Can the U.S. Defend Itself?

Soviet military buildup worries leading U.S. defense experts

"We face a challenge, and we will do whatever is necessary to meet it." So vowed Jimmy Carter in a major statement on U.S. defense policy earlier this month. Exactly what needs to be done--and what will be done--is not clear, however. Even the nature of the challenge from the Soviet Union is in dispute. Every day, behind the doors of congressional committee rooms, experts argue about how much the U.S. must spend to protect itself and how these vast sums (more than $115 billion in the current budget) can be best used.

To analyze and explain these complex controversies. TIME invited five of the nation's leading defense experts (see box) to a daylong National Security Issues Round Table at the Time & Life Building in Manhattan. While the analysts represented some widely divergent views, they generally agreed on a number of key matters:

>The Soviet Union's continuing nuclear and conventional military buildup is increasingly ominous and may jeopardize the delicate balance of power that has deterred nuclear war.

>Disarmament negotiations like the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) may not be capable, by themselves, of preserving this U.S.-U.S.S.R. balance.

>The U.S. may be hampered by a lack of creative strategic thinking.

Dominating the experts' discussions --as indeed it does all U.S. military planning--was the specter of the Soviet nuclear buildup. In 1965 the U.S. enjoyed about a 4-to-1 lead over the Soviets in strategic nuclear missiles; today the Soviets deploy 1,477 land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMS), compared with 1,054 for the U.S., and the Russian lead in submarine-launched nuclear weapons is 909. v. 656. The main American advantages remain in its bombers (417. v. 140). the accuracy of its missiles and the number of warheads (9,000, v. 4,000). But many of these warheads may become vulnerable to destruction by a Soviet attack in the mid-1980s if Moscow improves and deploys large numbers of the SS-18 and SS-19 missiles that it is now testing. Declared William Hyland: "We are at a crossroads because of the trends in Soviet policy. The gap between our capabilities to gain some advantage by striking first and Soviet capabilities to do so seems to be growing." The gap is also widening in defensive deterrence, according to John Collins. The Soviets, he noted, stress civil defense and maintain an extensive antiaircraft network, while the U.S. does not. He added: "We repudiate strategic defense of the homeland and rely solely on an offensive deterrence."

Barry Blechman cautioned, however, that the numbers in themselves can exaggerate the Soviet threat. "Their military power is very troubling, and I'm not saying that we should discount it," he explained, "but I certainly wouldn't throw up my hands in despair and say that we will be on the losing end." The U.S. spends a great deal on readiness, for example. "We keep roughly half our strategic submarines at sea at all times, where they can hit their targets, but only about 15% of Soviet subs are on station." he noted.

Edward Luttwak was not impressed. Said he: "The fact that they do not stress readiness as much as we do may say something about their idea of who will strike first; readiness is only important for the side being surprised."

Responded Blechman: "Nonetheless, one should not think that a Soviet leader would lightly contemplate a first strike at our missiles. Even if he convinced himself that he could destroy 90% of our Minutemen, he would still be faced with about 100 of those missiles. In addition, we would have some 20 submarines at sea with another 3,000 warheads, plus our bombers."

But the main danger of the Soviet buildup is not that the Russians are planning some future Pearl Harbor. All the analysts agreed that the Kremlin's strategy is almost certainly less violent than that. Said Lieut. General Andrew Goodpaster: "By achieving nuclear parity, the Russians are protecting their nuclear flank to gain added freedom of action at other levels, such as political intimidation, deployment of conventional forces and so on." Added Collins: "Sun Tzu, the ancient Chinese philosopher, wrote that the supreme art of war is to defeat the enemy without fighting. Soviet nuclear advantage could put us in the position of having to back down in a crisis because we might conclude that we would have nothing to gain and everything to lose."

The fact that the Soviets are ahead or gaining in almost every category, noted Hyland, "may have no particular relevance to how a war is actually conducted. But the calculus will surely affect how we are perceived by our allies, the rest of the world and ourselves." During every U.S.-Soviet crisis in the postwar period, he noted, the U.S. has had a strategic advantage. The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 was a particularly dramatic example of the Soviets having to back down. But the Soviets could gain a similar strategic advantage by the early 1980s. That, said Hyland, would "make crisis management extremely difficult and dangerous for us."

In such potential crises, according to Luttwak, the U.S. may find that it does not "dare to use its nuclear weapons to offset Soviet advantages in conventional forces." As Luttwak imagined the scene, "Moscow could then say to the West, 'Gentlemen, we are superior in ground forces, we can take most of West Germany in 48 hours. You cannot checkmate that by strategic nuclear forces, for you no longer have superiority. Now we want to collect.' " And what will they collect? Luttwak speculated that while they would not actually occupy Western Europe, they would demand that it "show 'proper respect' for their wishes, perhaps using Soviet-Finnish relations as a model. This would be the 'Finlandization' of Europe. Of course, Western Europe is more powerful than Finland and would have more leverage."

SALT was intended to help avoid such a situation by establishing a mutually acceptable nuclear balance. But SALT has fallen far short of expectations, and there is little hope that it will substantially affect the arsenals of the two superpowers. The 1972 interim limit on offensive weapons expired last fall; progress on SALT II has slowed to a crawl. Observed Hyland: "On the Russian side, things are getting tougher." He thus cautioned against seeing SALT as "a vehicle for solving our strategic problems and achieving stability with the Soviet Union."

But not all the roadblocks to future arms accords will be the fault of the Soviets. Goodpaster said that one obstacle, for example, could be the attitude of America's NATO allies. While Moscow has been pressing Washington not to transfer cruise missile technology to other nations, the British, French and Germans seem to be counting on acquiring the accurate, low-cost cruise missiles. Goodpaster observed that tensions within NATO could mount if SALT starts dealing with issues like the transfer of technology.

While all the experts concurred that SALT negotiations were going slowly, most seemed to feel it would be worth the effort to continue trying to reach an agreement. But Luttwak criticized the whole concept of negotiating for arms limitation. Said he: "Without SALT, the two sides would still have to avoid nuclear war, just as they did before the talks. During the whole negotiating period, beginning in 1969, the Soviets have been expanding and modernizing their arsenal while we have been talking. Worst of all, SALT imposes mutual limits on technology, the key area where we are ahead."

This prompted a lively exchange:

Blechman: That is nonsense. We have gone ahead and modernized our ICBMS and our submarine-launched missiles. We decided against producing the B-1 bomber, but this had nothing to do with SALT.

Luttwak: Oh, no? Every time someone would come up with an idea for a weapons program to serve a military need of U.S. forces, he was told: "No, this military need is going to be dealt with in SALT. We will control the Soviet counterweapon. We don't need your system."

Blechman: How do you explain our doubling the number of strategic warheads during the period of the arms talks? You tell me, Edward, does that show self-imposed, unilateral restraint?

Luttwak: The programs doubling the warheads began in the mid-1960s.

Blechman: But these programs have been continued. Moreover, the SALT process symbolizes recognition by us and the Soviets that it is in our mutual interest to achieve a relatively stable relationship.

Luttwak: It is a mistake to assume that the Russians seek stability. In your kind of strategy, Barry, the word stability has a good connotation. But remember, the Russians still wish to change the state of the world and so, to them, stability is a frustrating obstacle.

Blechman: SALT, at heart, is a political question. Were the SALT process to collapse, the implications of an unrestrained arms competition would be extremely adverse for our political relations and the degree of tension in the world.

Although it was felt that it is still possible that a treaty could be signed this year, it would not impose significant cutbacks in Soviet and American nuclear arms. Such a treaty would, for instance, probably permit both sides to deploy about 2,200 nuclear-weapon launchers (including strategic bombers). Furthermore, it is not expected to cut the number of Soviet monster rockets, like the SS-18, which could threaten the U.S. Minuteman missiles. As a result, Washington is considering going ahead with the development of the sophisticated MX missile. The mobility of the MX, which may run on underground rails, will make it an elusive target for Soviet missiles, theoretically ensuring that it can survive to make a counterattack.

Even a comprehensive SALT agreement, moreover, would not check the Soviet Union's buildup of conventional arms. At sea, for example, the Red Fleet leads the U.S. Navy in major surface combat ships (230, v. 175) and attack submarines (234, v. 78); the onetime unchallenged U.S. superiority exists only in fixed-wing aircraft carriers (13, v. 0). Noted Blechman: "The Navy has had serious problems, and the shipbuilding program, with its long delays and cost overruns, is just one of them." Observed Hyland: "We no longer seem to know what we want the Navy to do: project power ashore far from the U.S. or keep the sea-lanes open. To do both may be too costly." In rare accord, Luttwak and Blechman emphasized the Navy's diplomatic and political value. Said Blechman: "The Navy makes our power known." Added Luttwak: "It's our only maneuver force."

On land, the U.S.S.R.'s conventional advantage is most dangerous in central and northern Europe. There the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact vastly outstrips NATO in military manpower (945,000, v. 630,000), tanks (20,500, v. 7,000), artillery (10,000, v. 2,700) and fixed-wing warplanes (3,525, v. 2,050). While an imbalance has existed for some time, the gap has been widening in recent years, increasing the doubts about NATO'S ability to repel an attack. Although that attack may never come, the possibility has important political consequences and therefore needs to be met by a credible defense.

Goodpaster explained: "The Warsaw Pact would have the initiative; it would choose the time, place, mode and weight of an attack. The key lever we have to dissuade it is our tactical nuclear-weapon systems based in Europe." But relying on tactical nuclear arms may be very dangerous. Using them in Europe, for instance, could quickly escalate out of control to a devastating nuclear exchange between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Warned Collins: "In the 1950s, when we had a strategic nuclear superiority, we probably could have fought a controlled tactical nuclear war. We could have said to the Soviets: 'Halt your actions or we'll eradicate your homeland.' But we can't do this any more because now they could respond: 'Get lost. Your homeland will go at the same time.' Almost immediately after invading, moreover, Soviet forces could be hugging West German cities. Would NATO dare use tactical nuclear weapons to root them out?"

More promising may be the improvements in the precision-guided U.S. weapons, like the so-called smart bombs that are literally steered to targets by television, laser beams and other means. With their pinpoint accuracy, they could stop many of the Soviet tanks that would spearhead a Warsaw Pact invasion. Although the critical guidance mechanisms of these new devices still do not work well when bad weather or smokescreens limit visibility, Collins was certain that "we will solve these and other problems, and the Russians know it." He feared, however, that "if we are going to have a crunch with the Soviets in Europe, it's likely to be in the early 1980s before we have perfected the new weapons."

Hyland had a more basic proposal: increasing the U.S. forces on NATO's front lines. "The Europeans on their own are never going to be a match for the Soviets. Thus we simply must fill up the gap and move five U.S. divisions to Western Europe to join the four we now have there. While it will cost a lot of money to build barracks, to set up the logistics and so forth, it would be one of the most effective things we could do. It would impress the Russians that we are serious about our commitment to Europe."

Luttwak conceded that extra divisions and new weapons would be helpful. But he suggested that NATO's conventional capability would be boosted more by changing its basically defensive strategy. His proposal: "Instead of responding to a Soviet push into West Germany by trying to contain the invasion all along the line, NATO could countermaneuver and penetrate into East Germany. Because this would guarantee that the enemy would immediately be hit where he is vulnerable, it might deter the attack." Yet this also would probably mean risking some West German territory, at least temporarily. Admitted Goodpaster: "You're not going to sell that to the Germans."

Criticism of NATO'S strategy was part of a broader critique of overall U.S. strategic concepts. Collins, for example, complained that "the No. 1 U.S. national security problem is the lack of creative strategic thinking. Without new strategic conceptualizing, we are not even sure that our defense policymakers are identifying the proper issues." Luttwak went further, speculating that Americans may lack the innate characteristics needed for strategic thinking. He argued: "Ours is not a culture oriented toward the accumulation and rational use of power. We have a kind of Anglo-Saxon, pragmatic penchant for separating problems into small pieces. But the essence of strategy is to look at all the pieces together."

But Blechman, interjecting, insisted that "there is a strategy and sense of purpose, and the U.S. Government generally has been following it." Trying to bridge these two positions, Hyland noted that while "America has had a strategy since 1946 or 1947--essentially containment --its current relevance is questionable." He said the U.S. had based its strategy on the notion that if it could limit the Soviet Union's imperial push for a period of years, that imperial impulse would die. "Unfortunately, this has not happened," he added. "We now need a strategy with military, political and economic facets for providing penalties and rewards for Soviet behavior."

Addressing the military aspect of such a strategy, Luttwak suggested "putting some more forces back on the East-West chessboard. We should not do it with pawns such as ground troops but with queens and bishops, like high-technology weapons." Agreeing with this somewhat, Hyland nonetheless wondered whether such a move would be politically feasible. He said that "we Americans do not like long, protracted struggles or conflicts. So we are constantly driven to find some simplistic solutions--SALT, detente and others--to the problem. But there is no easy or quick substitute for being prepared to confront the Russians when their aggressiveness creeps into areas we consider vital." Concluded Goodpaster: "You are right. This may be a kind of endless task. Thus we should not hold out the hope to the American people that the military threat from the Soviet Union is likely to fade."

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