in the antiques-filled James Madison Room atop the State Department Building ended when Vance had to rush off for a final pre-Moscow meeting with Soviet Ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin. Excerpts:

His role as Carter's foreign policy formulator. I am very much at the center of the formulation of policy. Each President sets up [his] mechanisms. Some Presidents have turned this over almost totally to the Secretary of State. Other Presidents want to play a very active part in foreign policy. President Carter is closer to the second approach. He fairly regards the Secretary of State as the principal adviser on the development and certainly the implementation of policy. There has never been any major question in which he has not fully considered my views and given me all the access and time that were required. We have worked extremely closely together.

Vance's reputation for being excessively cautious. I realize that carries with it negative consequences, but the dangers of not being careful are much greater. I'm willing to take the negative consequences. I have seen too many serious things happen over the years when people spoke without being careful and then that changed the situation or it took a hell of a long time to get things back on the track again. [Saying too much] is much more dangerous, no question about it. Often I think I could have said things better. Being terribly cautious about how I phrase things sometimes [means] it has less impact than if I were more freewheeling. You have to balance the two, and I find it a little easier as I go along to be a little freer without being careless. I come to this from my training as a lawyer. You have to be damn careful. If you're loose with what you say, you may have lost the case. I am dealing with a lot of nations who are watching. Don't think they don't dissect every word. Every time you vary one word or one clause from the standard formulation, you get a rocket from each of the parties saying you've changed the position of the U.S.

On criticisms of the Carter foreign policy. The problem is that the problems we're dealing with are so immensely complex. Quick solutions are not possible. People expect immediate successes and when that doesn't happen, criticism is bound to follow. People have got to recognize that these are terribly difficult, long-term problems. You've got to give necessary time to work through them and not stick down a thermometer each week and say: What in hell have you done this week? This is true on Panama. I think we are going to get a Panama Canal treaty, but this has been a long, arduous process. You couldn't accelerate it. That takes time. The Middle East is another case. Although it may look like a stalemate at this point, really a great deal of progress has been made in the past year, and we will move forward. SALT--again, a long, arduous process, a tough row to hoe. But bit by bit, we have chipped away at the problems.

Opinion is very, very fickle. What people want to see is coonskins on the wall, and they don't see enough coonskins on the wall at this point. Perhaps there has been failure on my part in not sufficiently articulating on some of these issues the objectives and progress we have made.

On Carter's competence. I believe the President really has the competence to manage foreign policy. We have made mistakes, obviously. When you balance the mistakes against the failure to be able to point to successes, that then underscores or accentuates [the criticism]. If we had and could line up against that a number of successes, I think you would see much less of the kind of carping you do at this time. They're saying: What is it on this side of the ledger sheet that is positive? I say let's see how it looks at the end of this year. I think it will look very different. Let's look at it at the end of next year, the end of the whole first term. It's too easy to jump in and draw conclusions on the basis of too short a time span.

[President Carter] has the right instincts. Obviously you have to learn as you go along. We have all been learning as we go along. The tendency of a great many people who are politicians is that the easy thing is to take the optimistic view, to put a positive gloss on what is going to happen. I find with things as complex as foreign policy that is a very dangerous thing to do. You are a lot better off if you have lower expectations. When it comes about, that is fine. But to create expectations unless you are damn sure something is going to happen is a very dangerous thing to do.

On a Carter-Brezhnev meeting. When the two men eventually sit down together, they will get along well. Both of them are strong men and have similar dreams and aspirations about the most fundamental issues. Both really have a deep conviction that somehow we've got to stop the arms race, that this is fundamental to the survival of the human race. Neither one wants to see the world faced with the specter of a nuclear confrontation. Both are practical men. They can sit down as practical men across the table and deal practically with international political problems, with an understanding of the problems each faces within his own constituency. I just have a feeling the chemistry between the two will be good.

Relations with Moscow. There is certainly a sense of frustration at this point on both sides. The Soviets may find it difficult to understand some of the things we do. They don't like many of the things we stand for. The future is going to depend a lot on whether or not we can begin to make progress on areas of central importance. At the heart of this lies SALT. If we can eventually reach a SALT agreement, which I believe we can, that will begin to change the whole character of the relationship, put it on the right track again. A sound and verifiable SALT agreement is essential if we are going to move into a new phase in our relationship.

On negotiating with the Soviets. The Soviets are very tough negotiators. They strike a very hard bargain. They have very clearly in their minds what their self-interests are, and they will doggedly pursue those interests. Negotiating with the Soviet Union is a sometimes frustrating experience, but at the end of the road, when you reach an agreement, they stick to their bargains. In the past, where we've reached an agreement with them in which other parties are involved and one of their friends moved away from the bargain we had reached, I brought this to the attention of the Soviets and within hours, in the middle of the night, they corrected that situation, saying, our reputation is behind that agreement, this is unacceptable, and the situation is straightened out by the next morning.

The Soviets in Africa. I don't think they are deliberately trying to test the President. Their objective in Africa is to strengthen their position in a number of areas they believe to be of strategic importance, to strengthen their position in the Third World, where they see increasing power to lie. They want to have the greatest strength possible in relations with these countries. The U.S. is beginning to establish relations with the Africans where they believe we really do care about their future, that we want to work with them. That they can trust us is going to help us in the long run. This is one area where Andy [Young] deserves tremendous credit.

His relationship with Young. Andy has built a great deal of good will and confidence in the U.S. through his efforts in dealing with the African states. This is going to be very important to us in the future. [On Young's sanguine statements about the Cubans in Africa:] I just don't agree with Andy on that. He knows it. We have a very good relationship. I have great respect for Andy. He and I differ from time to time, and I don't hesitate to tell him when I think he's wrong, just as he doesn't hesitate to tell me when he thinks I'm wrong. If necessary, I tell him I am going to have to publicly disagree with him, which I do. But his instincts are excellent.

On apartheid. Apartheid must be condemned and must disappear from the scene. It is just morally wrong. Because it is morally wrong, and because it does deprive the individual of his dignity and his rights, it cannot last. It can either change by peaceful means or it will change by nonpeaceful means. That is why my feeling is that this is a subject that has to be attacked, and attacked immediately, because I think there still is a chance to change it by peaceful means, but I think time is running out.

On the need for a Rhodesian settlement. If some sort of all-party solution is not found soon, the chance will probably have slipped away. The result will be a very sad and dangerous one. Unless some way can be found to bring the nationalist leaders in to working together, we are going to end up in civil war and could end up with outside powers moving in to assist the parties involved and increasing the fighting and bloodshed. I am taking a hell of a chance on this [going to Africa] because if we don't, we are headed for a terribly serious situation. I think you've got to go the last mile. I want to go and talk about the consequences if we fail to get some common ground to permit free elections. Sure it's a risk, but it's a risk you've got to take. We are not tilting toward [Patriotic Front Leader Joshua] Nkomo. We've been saying: Don't load the dice in favor of anyone. We told that to the Patriotic Front, and we've told that to [Bishop Abel] Muzorewa and [the Rev. Ndabaningi] Sithole. We told all of them: Let's go. Let's have free elections where everybody can compete and let the people decide at the ballot box.

On Zbigniew Brzezinski. I'm very fond of Zbig, and we share a common view on most issues. We have differences of view from time to time and that is quite clear, but that's as it should be. It's good for him [the President] to have differences of debate among us. A different perspective with respect to the Soviet Union is the biggest set of differences. I believe it is essential we try to find common ground [with the Soviets]. I believe as long as we maintain the necessary military might and strength at home we shouldn't be fearful of everything they do and automatically accept the thesis of the worst-case motivations. One has to be more pragmatic about it.

On Henry Kissinger. I knew that being the Secretary who followed Henry was going to lead to inevitable comparisons, and we are just very different people. It really doesn't bother me. I consult him very frequently ... a couple of times a month. Henry has been extremely helpful. Henry has never failed, when I asked for him to come by, to drop everything and do that.

On trying to do too much. One of the things I said at the very outset was that we should not attempt to do everything at once, should try not to proceed by flurry but to decide what were the most important things to be done. I have found that the ability to do that is less than I thought because of the increasing complexity of dealing with problems. Take the whole set of north-south issues. Those were often ignored before. Now they're being faced up to. They're incredibly complicated. They involve economic problems, social problems, growing nationalism. You have a growing feeling among Third World countries that by solidarity they're going to be able to accomplish their goals. That makes negotiations a hell of a lot more difficult.

On being Secretary. I have a great deal of fun. I really do like to make decisions. I like to dispose of problems. I just wish to hell I didn't have to travel as much as I do. It does take me away from dealing with a lot of things I don't have enough time for. The traveling really becomes quite burdensome.

On how long he wants to be Secretary. One term is all I can take.

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